Preface by Javier Solana
EU High Representative for common foreign and security policy

"Peace building and conflict prevention lie at the heart of the European Union's external action.

Helping the media in areas of tension requires patient, long-term commitment. The Union, also as a leading donor, should continue to support projects aimed at bolstering independent media in such contexts. The range of instruments it has developed over the years as a leading international actor means that it has a key role to play there.

It should also take this dimension into account in its political approach to conflict situations and in its crisis management activities in the field of the European security and defence policy.

When we tried to help civil society in the final years of the Milosevic era in Serbia, few measures were more effective than lending support to the independent media who were trying to do their job in spite of the dangers they faced. The informal network of European media corporations we put together then was able to deliver much needed support. Deutsche Welle, the host of this year's Bonn conference, was one of them.

In most of the crisis management operations the EU has launched since 2003, the media landscape has been an important factor. For instance, this was the case in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Last year, during the crucial election process the EU forces deployed in the Kinshasa area to contribute to creating secure conditions for those elections to proceed smoothly. The attitude of certain media - as is unfortunately too often the case - was a factor in building up tensions in the run up to the elections. Accordingly the DRC's media watchdog was an important player, which we encouraged as an important part of the transition institutions.

As we take on new missions, we are very conscious of the need to factor in the media dimension into our planning and preparations right from the start.

There is a range of crisis situations in which the local media need help or in which the media landscape has to be restructured. The Bonn conference has been successful at identifying the different categories of these situations in which the international community in the broad sense should intervene to support the media.

The European Union as an emerging global player has to consider the situation of the media as an integral part of its approach to crisis situations.

It cannot do it on its own. It should work with its partners in the international community and with non-governmental organisations. Hence the importance of building partnerships. The "Bonn network" is one of them, and it deserves support. I am looking forward to its fruitful development."
Foreword by Benita Ferrero-Waldner
EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy

In the context of its major contribution to development co-operation world-wide, the European Union is putting a strong emphasis on stability and peace-building. The promotion of human rights, democratisation, good governance - but also fighting poverty and strengthening the provision of essential services, like health and education - are part of our efforts to increase human security around the world. With the new Stability Instrument, we have enhanced our possibilities to react more quickly to a crisis situation, and to help affected countries return to a situation of post-crisis normalcy.

We all know that the media plays a significant role in both fuelling – and also in moderating – domestic and international violent conflicts and/or inter-cultural tensions. This book provides an introduction to the role of both traditional and internet-based media in conflict prevention, and documents more than 20 concrete cases, in which media assistance has been provided in order to prevent conflicts and/or build peace.

Following the Deutsche Welle’s conference on “Media in Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention – Rapid Actions and Co-ordinated Strategies”, held in Bonn on 26-27 April 2007, a number of tool boxes have been developed with a view to utilizing the media to prevent conflict and to build peace. International assistance can help address these issues through, inter alia, structural support to news providers and through promoting adequate legislation and regulation, which in turn should serve to strengthen the diversity, independence and social responsibility of the media. However; media assistance must also play into the dynamics of conflict prevention by combating hate speech, stereotypes or prejudices, and by providing necessary crisis communication channels, independent news reporting, and other important relevant media programming. By helping to increase the professionalism and capacity of the local media, we therefore aim to provide the foundation for sustainable peace and democracy.

Besides the useful tool boxes, the book provides a number of interesting perspectives on conflict prevention from the European Union; from major intergovernmental organisations - the UN family, the World Bank, OSCE, the Council of Europe; from non-governmental organisations; from research institutes; and from international broadcasters. Therefore, I believe that the book will become important reading for a wide audience, and, in particular, for donors and for intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations working with the media in conflict prevention and peace-building.

Moreover, I am pleased to see that a significant number of intergovernmental, non-governmental, media and research organisations - which are already working globally with media in conflict prevention and peace-building - have established a network for co-operation, rapid action and the development of co-ordinated strategies: the Bonn Network. This network should become an important partner for the European Commission in crisis response and long-term development work. I hope that the network will prove equally fruitful for its members and for other relevant international organisations and donors.

I very much look forward to following closely our future co-operation in this extremely important and interesting field.
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Introduction to media in conflict prevention and peacebuilding
Dr. Bent Nørby Bonde

Since 1989, with the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, nine out of ten violent conflicts have been internal and have often been rooted in resource or land disputes, but fought with strong references to ethnic, cultural and religious identities.

The mass media has played an increasing role in mobilising population groups behind their leadership in violent conflicts. In the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and many other countries, the local media have turned a blind eye to societal inadequacies and the political or economic root causes of conflicts. During the escalation of conflicts, the media have contributed to it by perpetuating prejudices, stereotypes and hate speech against other parts of the population using ethnic, religious or cultural identities as rallying cries.

As evident it is that media plays a significant role in inciting conflict and violence, it is also logical that media can play a constructive role in preventing escalation of conflicts or bringing about peace and reconciliation and addressing the root causes of conflict. Professional and responsible media in conflict areas is just one tool among other conflict prevention tools. It is, however, difficult to imagine that international support to improved internal dialogue, reduced radicalisation, improved respect for human rights, fight against corruption, or mediation in a conflict and monitoring of elections can succeed if the international actors have not decisively included the media in their strategy. For those working in other fields of conflict prevention and peacebuilding it is important to be aware of the media’s potential, and for the media practitioners it is necessary to use the insights from the other international actors.

In this chapter, we shall introduce the current thinking about the nature of violent conflict, conflict prevention, peacebuilding and other terms used by governments, practitioners, and theoreticians dealing with conflicts.

We shall also look at the phases of conflict, the international actors and the principal considerations when working actively with media in the prevention of conflicts, as well as models for designing the media’s constructive contribution to peace.

In Chapters 2 and 3, we shall look at twenty cases in which international organisations have helped media in conflict areas to play a role in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. With these practical examples, we have developed toolboxes which can be useful in conceiving and creating strategies for media intervention in a number of scenarios. The toolboxes were discussed in detail by the 77 international organisations taking part in the part in the conference on Media in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding – Rapid Actions and Coordinated strategies, Bonn April 26/27 2007.

In the second part of the book, we bring several significant essays from international organisations about their principles for working with media in peacebuilding or conflict prevention, and about their perspectives on a collaborative approach to these efforts. These essays are mostly based on presentations from the conference in Bonn. Finally we introduce the Bonn Network and, next year’s Global Media Forum in Bonn.

Causes of Conflicts
To explain why conflicts occur, the American researcher Michael E. Brown analysed all thirty-five ongoing internal conflicts in 1995 and found a combination of pre-disposing and proximate causes, also called root causes and triggers. From the thirty-five cases, Michael E. Brown extracts twelve pre-disposing causes which make it more likely that a region will fall into violence. Similarly, he identifies a list of triggers.

**Economic/Social factors:**
**Causes:** Economic problems, discriminatory economic systems, economic development and modernization.
**Triggers:** Mounting economic problems, growing economic inequities, fast-paced development and modernization.

**Cultural/Perceptual factors:**
**Causes:** Patterns of cultural discrimination, problematic group histories.
**Triggers:** Intensifying patterns of cultural discrimination, ethnic bashing and propagandizing.

**Structural Factors:**
**Causes:** Weak states, intra-state security concerns, ethnic geography.
**Triggers:** Collapsing states, changing intra-state military balances, changing demographic patterns.

**Political Factors:**
**Causes:** Discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics, elite politics.
**Triggers:** Political transitions, increasingly influential exclusionary ideologies, growing inter-group competitions, intensifying leadership struggles.

The distinction between pre-disposing causes and triggers also reflects the structural and dynamic factors behind the conflicts. This distinction is very useful when we look at the scope and goals for media support. It is easy to see that media plays very efficiently into the dynamics of conflict, whether it is in intensifying patterns of cultural and ethnic bashing or as a tool in political power struggles. Consequently, a goal for international media assistance might be to ensure a better balance and professionalism within existing media, or to support new and independent media.

In many conflict areas, the media have neglected to report on structural inadequacies and root causes posing a threat to the stability of the country. The reasons may be lack of editorial independence, the media’s loyalty to certain population groups, lack of professionalism, and other reasons which should be targeted through international assistance. Obviously, any long-term strategy for peace and conflict prevention should seek to eliminate the root causes.

Equally necessary is to identify and understand the triggers to a given conflict in order to help the media deal adequately with the issues and do it in a professional and de-escalating manner. A solid understanding of the dynamics surrounding the violent conflict phase, as well as a rapid reaction to the triggers improve the chances of preventing open conflict or, post-conflict, of re-establishing relationships and starting a move towards sustainable peace. A coherent media strategy should neither focus exclusively on the removal of root causes, nor solely address the triggers to conflict, but rather combine the two in a coherent and comprehensive strategy.

When designing the strategic goals and scope of media interventions, it is necessary to clarify the desired outcome after the conflict has ended.
If we strive for **Conflict Settlement**, the conflict is understood as a problem of the political order and status quo. By settling the conflict, order is restored and, if possible, a zero-sum situation is changed to a positive-sum outcome. Conflict Settlement works at the Track I level, being diplomacy and power politics at the official leadership level.

If we seek **Conflict Resolution**, the conflict is philosophically seen as a result of underlying causes of direct, cultural and structural violence. The conflicts are not based on negotiable interests, but on needs and fears. Consequently, conflict resolution is process and relationship oriented, non-coercive and unofficial. While accepting Track I activities, it also stresses the need for Track II activities with actors like civil society and middle-range leadership.

The **Conflict Transformation** approach also sees conflict as a result of underlying causes, but aims through process and long-term structural transformation efforts to overcome these forms of violence. It understands the conflict from human needs and non-violent action perspectives and effectively combines Tracks I and II activities with Track III, strengthening the capacities of divided/war-traumatized societies to integrate. The activities follow the continuum of short, middle and long-term involvement.

To find the best way to assist media, as we shall see, some of the important factors to take into consideration when analysing a conflict are listed below:

**Structural issues**
- **What are the root causes**
  - Economic/Social factors, Structural factors, Cultural/Identity factors, Political and regional factors
- **How is the media landscape**
  - Structure, Ownership, Distribution, Legislation, Media sustainability index, Capacity
- **What are the Identity groups and Social Communication**
  - Ethnic, social, religious, geographic identity groups, Private, public and social communication structures, Levels of media leadership, Civil society actors

**Conflict dynamics**
- **What are the proximate causes and conflict phase?**
  - Economic crisis, Structural changes, Minority bashing, Political power struggles, Phase of Conflict
- **How is the current editorial policies and media content?**
  - Editorial control, Journalist safety, Conflict escalating content, Journalists’ identification with the conflicting parties, De-escalating potential – media by media
- **How do the recipients use the current media content?**
  - Consumption of media, Trust in media, Perceived images of ‘others’ and mirrored images, and Appropriation of media messages by various identity groups

As we shall see in the following parts, there are a number of issues to consider when we based on a thorough analysis end up designing the assistance to media in conflict prevention and peace building. Some of them are listed here:

**Structural issues:**
• What phases are we working in?
  Conflict prevention, Peacebuilding, Conflict transformation

• What intervention areas are relevant?
  Media structure, Media legislation, Capacity and Institution Building

• How to reflect conflicting identity groups in future media structure?
  Media diversity, Common media platforms, Diversity of journalists, Capacity building, and Civil Society Organisations

Conflict dynamics

• What Conflict resolution goals are we working for
  Resolution of conflict issues, Re-establishing relationships, Reconciliation, Visions for future

• Support to Content
  Choice of media, Choice of programme genre, Content goal, Institutional and ethical Approach

• Content Identification
  Conflict issues and solutions, Confidence-building, Dialogue and reconciliation, Societal inadequacies and visions

The conflict cycle and the moment for prevention

Conflict prevention is a term with one meaning, but used to describe two very different approaches. It describes the attempts to avoid conflict in the period immediately before the outbreak of violence. In the immediate pre-conflict period, there is not enough time to remove the root causes of conflict, and conflict prevention efforts must seek to dismantle the apparent triggers to violence.

Conflict prevention is also used to describe the long-term processes of removing the systemic root causes – either for the first violent conflict or, in most cases, for recurring conflicts. More than 50% of ended conflicts recur within the next five years. Conflicts can be seen as cycles: from a peaking violent conflict, the stopping of violence and de-escalation of conflict leads to a peace which, unfortunately, is often taken over by the re-escalation of tensions, and again, peaking violence. If the cycle can be broken by removing the root causes, much has been achieved to prevent new conflicts.

Different organisations and countries use different definitions for their work in conflicts. The traditional definitions used by the UN to describe the use of diplomatic and armed intervention in conflict management includes preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Peacemaking is the process of establishing a truce or a peace agreement between the conflicting parties. Peacekeeping is the process of keeping the peace, often with troops. Peacebuilding is the consolidation of peace and ending of civil strife. Former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan later added preventive action, which addresses the root causes of the conflict and includes both short and long-term measures. By letting preventive action cover both the period before a violent conflict, and—should the conflict occur—the period after the conflict, the attempt is to gradually remove the roots of conflicts with continuous structural conflict prevention efforts. We use the term conflict transformation to describe both the process of re-establishing relationships and reconciliation between conflicting parties, and the long-term structural changes removing the root causes and transforming the conflict into a new
and lasting peace. An example of conflict transformation is the development of the European Union, which after two World Wars began sharing access to coal and steel while building a vision for a common community based on common interests.

In the following, we shall systematize the phases before, during and after a conflict with a particular view to an operational approach for international support to media in order to prevent violent conflicts and/or build peace. The potential fields for international media assistance in conflict prevention are Media Structure, Media Legislation, Ethical Standards, Journalists’ Capacity-building, and Media Content. In the following, we shall systematize the phases before, during and after a conflict with a particular view to an operational approach for international support to media in order to prevent violent conflicts and/or build peace. Though different phases offer different possibilities, it is very important to link short-, mid- and long-term strategies for media assistance. Depending on the context of the individual conflict, we can put media assistance on a timeline with the following phases after a violent conflict:

Distant Pre-Conflict
Years or even decades before an armed conflict erupts, the media can and should play a role in building awareness of the inequalities, injustices and imbalance of power or other factors which are the root causes for future conflicts. In conflict areas, this has seldom been the case in mainstream media. As illustrated by the case studies in Chapter 3, there are several cases in which the media have not paid adequate attention to the root causes of a later conflict. For various reasons, they have turned a blind eye to these problems, primarily due to the absence of genuine democracy with its corresponding developed civil society organisations and institutions. It is often possible to predict a regression towards violent conflict, even from distance.

Possible Interventions:

a. **Aim**: Remove the root causes for future violent conflicts through structural and systemic activities.

b. **Areas of Media Interventions**
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Media legislation
   - Ethics
   - Capacity building

c. **Local Actors**: Parliament, Government, regulatory bodies, broadcasters and print media, media, minority and human rights NGOs.

d. **Appropriate support activities**: Development of new content formats offering balanced discussions and necessary communication between citizens and politicians. Support to governments working for media structures balancing independent public service and private media. Legislative provisions for freedom of speech, access to information, independent regulation and broadcast license distribution. Self-regulatory mechanisms, advocacy, and civil society organisations strengthened. Independent public media educations and training institutions strengthened.

Pre-Conflict
In the pre-conflict phase, most media have built and fuelled prejudice against their adversaries. This is a phase during which the top leadership of governments, opposition parties, independence movements or threatened minorities seek to gain control over the media. The media institutions are a scene for internal fighting
between professional management and journalists on one side, and staff obeying the political will of the top leaders on the other. This was the case in Rwanda, in Yugoslavia and in several other countries. In this phase, it must be the goal of international media interventions to support genuine media ideals like impartiality, diversity and objectivity. Often, this can be done by combining capacity-building, advocacy and the increased involvement of local media representatives in international cooperation.

Possible Interventions:

a. **Aim:** Through monitoring and dialogue, to revitalise positive relationships between conflicting partners and to find practical solutions to issues of conflict.

b. **Areas of Media Interventions:**
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Media legislation
   - Ethics
   - Capacity-building

c. **Local Actors:** Media NGOs, broadcast and print media, media councils and ombudsmen.

d. **Appropriate support activities:** Development of content formats focusing on dialogue about conflict issues, different cultural perspectives and possible common solutions. Strengthen common media platforms, building on cooperation between media representing the different conflicting parties, or with an inclusive approach. Strengthen and ensure all legislative provisions for media independence, freedom of speech, and transparent license allocation through technical assistance to governments, and public authorities. Enhance capacity to produce news and other professional journalism with diversity, balance and impartiality, reflecting all parts of the population. Strengthen self-regulatory mechanisms, advocacy organisations, professional and public awareness about media ethics. Train journalists and editors in impartial journalism and coverage of conflict issues.

**Immediate Pre-conflict**

In the immediate pre-conflict phase, all significant media are either under the total control of the vested parties to the conflict, or have been harassed and closed down. The space for questioning the top leadership in its conflict building record is either minimal or non-existent. Media is creating moral panic by spreading prejudice, stereotyping and hatred against the “others.” Some media are even actively encouraging popular participation in killing. It is impossible for the population to rely on any media as neutral in this phase. Intervention must either, through cross-conflict self-regulatory means, prevent media from broadcasting and distributing conflict escalating journalism, or the interventions must have the shape of reliable, trustworthy, alternative sources of information outside the control of the top leadership. This phase calls on multilateral actions also to make conflict-escalating media aware of the risk of being held accountable to the International Criminal Court. Another approach to prevention could be a self-regulatory press council on conflict journalism, possibly with a regional dimension.

Possible Interventions:

a. **Aim:** To prevent outbreak of conflict through high-level negotiations, monitoring of human rights situation and protection of exposed identity groups.

b. **Areas of Media Interventions:**
   - Content
During Conflict
With the exception of communal conflicts in which public or national private media may try to either mediate or, at least, to balance the information, the phase during conflict leaves the domestic media completely untouchable. Too many things are at stake – both for the top leaders, the involved mid-range media managers and journalists, as well as for large parts of the population. It is hardly possible to change the media’s role in a de-escalating direction, and it is in this phase that the population is most blinded towards what is going on. The population has severe needs for humanitarian information as well as for neutral information about the conflict. This phase leaves a key role for multilateral organisations and other external actors to ensure the provision of relevant information. This can, by Security Council mandate, be delivered through existing media or through the establishment of their own media in and outside of the country of conflict.

Possible Interventions:

a. Aim: To stop violence through the provision of neutral humanitarian assistance and support to peace-making high-level negotiations.
b. Areas of Media Interventions:
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Ethics
c. Local actors: Civil society organisations – cross-conflict media councils, transmitters of humanitarian information.
d. Appropriate support activities: Help the production and distribution of independent humanitarian information and news. Link up niche media via Internet or satellite systems, or finance international broadcasters and cross-border broadcasters to provide the same sort of programmes. Strengthen the role of civil society organisations to monitor media and advocate de-escalating content.

Immediate Post-Conflict (2-6 months)
This phase is often neglected by international donors and organisations dealing with media interventions. Everything is unstable, difficult and most likely without sufficient technical and management structures. But this phase is important for two reasons: the population is in dire need of humanitarian information and information about the state of the country, the top leadership and future plans, and it is also the phase in which all options are open, and during which the immediate short-term media interventions must be linked to the future design of media and social structures. The intergovernmental organisations have the legitimacy to intervene and should be
prepared to do so. Also, nongovernmental or media organisations should build capacity to act quickly in such situations, as has been the case in Afghanistan, Kosovo and several other places.

Possible Interventions:

a. Aim: To re-establish order and popular trust through humanitarian assistance, peace negotiations settling issues of conflict, reestablishment of relationships.

b. Areas of Media Assistance:
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Media legislation
   - Ethics
   - Capacity building

c. Local Actors: Humanitarian organisations, national broadcasters, other media.

d. Appropriate support activities: Actively lead and support production of humanitarian information and news on the political and crisis situation, as well as start up of programmes helping to re-establish relationships across conflict lines. Re-install transmitters and production equipment destroyed by war; immediately start cooperation with the public broadcaster and private mainstream media to build capacity and an editorially independent media. Agree on core principles for the media’s independence, license granting and public/private structures with the interim government. Capacity-building in production of public service and quality programming, as well as in professional and de-escalating conflict reporting.

Post Conflict Planning (½-2 years)

This is the phase in which the future media legislation, structure and management is negotiated and planned between local and international partners. It is also a phase in which it is important to re-establish relationships between the conflicting parties—both at top, middle-range and grassroots levels. During this phase, many national donors and media NGOs get involved in supporting the media, but experience has shown that it is usually done in an un-coordinated and haphazard way. Through intellectual leadership and strength in terms of resources, intergovernmental organisations should, in collaboration with the local authorities and media organisations, point the direction for potential international partners to take action. This phase should begin establishing a framework of national and international networks to increase the communication between media leaders on all sides. It is also crucial during this phase that media increase the mutual knowledge and understanding between the conflicting parties. There are several examples of projects in the toolboxes on, respectively, media strategies seen in a regional context, long-term support to re-structuring of media landscape, and programme genres, formats, ICT and target groups to re-establish relations and collaboration between adversaries.

Possible Interventions:

a. Aim: Reconciliation, social change and civil society networking across conflict boundaries.

b. Areas of Media Assistance:
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Media legislation
   - Ethics
   - Capacity building
c. Local Actors: Government, regulatory bodies, media, training and educational institutions, media-, human rights- and minority NGOs.

d. **Appropriate support activities:** Content collaboration across conflict groups, info- tainment and factual programmes supporting reconciliation, dialogue on a common future, and re-establishment of cooperation across conflict lines. Partnership building between local media, political leadership, and civil society on one side, and intergovernmental, nongovernmental and international media organisations on the other, with a view to establishing coordinated priorities and visions for future international support to development of the media landscape. Transformation of political principles into media legislation with international technical assistance. Continued training of journalists, editors and managers as well as assistance to the establishment of media advocacy organisations.

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**Post Conflict Peace-Building (2 -10 years)**

This is the phase in which the development of new visions and practical solutions to the root causes of conflict take priority. It is important to support a media structure which, in its content, raises awareness of imbalances that demand adjustment. It is also the phase in which the visions for a new common future could be developed with the media as an efficient platform. At the multilateral level, the actors must now focus on long-term development. Additionally, structures providing professional and stable media governance must be implemented. This phase is well represented by case studies in the same toolboxes as mentioned above.

**Possible Interventions:**

a. **Aim:** To diminish the root causes for future violent conflicts through structural and systemic activities.

b. **Areas of Media Assistance:**
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Media legislation
   - Ethics
   - Capacity building

c. Local Actors: Parliament, Government, regulatory bodies, broadcasters and print media, media-, minority-, and human rights NGOs.

d. **Appropriate support activities:** Develop formats dealing with root causes and solutions. Continue development of sustainable public service broadcasting and market based, private, high-quality media, as well as professional media associations and joint infrastructures. Refine media legislation and its implementation as in regulatory bodies. Development of agreed upon professional codes of ethics and self-regulatory guidelines. Strengthen education/training for journalists, technicians, editors and managers, and develop in-house or association-based training programmes.

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**Transformation of Conflict Society (10+ years)**

In this phase, relationships have been re-established and reconciliation has taken place, but a sustainable peace needs to be assured. It is assumed that the role of all multilateral organisations working with media must soon come to an end. Professionalism and balanced media behaviour must be developed through international and local networks or organisations. It is important for the media to continue stimulating peaceful communications, to address divisive issues in society
that must be dealt with in a long-term perspective, and to stimulate development and debate about a unified vision for the future.

Possible Interventions:

a. Aim: To finally remove root causes and involve all society in the development of joint values, visions and systems through support to government, local and minority leadership and civil society organisations.

b. Areas of Media Assistance:
   - Content
   - Media structure
   - Media legislation
   - Capacity building

c. Local Actors: Regulatory bodies, legislators, government, media, media-NGOs and other civil society organisations.

d. Appropriate support activities: Help media to integrate into national, regional or international programme collaboration, and stimulate constructive interactive ICT. Advise on cementing a diverse and yet coherent media structure that reflects the interests of different minorities, while still providing common national media platforms. Advise on safeguarding media freedom, freedom of speech, access to communication means, and self-regulatory, responsible media. Integration of journalists, independent producers, editors and managers into regional or international capacity building initiatives.

Support to Content

International assistance to improve media legislation, media structure and common infrastructures often provide the largest long-term impact on the role of media in a given country, and, consequently, provide the best options to deal with the root causes of a conflict. Support to content often plays a crucial role in dealing constructively with the dynamics of conflict, countering that renewed violence is triggered, and contributing to the re-establishment of relations after a conflict.

The Canadian peace researcher Maire Dugan suggests in her Nested Paradigm of Conflict Foci that the immediate trigger of a conflict might be "micro-issues," but that in order to build a sustainable peace, it is necessary also to seek a systemic or structural change. However, Dugan accepts that it is difficult for the population to realize and understand the need for a systemic change.

Therefore there is a need first to seek to resolve the issue of conflict. But as the issue, particularly in protracted conflicts, is often embedded within a bad relationship over time, the relationship has to be reconciled. In practical terms, this might be through prejudice reduction, bias-awareness and confidence-building. While the conflict is mired in deep-lying structural and systemic inequities, the re-establishment of the relationship should be followed by efforts to change the general system. As this seems easier to suggest than to implement, Dugan adds a third, intermediate level – the subsystem, connecting the levels of issue, relationship and overall system. The subsystem consequently becomes a middle-range locus of activity connecting all other levels in the system. With the starting point in the issues of conflict and the actors directly involved, the subsystem level might attempt to remove the root causes for those directly involved, and in parallel, seek to find solutions for changing the system level.
If we seek to adapt the conflict resolution model to deal with media content produced and distributed across conflict lines in a post-conflict environment and in the prevention of continuous protracted conflicts, a model could look as follows:
**Issue:**

*Conflict Resolution goal:* To find a solution to the issue which triggers the conflict.

*Genres:*

News and current affairs should ideally report on the triggering issues from different perspectives and interview representatives of all sides on possible solutions. Debate programmes involving leadership, middle-range leaders or grassroots leaders from all sides discussing issues of concern and possible solutions. The leaders might also be held accountable to studio audiences or through phone-ins.

**Relationship:**

*Conflict Resolution goal:* The goal is to re-establish the relationship and take the first steps towards reconciliation through the reduction of stereotypes, prejudices and fear as well as the building of mutual confidence.
Genres:
Almost all genres ranging from magazines, documentaries, fiction, or entertainment to sports programmes can be used. In documentaries or magazine programmes, the key is probably to reflect the people behind the mirrored enemy pictures, to deal with differences or common characteristics in everyday life or culture. By capturing and presenting humanity behind the disintegrated identities, it might reduce prejudices and stereotypes. The same could be done through the use of irony and humour in soap operas and other fiction programmes. Another way of humanizing the de-humanized enemy could be through sports competitions or game shows.

Subsystem:
Conflict Resolution goal:
By connecting the levels of issue, relationship and system, the goal is to remove the root causes for those directly involved and to point to potentials for change at the system level.
Genres:
Magazines and documentaries can be used to look at the broader picture of structural, economic, social or political inadequacies which would need to be addressed as a step towards, ultimately, removing the root factors for conflict. As part of this process, it might also be feasible to produce content which takes a broad approach to each party’s interests and motives and the societal context behind the conflict. This would enable the broader population to discuss the causes and triggers of a conflict as well as to call/demand for changes in the system.

System:
Conflict Resolution goal:
Through a broader transformation of the society and its structure, the goal is to remove the root causes for future conflicts and to establish a joint vision for the future society across conflicting population groups.
Genres:
Besides investigative, historic or thematic programmes pointing to systemic weaknesses in society, documentaries and news programmes can discuss possible visions for the development of society. However, such discussions of the possible transformation of society are often lengthy processes lasting many years, the outcome of which would depend on the media’s ability to question existing structures and the exploration of new ones in society.

Support to content and to media in general raises important questions for international organisations, donors and implementers. Like transition from totalitarian rule to democracy, the post-conflict period is more likely to make a country vulnerable to the re-emergence of violent conflict. An international focus on freedom of speech standards is seldom enough to establish peace in an immediate post-conflict situation or prevent the outbreak of violence in a pre-conflict context. A stable and fully developed democracy with international standards for freedom of speech, access to information and other human rights is, however, one of the most important prerequisites for sustainable peace.

The temptation for international donors in crisis situations to produce content with certain messages or conveying particular policies is doomed to failure. This is partly because, as communication research shows, there is absolutely no guarantee that the recipients accept and appropriate such messages—and particularly not if their own reality is different from that of the conveyed messages. It is also partly because constructed messages or positive “propaganda” for peace hampers the credibility of
the local media and makes it difficult for the local population in the long run to believe that the media content is independent and free. If a journalist in one situation pursues one goal as peace, however important it is, s/he might be perceived as pursuing other special interests in the political life of a democracy. Therefore, it is important even from a short-term perspective to respect the editorial freedom and autonomous control over editorial content of publishers, broadcasters, editors and journalists of the internationally supported local media.

Particularly in news and fact-based journalism, as international actors it is important to maintain a careful balance between respecting the integrity of local journalists, while also helping to develop their professionalism and capacity to make sound, impartial and responsible editorial judgements. Less controversial than news programmes are fiction series, sports and entertainment. As we can learn from Toolbox 5, these programme genres can be highly efficient in setting the agenda for popular discussions and can contribute to reconciliation efforts between populations and increase awareness of the causes of conflict.
The following table reflects the phases of conflict and corresponding support to content, as delineated in the paragraphs above:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Distant Pre-Conflict</th>
<th>Pre-Conflict</th>
<th>Immediate Pre-Conflict</th>
<th>During Conflict</th>
<th>Immediate Post-Conflict</th>
<th>Post-Conflict</th>
<th>Peace-building</th>
<th>Transformation of Conflict Society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aim</td>
<td>Removal of root causes of the conflict.</td>
<td>Mediation between adversaries and solution of conflict issues.</td>
<td>High level negotiations, monitoring, protection of diverse identity groups</td>
<td>High level negotiations, humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance, re-establishment of relationship and state structures</td>
<td>Reconciliation, social change, civil networking between adversaries</td>
<td>Involve society in the development of joint values, visions and systems.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus of Content</td>
<td>Debating existing systemic weaknesses and visions for the future</td>
<td>Debating conflicting issues of concern to the adversaries and allowing access for all identity groups</td>
<td>Strengthening relationship between identity groups, discuss solutions to issues of conflict, and reduce stereotyping in media</td>
<td>Providing neutral humanitarian information and news about political and international development</td>
<td>Providing neutral humanitarian information and news about post-conflict and discuss solutions to the triggers of conflict</td>
<td>Re-establishing relationship through dealing with human life of enemies, providing common platforms for interaction, communication and cultures</td>
<td>Analyzing and debating economic, social, structural and political inadequacies, search for solutions and common visions for future society.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>Existing main stream, New local, Net media</td>
<td>Existing main stream, Community, Net media</td>
<td>Existing main stream, Community media</td>
<td>Existing niche, Main stream UN, International media</td>
<td>Existing main stream, UN, New local media</td>
<td>Existing main stream, Niche, Net, Local, Community media</td>
<td>Existing main stream, Niche, Net, Local and Community media</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Choice of Media
When developing strategies for media support in a given conflict area, it is important that the large international donors and intergovernmental organisations have a certain accordance on what future media landscape to support. In war-torn countries with a meagre market, it is undoubtedly most efficient to agree on certain priorities and avoid spreading funding and efforts too thinly.

Based on experience from different media in conflict situations, we can systematize media into three groups, each with its own characteristics, strengths and weaknesses:

- Government, State and Public Service media
- Commercial, Political and Religious media
- Non-profit and Community media

All three groups include Net-media as one mode of communication and distribution of information.

If looked upon in terms of impact, geographical coverage and potential de-escalating values, the most appropriate media for direct support are the public media. However, as they in conflict areas often are government or state controlled media international assistance should besides conflict prevention aim at developing them into genuine public service media, which generally have the following characteristics:

- Editorial independence from all political, economic and vested interests.
- Universal reach – transmitting to and received by all parts of the population.
- In its programming, it should cater for all tastes, interests and needs, provide quality, diversity and impartiality, take minority needs into consideration, as well as providing a common platform, strengthening national culture, identity and coherence.

What commercial, political and religious media often have in common is that few of them acknowledge a responsibility to society as a whole, and many believe that editorial decisions should mainly be based on the owners’ interests, be they political, religious or to maximise profit. However, particularly among the commercial media, but also among religious media, some seek to restrict direct editorial influence from owners by having internal structures and editorial codes protecting editorial independence. Consequently, they are generally able to maintain professional standards of impartiality and objectivity and deserve international support in these efforts.

Also, professional media independent from the state and owned by non-profit foundations, family foundations, public trusts etc. have a great potential for de-escalating the conflict. They offer alternative voices to the public media and deserve efficient support. Differing from public media, professional non-profit media often assume some of the social responsibilities as public service media. One obvious difference is that these media rely on commercial income and, consequently, are more dependent on their market share than is the public service media. Still, they give priority to impartiality, diversity and social responsibility. Examples of such
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media are Le Monde in France, the French-German Arte TV, the American New York Times, the Danish Politiken, Jyllands Posten, and several others.

Community, radical and alternative media might contribute to the establishment or re-establishment of a "social fabric" "made of responsible and empowered citizens that value the public good, demand transparency, participate in collective decision-making processes and cultivate local cultures." Professionalism meant as impartiality, objectivity and diversity are not important values and one should be aware that the use of the specific media – community, radical or alternative media – does not in itself guarantee that it will be used for the good in relation to conflict and peace.

Net media is an increasing factor in shaping agendas and influencing political decisions. Coupled with global and local civil society movements, community, radical or alternative media net media becomes still stronger actors – even in relation to non-wired societies. However, the diversity of these actors still makes it difficult to predict whether net initiatives will contribute to conflict de-escalation or escalation.

The choice of media must necessarily depend on an analysis of the specific country context and the relevant communication needs.

**Local Actors**
The American conflict mediator, John Paul Lederach, has analysed the local actors in conflict areas. He presents his analysis as a pyramid and distinguishes between the following three levels: Level 1, the top leadership, at the apex; Level 2, the middle range leadership, in the middle; and Level 3, the grassroots leadership, at the base. The model is widely used in European and other donor agencies working with peacebuilding.

The top leadership are the military, political or religious leaders who have high visibility and are concerned about the kind of press coverage given to their statements and the interests they represent.

The middle-range leadership is less visible and is freer to move in processes of peace making. Often they are known by the top leaders and are very knowledgeable about the mindsets and living conditions of broader sections of society. Therefore the middle-range leadership is important in any peacebuilding process. The middle-range leadership is very important because the have ties not only to counterparts across the conflict line but also have important vertical relations to the top leadership as well as the grassroots.

Level 3 is the grassroots leadership. They operate at the base of the society, which is characterised as having a survival mentality. The leaders are directly involved in local communities, are members of indigenous NGOs, officials in health or refugee systems. They know the fears of the population and, where it exists, the deep-rooted hatred and animosity on a daily basis. It is easy to work at the grassroots level across the conflicting societies, but it is also the level in which the impact of successful cooperation is smallest.
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Lederach’s model of actors lends itself readily to the media field and seemingly to both the pre- and post- phases of violent conflict.

At the top of the pyramid are those who politically are in control of media legislation, media structure and media content. In most cases, these are presidents, ministers of culture, government representatives, or political leaders from opposition, minority groups or local communities.

The middle range leadership is the director generals of public broadcasters, television and radio directors or editors-in-chief. For larger private broadcasters and print media, the same categories apply, as with the managers of regulatory bodies and administrative authorities responsible for implementing media legislation and regulation.

Finally, the grassroots leadership in the field of media would include leaders of human rights, freedom of expression, professional journalist and media associations, community media, local media and other civil society organisations. In larger media, the journalists, producers and editors can be seen as being in line with the grassroots leadership, being in touch with the needs, aspirations and feelings of the people, while also internally designing programmes to meet these demands.

The dynamics between the three levels can be important when designing media interventions. As long as we talk about interventions which are not forced upon the representatives of a given country or group, the obvious entry point would be the middle range leadership. The middle range leadership within the media will be influenced by the professional journalists and editors as a counter balance to the top political leadership. The middle range leadership within regulatory bodies and administrative authorities will equally be under the influence of media leaders, journalist leaders and the visible political leadership.

If international interveners stimulate a dynamic in which the middle range media leaders are open to cooperation with the journalist and editor levels, then the leaders will act as a defence against political interference, while the journalists and editors will be the mediators between the population’s aspirations and the actual possibilities within the organisation.

Ideally, international support should seek to facilitate a vertical dialogue and dynamic between these levels to ensure that the possible changes are rooted with all parties. Ideally the grassroots leaders from human rights, freedom of expression and professional media associations can be the external voices outside the media, which promote the agenda of independence and accountability of the media in the journey towards sustainable peace. Below is Lederach’s model on actors and approaches in peacebuilding adapted to media:
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Types of Actors

Level 1: Top Leadership
Military/political/religious leaders seeking high visibility in and control of the media.

Level 2: Middle-Range Leadership
Radio-/TV-directors, public administrative leaders, intellectual/religious leaders and relevant members of parliament.

Level 3: Grassroots Leadership
Journalists, producers and editors accountable to both leaders and the broader population. Responsible for formats, framing and production of content. Leaders of media NGOs, journalism schools, human rights organisations.

Media Approaches to Peace-Building

Loosen control, play down hostility and encourage de-escalating initiatives.

Provide practical solutions and infrastructure for media platforms and cooperation across conflict boundaries. Secure access and accountability to the public as well as codes of conduct.

Production of de-escalating programmes and articles on reconciliation, examining systemic inadequacies, possible visions and transformation of conflict. Strengthening of journalistic training systems, long term civil society activities in favour of human rights, access and freedom of speech.

Kommentar [OU1]: Maybe this is something DW can do: I widened the box because it appeared that some of the text at the bottom of the pyramid was difficult to read as it was over the dark blue. I love this model, by the way!
International Actors
The roles of the international actors providing support to media in conflict areas vary largely because of the mandates of the individual organisations. Each has its own strengths and limitations, which can be fully made use of through a comprehensive cooperation and coordination between these organisations.

There is a marked difference between what the UN-DPKO, DPA and DPI and other UN organisations can do in the media field before and after conflicts, and whether they work with or without a UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate. When the UNSC includes provisions for media and public information in its mandate to a mission, the mission has, in Chapter 7 mandates, the authority to ensure that the mandate is implemented in spite of possible local resistance. In very few situations, as in Kosovo and Bosnia, the UN and its international partner organisations have full executive powers. The UNSC can also delegate its mandate to regional partner organisations like the EU, OSCE or African Union.

In a number of other conflict or post-conflict countries, the UN has had to either work in tandem with the government or within the framework of peace agreements negotiated with conflicting parties. Such agreements could include provisions for monitoring indigenous media, controlling and restricting the media from hate speech, incitement to violence or similar acts, which are counterproductive to the UN’s peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts. The mandates and agreements could further ensure available media platforms for the distribution of public service announcements related to the UN’s mission and humanitarian needs in the country.

When organisations like OCHA, WFP, WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNESCO, the World Bank, EU, OSCE, AU and others work without a UNSC mandate, they do not have the authority to impose decisions on the local government, but work within the much broader general mandates given to them. This means that in many situations they are freer to work without direct consensus of the government or the leaders of the conflicting parties. These organisations have the option of working directly with civil society organisations, community, private and state media, and to do so with a humanitarian, human rights or development perspective.

The international media NGOs are a heterogeneous group.

One category covers the professional organisations, which guard the interests of their members and additionally sets standards for their professional constituency in developing and conflict countries. Amongst the professional media organisations are the International Federation of Journalists, World Association of Newspapers and the European Broadcasting Union. Local self-regulatory bodies dealing with professional checks and balances in reporting also form a core part of this group.

Another category is monitoring and advocacy organisations. They most often have human rights and freedom of speech as their central tenets. Consequently, the development or the conflict prevention perspective is secondary to the overall goal of freedom of speech or media freedom. From a simplified perspective, these organisations prefer the establishment of as many alternative voices as possible instead of emphasizing a social responsibility for existing media. Among these organisations are Article 19, the International Press Institute, the World Press Freedom Committee and, as defenders of journalists threatened in their press freedom, the Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters Sans Frontières. Through their funding, these organisations tend to operate relatively independently of
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policies of the nation states and also tend not to work with governments in the target
countries, but as watchdogs.

A third category is the media development organisations. These NGOs are all based on
a belief in freedom of expression as a fundamental principle to be observed for all
media support. Their aims are, however, through support to media to strengthen
democracy, conflict prevention, peace building or development, and as we have seen,
media freedom is only one possible tool to achieve the goals. Their range of activities
reaches from capacity and institution building to media policy advice, support to co-
productions and dialogue, as well as to the building of associations. Among these
organisations are IREX, Internews, Search for Common Ground, Equal Access,
Impacs, Free Voice, Press Now, Open Society Institute, International Media Support,
Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Panos, Medienhilfe, Hirondelle, and other
member based organisations. These organisations seek to operate and prioritise from
a professional needs analysis and strategy design, but are also dependent on nation
states as donors. Most of these organisations were established in the late 1980s or
early 1990s. There is often some overlap with the above category of monitoring and
advocacy organizations.

The fourth category is broadcasters, educational institutions and development
foundations without memberships. Among these are Radio Netherlands Training
Centre, BBC World Service Trust, Deutsche Welle Academy, FES, KAS, and the Danish
School of Journalism, European School of Journalism, FOJO (Swedish School of
Journalism), Radio France International, and others. Like the media development
NGOs, these organisations are based on a belief in freedom of expression and
primarily provide training and, in some instances, support to institution building,
media legislation or programme production. These activities can range from income-
generating initiatives to benefit their non-profit mother institution, to the promotion of
the public service concept and media pluralism. In all cases, they are able to draw
upon a large supply of permanent and professional staff and reciprocally, offer their
staff more variety in its daily work.

Cooperation and Coordination of International Media Assistance in Conflicts

As we have seen, there are different international actors, missions and goals, possible
strategies, areas of support, and project possibilities for the prevention of violent
conflicts and the building of sustainable peace in volatile regions. It is also clear that
the more coherence between the different polities, strategies and projects, the
stronger the coherence, comprehension and chances of success will be.

In principle, we can talk about three levels for coordination of international assistance
to media in conflict situations.

The political level is where intergovernmental organisations, like the UN, EU, AU and
others decide if they aim for conflict settlement, resolution, or transformation, and
where their members give priority to actions leading to government change, building
democracy, or political continuity. It is decided whether and where they will work with
a UN-mandate, with or against the local political authorities, and with or without
armed intervention. It is obvious that a common consensus among all national
governments invested in these political decisions is crucial to enhance the constructive
impact of all international efforts.
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The strategy level might leave some influence to all the international actors mentioned in this chapter. Which phase of conflict, what fields of media assistance, which media structure, and with which local authorities, media, institutions and NGOs shall we work? As the strategies depend very much on the interests of individual donors, this is a field in which more coordination is needed. More donor cooperation, guidance from the intergovernmental organisations, and solid knowledge and strategy development would be useful, based on professionals’ insights into specific conflicts and into the most promising use of professional media as part of conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies.

The project level seems most coordinated among international implementers, IGOs, NGOs, and donors, which often work together on concrete projects in a given conflict. At this level, coordination frequently also involves local authorities, media and media-NGOs to ensure the coherence and sustainability of projects. It is logical and right to have local actors as full partners, feeling ownership to the process of media development following a conflict. However, as it is difficult to believe that international actors always and solely have altruistic motives, it is equally evident that the local authorities, media, advocacy and media development organisations have their own stakes and interests.

One dimension in which cooperation definitely should be strengthened in the future is the linkage with other international conflict preventing support. It is difficult to imagine that international support to improved internal dialogue, improved respect for human rights, fight against corruption, or mediation in a conflict and monitoring of elections can succeed if the international actors have not decisively included a media strategy.

Cooperation and coordination – or lack of the same – will be illustrated in the many cases in the toolboxes. But it will also be discussed further in the second half of the book, where several significant international actors give their vision of the possibilities.
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Chapter Two

Toolboxes
- Shira Loewenberg

The concept of a Toolbox, as implied by the name, is an assembly of possible instruments—programmes, projects, initiatives and models—that can be considered when conceiving of a media intervention to address specific issues in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The Toolboxes outlined in this chapter are largely derived from case studies—listed in full in the following chapter—submitted by participants and panellists at the Bonn Conference on Media in Conflict Prevention and Peace Building – Rapid Action and Coordinated Strategies, and additionally rely on the resulting working group discussions and the conclusions offered by the working group moderators. Among other things, the Toolboxes demonstrate the creativity and flexibility required to overcome obstacles and work effectively in challenging situations, and may serve as inspiration for new media initiatives by providing guidance to media interventions and initiatives in the context of peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

The Bonn Conference working groups were established to discuss and develop Toolboxes for the following five categories:

1. Conflicts in which media strategies must be seen in a regional context – moderator Mark Whitehouse, IREX.
2. Conflicts in which the governments oppose international communication and media intervention – moderator Susan Manuel, UNDPI.
3. Media interventions in the prevention of imminent conflict and in early recovery – Cees Hamelink, Amsterdam University.
4. Long-term support to the re-structuring of the media landscape to prevent the recurrence of conflict and to strengthen democracy – moderator William Orme, UNDP.
5. Programme genres, formats, ICT and target groups to re-establish relationships, reconciliation and engender common visions between adversaries – moderator David Smith, Okapi Consulting.
The categories of the five Toolboxes are in many cases interrelated, resulting in inevitable overlaps of several relevant “tools.” The following box includes points that apply equally to all conflict situations.

**General Toolbox for Media in Peacebuilding and Conflict Prevention:**

- **Know the environment**—an international media player must thoroughly know the country it is planning to work in and to understand the needs of the population and of the environment, as well as the most appropriate media formats and vehicles to address those needs.

- **Root causes of conflict**—it is crucial to have a thorough understanding of the conflict, its root causes, and the competing interests of all involved parties, potential spoilers and external factors. In particular, there should be an understanding that in a conflict, there are often more than two parties involved. Without recognition of the complexity of the situation and of all of the motivations and issues that drive a conflict towards violent eruption, it is easy to make mistakes. The admonishment to “do no harm” is one that applies not only to humanitarian assistance, but to media development and interventions as well.

- **Assess and evaluate**—a thorough assessment of the media landscape, including media culture and infrastructure, is necessary. By taking these factors into consideration, and applying the most appropriate media strategy, medium, and methodology to achieve the desired goals, an international media organization may avoid foreseeable obstacles and improve its chances for success. Evaluations of programmes allow implementing organizations to obtain feedback on the ongoing success or failure of their programmes, and to modify strategies and operations accordingly. Without formal evaluations, initiatives are at risk of achieving little to nothing of their proposed goals, or even of causing, albeit unintended, harm.

- **Comprehensive media strategy**—the approach to affecting media in a conflict environment must be comprehensive. One cannot, for example, solely do the training of journalists to mitigate conflict or promote peace. One has to address endemic problems and structural issues in the media as a system and focus on that system as a whole—structure, infrastructure, outlets, associations, media law—in order to work effectively to prevent future conflicts.

- **Holistic approach**—since the media does not function in a vacuum, the roles of civil society and of other social and government structures in supporting media institutions and freedom of expression are also crucial. The media must not be an isolated peacebuilding initiative; rather, it should be part of an overall development package that the international community is providing to a region or country in a post-conflict phase or as a measure to prevent conflict from erupting. By building the media into a larger framework of peacebuilding—including the media with other initiatives and strategies on humanitarian assistance, health, governance, etc.—the entire effort will be more successful than if each sector of development were to
strategize and act independently. A holistic approach to intervention may prevent contradictory or counteracting efforts, and contribute to a unified and complementary approach that benefits all actors. Cooperation and, when possible, collaboration amongst involved organizations is needed.

- Collaboration and/or coordination—both a comprehensive media strategy and a holistic approach require good communication and the sharing of information between involved organizations and actors. Without good channels of communication and complementary strategies, the duplication of efforts is inevitable as is, amongst other things, the increased likelihood of working at cross-purposes, neglecting critical issues or populations, and the wasting of resources—material and human.

- Long-term—a long-term perspective is essential. Strategies should incorporate short-term results with long-term goals, and build the latter by laying the groundwork with the former. Even in crisis situations where short-term impact is the priority, interventions should, whenever possible, take a long view towards influencing the media landscape. Sustainability, too, must be considered early on in the intervention strategy and programme development process.

- Local involvement—international organizations should embark on initiatives very carefully and work with local partners whenever possible, and use local voices and media with the primary caveat being consideration for the safety of the local staff members and the local media partners. Individuals must not be put at risk by their involvement with the international actor.

- Unintended outcomes—organizations must be mindful of unintended outcomes. These may include empowering one segment of society to the exclusion of another, reinforcing economic or social disparities, and, albeit inadvertently, emphasizing divisions that create or intensify resentments. Another unintended outcome is "brain drain," to which intervening organizations may contribute. Skilled professionals, including journalists and media technicians, have the required skills and the incentive to leave their home countries for more lucrative opportunities. NGO and multilateral organizations may be keen to recruit talented staff and, with the advantage of their experience with the organization, will wish to deploy them elsewhere once international attention moves on, removing the necessary elements for programme sustainability. The "brain drain" phenomenon makes the post-conflict phase of recovery all the more difficult for struggling countries.

Toolboxes

1. Conflicts in which media strategies must be seen in a regional context

There is general consensus that all conflicts must be seen in a regional context. Even in internal conflicts, neighbouring states are almost always involved directly or indirectly, whether because of minority/majority populations across national borders, the harbouring of rebel groups, fleeing refugees, State security concerns, political interests, etc. It is rare, indeed, if not impossible, for a crisis inside a country to have
no regional implications whatsoever. Violent conflicts between two States destabilize
the neighbouring countries and by extent, the region. The dissolution of a single
country into many, such as the former Yugoslavia, is also a case where the regional
impact of the conflict must be considered.

Therefore, media strategies often benefit from having a regional perspective even
when targeting problems internal to one country. In a post-conflict environment, a
strategy should strive to reconcile previously hostile population groups within the
country of conflict as well as reaching out to the relevant populations in the
neighbouring countries. In so doing, it will not only facilitate the peacebuilding process
but also contribute to a climate where the recurrence of violent conflict and spread of
conflict becomes less likely. Strategies should encourage positive relationships among
populations and help to develop common visions for a shared future.

One avenue to achieving this goal is to recreate links and networks between media
outlets that may have existed before the conflict, or to create new ones that had not
existed before. The sharing of information and culture across borders may lead to
better communication and understanding and thereby contribute to the lessening of
tensions between communities, reducing the potential for violent conflict. Such cross-
border networks may also provide a channel for alternative or minority views to be
expressed openly in an acceptable manner.

Another point to consider when working in a regional context is to think of media
broadly; that is, the focus can be on more than news programming. For the purpose
of peacebuilding, regional co-production of programme types other than news and
current affairs, such as entertainment and edutainment, can address critical issues in
a palatable way, and are genres that in some regions may be more successful than
news programmes in conveying peacebuilding information and processes.

The creation of positive models for media throughout the region to emulate is another
critical tool. By supporting exemplary media in one country, one can help to set
standards for the region. Similarly, the creation of benchmarks for media actors and
institutions to work towards can be an important tool in developing the media in a
positive direction in a regional context.

Certainly, technology is a consideration as well. Strategies should take modes and
methods of communication into account when devising strategies of support and
intervention. For example, if the aim is to reach a grassroots population in a region
with low literacy, newspapers are unlikely to be the best medium to focus on. One
must be aware of matching the method to the message and to the target audience,
and look towards the future for ways in which communication is changing around the
globe—through the Web, blogs, SMS messaging and more—and make sure that the
media tools employed in a given country or region are most appropriate.

There is a significant role for regional and/or international organizations such as IFJ
(International Federation of Journalists), EBU (European Broadcasters Union), and the
AU (African Union) to play in regional media initiatives. Such organizations have
credibility and may be able to operate outside the context of a conflict because they
are perceived as truly neutral actors. Other organizations and direct representatives
or contractors of foreign governments may have their motivations questioned and,
thereby, face increased challenges and obstacles.

Finally, it should be said that despite the recognition of the importance of a regional
approach, the country focus of a media strategy remains critical. Although the conflict may be regional or have regional implications, the media are in general country-based and to work effectively with the media one must work intensively in the affected country.

2. Conflicts in which the governments oppose international communication and media interventions

The situation of a State government or regional authority opposing international media intervention is one that challenges the creativity and ingenuity of media practitioners to think “outside the box” in devising media strategies addressing the conflict environment and conflict-related issues. Under such circumstances, how can media initiatives be successful? What tactics may be used to achieve goals while complying with or circumventing restrictions? By thinking “outside the box” and examining a number of different cases, a spectrum of approaches may be considered when confronted with State government or governing authority opposition.

Transparency of intent and methodology is advisable whenever possible, for if the government is informed and can be convinced of the appropriateness and potential positive impact of a media intervention, its opposition may be averted, making any initiative infinitely easier to implement and more likely to succeed.

Flexibility is key; any media actor must be prepared to change plans in a volatile conflict situation. Large institutions such as the United Nations are big machines that have difficulty in this realm; other lither organizations may be better suited to responding to changing situations with flexibility. Especially in situations where the government is sceptical or suspicious of international media intervention, or unpredictable in its actions to allow or thwart international initiatives, the ability of an organization to change plans quickly is paramount to its efficacy and impact. Additionally, for the UN and its peacekeeping missions—often the largest media player in a given conflict zone—a prerequisite to effectively dealing with a recalcitrant government is a Status of Forces Agreement or a Security Council mandate that explicitly includes media initiatives or interventions, such as the creation of a radio station or use of existing broadcast facilities. Such clear statements have unfortunately seldom been included by the Security Council, but would be valuable for future UN media actions in regions of conflict.

In the international political arena, political figures and human rights advocates may emphasize that the provision of accurate information in any country or region (including a conflict environment) is not only important, but should be regarded as a human right. Information intervention thereby becomes a necessity, not merely a nicety. International documents on issues including freedom of expression and freedom of the press to which a government has signed on to should be invoked; these documents may be used to remind the opposing government of their international obligations. To avoid being shamed, a government may have a powerful incentive to change its policies. In this context, too, the goal should be to tie media intervention to other peacebuilding initiatives—emphasizing the importance of freedom of information as equivalents to the right to adequate health care, infrastructure development, and a functioning judiciary—media initiatives may be likelier to be included in an internationally agreed upon “peacebuilding package.” Media initiatives will thus not only be likelier to achieve short- and long-term goals, but it will also have greater leverage with the opposing government or authority.
Media institutions and programme practitioners may also consider training the government representatives themselves in their communications, in their dealing with the media and in running a press office. Such measures may allow the government to understand the media as a potential ally on important issues such as corruption, and thereby encourage it to loosen controls on the press.

The co-opting of local voices can be a most effective tool, for it can give local credibility to an international message. Often, the celebrity of a local individual can effectively counter government opposition. Local celebrities have the additional benefit of being able to bring information to the people in a way that is palatable to them, culturally appropriate, and over which the government has little control. In some situations, public support may weaken local government opposition. Additional consideration should be given to using alternative and potentially approvable methods of communication (i.e. street theatre, live music, cartoons) and content, (i.e. humanitarian information, drama, song), to get crucial information relayed to a target population.

Another consideration in formulating a media strategy is to negotiate with one broadcaster or local authority at a time, as was done in the mid-1990s in the UNTAES mission where negotiations with individual radio stations resulted in several complying with UN wishes without confrontation. In one case, it even led to a close collaborative relationship which provided tremendous benefits to both parties. The point is that initiatives may be implemented in increments; that is, opposition may be whittled away at by small gestures and agreements rather than taking on a government body or authority as a whole at a single moment.

Other tools include targeting Diaspora communities in neighbouring countries in order to reach people inside a given country of conflict. This was the manner in which a great deal of information was brought into Somalia in the 1980s and 1990s. Another option is not to ask, but simply to broadcast and deal with the consequences if and when they come. This was a tactic used by the UN in southern Sudan, where it had the permission of the government in southern Sudan but did not ask for permission in Khartoum.

International organizations should not fall victim to self-imposed restrictions that assume a once opposing government must always remain so; a government may be convinced to alter its views by results that show a positive impact on media institutions and information flow while not threatening government interests. Evaluation results may be able to show value to an uncooperative government and thereby overcome its obstinacy or trepidation regarding media intervention.

A more forceful solution to government opposition is broadcast jamming, used to counter "hate media." It is a tactic commonly invoked but seldom used, for among other side effects, it is likely to provoke a strong response from the government and escalate matters in the political arena. Sanctions by the Security Council may be effective in certain circumstances where incendiary messages are being disseminated, and should be considered before jamming. The threat of the ICC (International Criminal Court) is also a useful tool to use against governments that directly disseminate or indirectly support the broadcast of incendiary media targeted at civilian populations. The sentencing of individuals responsible for inflammatory media messages in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide attest to the power of the ICC to indict and convict those using the media for nefarious ends.
The case studies illustrate how government or authority opposition was contended with and addressed with varying degrees of success. The diverse contexts and natures of the conflicts and of the involved governments give some indication of the complexity and uniqueness of every conflict situation, and of the ingenuity required to deal with media issues in each.

3. Media interventions in prevention of imminent conflicts and in early recovery

The aim of media intervention in the context of conflict prevention is more accurately described as the prevention of the escalation of conflict into violence. Conflict can be a positive attribute of a healthy and diverse society, allowing for ideas to clash and intersect and thereby produce cultural innovation and advancement. A society at peace successfully manages conflict, and prevents it from turning violent. It is when conflict turns deadly that the results are overwhelmingly negative, impacting the lives and livelihoods of future generations. Even when localized, deadly conflict has the potential to spread, destabilizing neighbouring communities and threatening regional and global security. The goal of international intervention is not to eliminate conflict altogether—an impossibility, and undesirable even if it were an achievable goal—but to provide tools for conflict to be managed and to prevent it from turning deadly. It is within this framework of semantics that elements to be included in the Toolbox may be identified.

An important consideration is the nature of international involvement with a local media actor. As important as local partnerships are to the legitimacy and ultimate success of a project, the intervening international actor must realize that involvement with a local media institution or group may inevitably create a reality where, albeit inadvertently, it becomes part of the conflict or developing crisis situation. An international actor must insert itself into a situation well aware of the potential consequences.

That said, an organization should not be dissuaded from involving local media actors in initiatives in order to engender change from within. When local media organizations are supported and act collectively, their impact is strengthened. Additionally, all levels of media actors should be considered in programme design and desired impact; for example, media managers and owners as well as journalists should be included in capacity-building and skills training programmes.

Related to this is a consideration for the viability of practicing newly learned or developed skills and the safety and security of partners, employees and programme participants when designing strategies and implementing programmes. For example, a training programme for journalists in an environment where they will not be employed, where they will not be able to practice what they learn because of institutional or government restrictions or where they will get killed is not a sensible programme to implement, regardless of its noble goals. Strategies must be grounded in reality.

Capacity development should always be context-specific and situation sensitive. In conflict prevention, needs assessments are needed so as not to presume that what the international organization is prepared to provide is actually relevant or appropriate
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to the culture and region targeted. Audience surveys or impact studies are critical tools to gain this understanding before embarking on programmatic initiatives.

An international media monitoring system is an important tool in preventing violent conflict from erupting or re-emerging. An alert system can draw the international community’s attention to acts or messages that are inflammatory, as well as sounding a warning of impending violence if external actors do not intervene to prevent it. The International Criminal Court, too, can come into play as a threat to those that violate international law with incendiary use of the media.

Donors must be made aware of the importance of funding projects in States where conflicts have not escalated into violence of a massive proportion. Ironically, it is usually once a conflict is full-blown into people killing each other on a massive scale that the international community and donors get excited and act. Getting donors to recognize the urgency of acting in a pre-conflict phase should be a priority of all media institutions and organizations active in the field, for acting in a preventive capacity has many advantages, not least of which is the saving of human lives.

The Toolbox must include moral courage to act when action is needed. Moral courage is not uninformed action, but includes the recognition that there are situations where media support is so urgent that long-term strategies and considerations of sustainability cannot fit into the planning phase, and may in fact not come into play at all.

Finally, it is wise to recognize that sometimes things go wrong despite the best of intentions. Media actors need to have an exit strategy.

4. Long-term support to re-structuring of media landscape to prevent recurring conflicts and strengthen democracy

Long-term support inevitably leads to the question of sustainability. Certainly, support of media development in the form of restructuring of media institutions, media legislation reform and development of good journalistic practices requires a supportive infrastructure, so the issue becomes one of the sustainability of the society, the economy and of (democratic) governance in general. Without the larger development framework, development specific to media cannot exist and be sustained; it cannot develop and thrive in a vacuum.

The question of media sustainability may be unfair in an environment where economic self-sufficiency is not probable in the short- to mid-term. There may be environments where the international community must be prepared to provide long-term assistance to the media. Also, a role for overt or indirect subsidies—private, national and international—should not be discounted. Questions of sustainability should not be framed solely by the viability of the marketplace. In many countries where international organizations are active, as in sub-Saharan Africa, the public sector is strongly dependent on international assistance. In these countries, the private sector, too, is supported by loans and grants from multilateral lending institutions like the World Bank and regional development banks.

Providing multiple layers of professional training and development to the media—from journalists to management—are important tools to affect change, strengthen institutions of democracy and prevent the recurrence of conflict. Training only
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journalists does not address the larger issue of providing for their institutional support; if better trained journalists are not able to practice their profession, are not supported by their editors and management, the training will have no visible result. This point links directly to the next regarding coordination and collaboration of efforts among implementing actors.

Coordination of efforts is something everyone agrees should exist. There is no question that effective coordination would go a long way in preventing the duplication of efforts, needless competition and the wasting of resources. Despite the promise of potentially very positive results of coordination, very few actors would agree to being coordinated by someone else. More realistic a goal may be cooperation, which may imply less central control, but equally promotes the sharing of knowledge and information amongst media actors. Collaboration, too, may be a model to apply to long-term strategies, bringing together organizations that may apply their different strengths, different goals, and different initiatives to target the shared larger aim of media restructuring and conflict prevention.

Donors must be educated on the necessity of long-term commitments and investments in media development. Currently, there is a problem of very short-term project cycles attempting to address inherently long-term development problems. These projects cannot succeed. An additional problem regarding donors is the tendency of donors to concentrate on the “newsworthy” crisis of the moment, and move onto the next crisis long before the issues that led to the first crisis are adequately dealt with and real reform and restructuring are underway. A region may go through several cycles of international interest and investment, with conflict abating and re-erupting accordingly, as in Haiti. The Balkans were once crowded with development organizations and money; today efforts are concentrated on the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, but tomorrow the public’s attention—and the donors’ money with it—may move to a different region of the world.

Finally, as elucidated in the overarching Toolbox that applies to all conflict situations, working in tandem with other peacebuilding initiatives is vital to the long-term efficacy of programmes aimed at restructuring the media and strengthening democracy in countries emerging from violent conflict.

5. Programme genres, formats, Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and target groups to re-establish relations, reconciliation and common visions between adversaries

In media intervention, the ultimate goal is to get accurate and reliable information to a target audience. The methodology for doing so, whether it is through training, capacity-building, institutional development, legislation, strengthening of civil society, journalist associations or direct programming, is determined by the particular context, environment, media culture and access. A limited notion of “information programming” had for many years concentrated on news-based programmes, which in many environments proved to be less than effective in meeting programmatic goals. In recent years, a more creative approach has allowed numerous genres to flourish and to work on delivering much-needed information using storytelling, music, drama and theatre in conflict and post-conflict zones. Often, these non-threatening approaches are more appropriate and, therefore, more effective in working with governments, as well as gaining wide support in the population. Additionally, such programmes may offer a voice to all parties to a conflict, thereby potentially reducing
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overall tensions.

The question, initially, for organizations involved in programme development, production and support with the aim of establishing or re-establishing relations between adversarial parties is how to deliver the content—the message—in a way that is acceptable to the often belligerent local authorities and of interest to the local populations. Experience points to the use of storytelling using a locally informed format, such as a radio soap opera, that is already familiar and palatable to the audience to get messages across in situations where straight news and current affairs would not be likely to be permitted by the authorities.

It is vital to create a well-liked product. To do so, it is advisable to use local staff to the greatest extent possible. An added benefit of using local staff is that it makes the removal of the programme more difficult. If the programme creates stars or popular people that the local population esteems, the government will be forced to listen. And if those stars are removed from their position, or if the programme that is a vehicle for their celebrity is removed, it will be noticed by the public and the government will have to contend with a public outcry.

Funding, especially long-term funding, is a challenge. Conflicts have a history and, in many cases, post-conflict problems may last longer than the conflict itself. Sustainable solutions require long-term effort. Donor involvement from the initial phase of programme development may be advisable to ensure that the donor organization is well-informed and truly a stakeholder in the process and outcomes. With involvement, a better understanding of the necessity of a long-term commitment may result. A “donors Toolbox” may be advisable.

Cultivating like-minded local authorities can be important for sustainability. Importantly, other aspects of the media environment, too, that will allow an initiative to be self-sustaining, such as media legislation, journalist associations, the viability of a media market, etc. must be developed in tandem with programme content initiatives.

The role of Information Technology and Communications (ICT) in programming varies dramatically according to the available structure in the target zone. While programming available as a podcast may be popular and accessible in certain areas, basic infrastructure like electricity and its availability is a key concern in others. Organizations must keep an eye on ICT developments, be mindful of the popularity of certain communication technologies in a given region, and adapt accordingly to provide the programmes via the most suitable methods.

ICT training is generally considered to be best delivered on-site, taking advantage of local conditions on the ground and using relevant technologies. Training in optimal conditions (outside the conflict zone, often in the home country of the implementing organization) may lead to disappointment for the trainees when they return home to difficult conditions and find they are unable to apply what they have learned abroad, whether because of technical limitations or authority regulation. There is a conundrum inherent in training programs: not enough skills-development leads to programming that is not good, unsustainable and potentially dangerous, while training may set up unrealistic expectations for what is possible on the ground. Organizations must be mindful of the situation in which trainees will actually be working in developing training content and setting desired outcomes.
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Chapter 3
Toolbox Case Studies

No single organization claims to have all the right answers; much in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, unfortunately, is trial by error. The following case studies, submitted by participants in the Bonn Conference as examples of initiatives that fit into the parameters of the working group categories, illustrate the many angles and approaches taken by international organizations to impact the media in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The cases inform our understanding of the questions and concerns that must be addressed by strategies and initiatives to positively affect the media landscape. They also highlight the many challenges faced by media organizations active in conflict zones.

Toolbox 1—Conflicts in which media strategies must be seen in a regional context

Most of the violent conflicts after the end of the Cold War have been internal conflicts. That they are internal, however, does not mean that the conflicts may be understood or prevented in isolation from their surrounding countries. Violent conflicts are frequently affected by regional influences, as evidenced by Afghanistan, Iraq, other areas of the Middle East, the Balkans, and numerous violent conflicts in Africa. Internal conflicts may also be influenced by the actions and interests of invested international players including but not limited to the United States, the United Kingdom, Western European countries, Russia and China.

Media strategies will likely benefit by having a regional perspective even when targeting problems internal to one country. In a post-conflict environment, it is necessary both to ensure that the population groups that are hostile to each other internally, as well as the populations in the relevant neighbouring countries, are helped to re-establish positive relationships, reconcile and, when possible, develop common visions for the future.

The Kosovo Independent Media programme, implemented by IREX Media Development, aims for a professional and pluralistic media sector in Kosovo, and deals with the complicated issues of overlapping minorities in Kosovo and the rest of Serbia.

• The project focuses strategically on the long-term development of a sustainable professional, pluralistic and sustainable media sector, rather than on mitigating conflict.
• The project focuses on the Albanian language media serving the vast majority of the population, and it focuses on the private media sector.
• It deals with the overall framework of the media environment, working on journalist capacity-building, developing management-level business skills, media laws and regulation and institution-building of organisations for journalists and for broadcasters.

The BMC’s TELESEE, ERNO, SEENAPB programme for South East Europe is an attempt to support peace and democracy in the republics (now independent countries) of the former Yugoslavia.
The project builds programme cooperation between adversaries in the region to increase mutual coverage. It does not build a common media outlet for the involved countries, but rather, seeks through co-production and exchanges to enhance the capacity of the individual partners.

- It builds on the assumption that cooperation between legislators, regulatory bodies and media can lead to better understanding and better media regulation for all parties. It builds cooperation on media policy across the region so that no individual country feels attacked.

- The project facilitates the establishment of regional media networks for cooperation, and uses the neutral participating countries in the networks to facilitate cooperation.

- It illustrates the importance of making strong working links with professional media organisations and illustrates the importance for professional networks to deal with all levels of the involved organisations.

Professional networking at a regional level is also the key element in Search for Common Ground’s Radio for Peacebuilding Project, Sub-Saharan Africa.

- Instead of training, the programme focuses on building the capacity of journalists and editors working with peacebuilding elements in their radio programmes through establishing a virtual, online community.

- It builds on the assumption that mutual discussion and exchange of experience is the most effective way to increase the capacity of a large number of journalists and editors across the region.

- It builds a common regional capacity for community and private radio in the genres of talk show, soap opera and youth radio for peacebuilding.

- Regional sector partners may have strengthened the institutional implementation of the individual capacities.
Kosovo Independent Media Program
(and predecessor programs)
1999-present, By Mark Whitehouse, Director, IREX Media Development

Root causes:
After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Kosovo remained a part of Serbia and the majority Albanian population and the Serbian population in Kosovo and Serbia proper remained in conflict with mutual accusations of discrimination and violence.

Trigger:
With the Dayton Peace Accord, the majority Albanian population of Kosovo felt their issues were not addressed and felt oppressed under Serbian leader Milosevic’s increasingly repressive rule in the country. Violence escalated and the Kosovo Liberation Army emerged as it and the Serbian army and Serbian militias engaged in an escalating conflict marked by accusation of atrocities.

Media landscape:
Little independent media existed serving either the Serb or Albanian population. Serbian controlled state broadcasting dominated with a few independent newspapers serving the Albanian population. The Albanian population increasingly turned to satellite broadcasting from Albania and Europe and the Serbian population increasingly turned to independent media from Serbia proper.

Media legislation:
Kosovo, as part of Serbia, was subject to Serbia’s outdated media framework which aided repression of independent media.

Project aims:
Professional and pluralistic media sector

Immediate objectives:
Journalism: Improve professionalism of existing media outlets in order to provide balanced, in-depth, and attractive news and information to the audience. Media Business: Assist the development of a sound media market and efficient private sector media outlets in order to promote sustainability and editorial independence. Media Law: Promote a fair and democratic media law and regulatory system that protects and promotes free speech rights through transparent and minimally necessary regulation of media and media content. Supporting Institutions: Support development of journalist associations, broadcaster associations that promote the interests of the sector and defend the rights of independent media.

Strategy:
The programs specifically aimed to support development of a core group of independent media outlets with a focus on broadcast media; supported a journalist association and a broadcasters association; and assisted media law reform. Program not overtly a conflict-mitigation program but a traditional media development program taking place in a post-crisis environment.

The primary focus was Albanian language media. Serb media received support, but decision was made that other donors were supporting Serb media so IREX program focused less on Serb media.
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The strategy derived from belief that majority Kosovar Albanian population needed access to professional and moderate media in the aftermath of the violent conflict. Without this media, danger of nationalist media filling the void posed a serious threat to stability. Additionally, the strategy adopted a long-term approach and sought to support improvement in general professional standards without a specific focus on issues of conflict mitigation and reconciliation. Additionally, the program sought to promote sustainable media which could operate on the market and were not subject to dangers of partisan sponsorship.

Partners:
Social Impact (Monitoring and Evaluation). Close cooperation with the Open Society Institute. Coordination with active media development or other international organizations including OSCE, UN agencies, EBU.

Outputs:
Albanian population served by regional and national private and public broadcasters offering increasingly professional news and information. Two Kosovo private television stations now profitable businesses with robust news and public affairs programming. Regional stations increasingly professional. Public broadcaster has dedicated source of non-partisan revenue through fee on electric bill. Journalists association and broadcasters association represent interests of members. Media Law framework improved, with fair broadcast licensing and access to information laws. Development of non-partisan entity providing transmission infrastructure for broadcasters.

Impact:
Audience research shows that commercial broadcasters have closed gap with, and in one case, overtaken public broadcaster in ratings. This has created a diverse and competitive media market serving Kosovar Albanians; media, through associations and individually, advocate for their rights and effectively participate in media law reform; private media at or approaching profitability; Serb media, despite dispersed market and poor economic conditions, has improved and remained in business; transmission infrastructure for all nationally licensed broadcasters operated by non-partisan entity.

Weaknesses:
Approach to professionalization by the international community revealed to be weak after 2004 ethnic riots touched off by inaccurate and inflammatory reporting. Focus on media for Serbian minority inconsistent over time. Nature of project made cooperation with media in Serbia difficult since two separate USAID programs were in place, one for Kosovo and one for Serbia. Bureaucratic nature of this programming makes cross-border cooperation difficult and Serbia plays essential role in future of Serbian media in Kosovo as well as Albanian media in Southern Serbia.

Strengths:
Focus on business of media showing results in creating sustainable Albanian language media. Renewed focus on journalism after 2004 riots shows improvement in content. Long-term USAID commitment allows for progress in reasonable time-frame and allowed long-term view for media development rather than rush to mitigate conflict without deeper underlying reform of media sector.

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TELESEE, ERNO, SEENAPB – South East Europe

1999-2007
By Bent Noerby Bonde, fm. Director BMC

Root causes:
Disintegration of Yugoslavia rooted in economic and social un-balances between the different republics of the federation. A long term economic crisis and decentralisation of economic and political powers were among the root causes.

Trigger:
First multiparty elections led to nationalist leaders in 4 out of 5 republics 1 year before the conflicts started. Declared independence for respectively Slovenia, Croatia and later Bosnia caused armed resistance from the rest of Yugoslavia, led by Serbia.

Media landscape:
State broadcasters were dominant, based on a network of republic entities reporting for each other on regional issues and delivering inputs for the national programme. Towards the break out of conflicts the republic entities stopped programme collaboration. Private broadcasters were still not influential among the broader populations.

Media legislation:
2 years before break out of conflict new media legislation liberalised licenses for private media and stressed independent public service programming. The implementation, however, was slow.

Project aims:
Peace and democracy through regional cooperation between media, media organisations and media regulatory bodies in South East Europe.

Immediate objectives:
Media Policy: To stimulate media legislation and implemented regulation allowing editorially independent public service broadcasters and independent private broadcasters across the region.
Institution Building: To facilitate the establishment of regional networks of respectively national associations of local radios (SEENAPB) and national public broadcasters (TELESEE).
Production/Co-production: To co-produce news features and documentaries and to exchange news rushes among the national public TV broadcasters. To exchange news features among the local radios across the region.
Professionalism: To build the capacity of public managers and journalists through coaching co-productions and in-house training. To build the capacity of local radio journalists and managers through training-of-trainers programmes in cooperation with OSCE, SEENPM (South East European Network for Professionalisation of the Media), and others.

Strategy:
By choosing a regional strategy facilitating cooperation among media professionals across conflict boundaries, the intention was to develop professional relationships, which could facilitate sustainable programme cooperation across the region. In media policy, the regional approach made it clear that national problems were of a general character in the region, could be solved in cooperation and were not only the
weakness of one government. To avoid that the participating broadcasters in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Macedonia should perceive the project as an attempt to recreate Yugoslavia, also Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, and partly Greece, Hungary and Turkey were involved. A high level stakeholders process concluded with conferences for, respectively, public and private media. The results were agreed upon declarations on needs and interest in collaboration in the above mentioned areas, following the political standards of editorially independent media as stated by the Council of Europe.

Partners:
Lead partner Baltic Media Centre (DK) on stakeholders’ process, network building, co-productions, coaching, and media policy. The European Broadcasting Union (EBU) managed the satellite network, and Finnish Broadcasting Corporation (YLE) the news exchange. The One World was responsible for developing the Internet solution to SEENAPB, which also was supported by IREX. The project was backed by UNESCO and Council of Europe (COE).

Outputs:
Co-production of annually 20 documentaries, 50 news features and daily exchange of 30 minutes daily news rushes for TELESEE. Virtually all documentaries and news features were broadcast by the broadcasters taking part in the individual co-productions plus additionally a few less sensitive countries. The exchange of news rushes is less bound to stories, but has resulted in a significant larger news coverage of the region in each broadcaster than before the project. The private broadcasters exchanged radio news features daily with typically 3-10 local radios in each country broadcasting the stories. Annually 1 regional and 4 national "Forum for Dialogue" took place between legislators, regulatory bodies, private and public media.

Impact:
Qualitative focus group analyses show that the viewers of co-produced documentaries recognise that several problems are common to the region, that everybody lost by the wars, and request more co-productions pointing to joint or individual solutions for the problems of the region. There are no analyses indicating in quantitative terms the impact of the programme and news collaboration in re-establishing relations or in reconciliation compared to other external factors like economic connections, infrastructures, trade or politics.

Weaknesses:
The private broadcasters focused on individual income generation from the project and the technical Internet distribution only developed with huge delays. As BMC closed in 2005, the exit strategy period for the public broadcasters’ network resulted in a sudden cessation of the programme cooperation, only leaving the personal and institutional relations relatively intact. In this situation, it would probably have ensured a sustained programme cooperation if EBU had been more formally integrated into the running of the project network. YLE, who became responsible for the news exchange ERNO, chose not to work with the TELESEE network. In spite of this, the project has successfully been sustained.

Strengths:
The definition of a larger region and the creation of a network working at several institutional levels and issues must be seen as a strength, creating committed journalists and editors at the involved broadcasters. The regional dimension also
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made the politicians more open to discuss weaknesses in their media legislation. Finally, for the audience, the ties to the whole region were recreated and reinforced through the increased media programming reflecting other countries of the region. The public News Exchange ERNO has proven sustainable. The SEENAPB Network, with all its activities and the involved national associations, has continued successfully to the present day.

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The Radio for Peacebuilding Project, Sub-Saharan Africa
2004-2007
Francis Rolt, Consultant, Search for Common Ground with inputs to the description from Ross Howard, Media & Democracy Group

Root causes:
The region had endured a decade of increasing violent conflict at the internal and trans boundary level. Generally the root causes are tied to inequitable access to and distribution of limited resources, including land, education and political power, as well as to historical and more recent manipulation of differences between social groups for personal or group political and/or financial gains.

Triggers:
The triggers differed greatly across the region but were typically related to ex-colonial institutionalized racism, ethnic or religious divisions and exploitation, xenophobia, and corruption.

Media landscape:
The number and type of radio stations in Africa had massively increased due to governments’ liberalization of licensing laws, privatization of former state broadcasters, and commercial and religiously-motivated entrepreneurialism. Low-cost technological advancements had made radio widely available, requiring only modest investment in operating personnel. Programming initiatives had rapidly expanded to predominantly urban orientation and featuring music, talk, participatory talkshows, phone-ins, soaps (drama and comedy) and public affairs magazines. Many community radio stations had also emerged without much training or idea about what they should do.

Because of the increased diversity, independence and popularity-seeking content, radio had become the most widely accessed and, particularly in the talkshow format, the most influential media in the region.

While recognizing their real or potential influence on crucial social issues facing their societies such as poverty, HIV/AIDS, conflict, and access to food, water and land, most of the African broadcasters and media professionals are under-resourced financially, technically and editorially, with many individuals lacking formal training and skills. Some radios served political interests and thereby contributed to conflict escalations, while others already consciously tried to de-escalate conflicts. They had a strong consensus around the priority need for radio to play a responsible role in peacebuilding, and were eager to share their experiences with each other and to receive support to fulfill this role.

Project aims:
1. to increase the quality and amount of positive radio broadcasting about conflict for African audiences,
2. to encourage programming formats and tools which promote tolerance and understanding (undermining stereotypes, understanding positions/interests etc.),
3. to alter the quality and type of information people receive through radio which then influences their behaviour,
4. to promote tolerance and understanding between different ethnic, religious, language groups.
Immediate objectives:
1. To help Sub-Saharan radio professionals build an online community collaborating on preparation and production of a number of guidebooks and producing a number of exemplary programmes on incorporating peacebuilding elements.
2. To facilitate that African radio listeners will get an increase in radio programmes incorporating peacebuilding elements.

Strategy:
A major push was seen as necessary to generate interest in and understanding of peacebuilding radio techniques across the region reaching more than a minority of broadcasters. As training per se is ineffective in changing the professional behaviour of large groups of media people, to be effective, the project would have to create a ‘community’ within which debate and discussion was encouraged. The guidebooks, the website and e-mail support were the key tools to support the development within all participating broadcasters.

Partners:
The three-year project was solely funded by the British Department for International Development and implemented by existing local journalists and Search for Common Ground. Very limited help from Media Foundation of West Africa, BBC WS, BARN, AMARC.

Outputs:
- A website in English, French, Swahili and Hausa.
- Approximately 60 exemplary radio programmes in the project languages. Operation reports and a late 2006 evaluation confirmed almost 1,000 direct participants across Africa; the website received 250-300 downloads per month; members and evaluators indicated radio journalists had acquired greater knowledge of peacebuilding radio techniques and formats. To what degree this is directly attributable to the RFPA project is unclear. Half the members accessed the three guidebooks.

Impact:
Evaluations indicated endorsement of media proactively promoting peace was strengthened after exposure to the project. Participants’ self-declared behavioral change included more objective reporting, greater sensitivity to conflict, reduced sensationalism, and improved presentation skills. Intensive research is required to confirm these self-ascribed impacts. Evaluators concluded the project succeeded in resource development. Evaluators said the program established a firm foundation of great gradual potential.

Weaknesses:
Resource allocation was insufficient for such an ambitious project, deliverables were delayed; the internet platform was insufficiently exploited, the website/database lacked visibility and interactive participation. Local sectoral partners were not used, over-reliant on the Internet.
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**Strengths:**
Major funder and long time-frame, specific focus on radio, dedication to resource development, use of ICTs. It filled a massive and much needed gap; it was very ambitious and did have an impact.

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Toolbox 2—Conflicts in which the government opposes international communications and media interventions

Local government or local authority opposition to media intervention is a challenge to any international actor wishing to make a positive impact, via the local media, on prospects for an enduring peace. The case studies illustrate a number of ways in which organizations have either circumvented or dealt with this obstacle.

When the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) began in 1996, hostility and distrust of the UN presence was high among the local population and authorities. Although afforded authority by the Security Council mandate, UNTAES Radio and TV nevertheless had to deal tactfully with local distrust and opposition. Several elements that contributed to UNTAES Radio and TV success were:

- The mission had the strong leadership of the SRSG, who understood the value and importance of media to peace in the region and to the ultimate success of the UN mission.
- Rather than imposing UN authority with force, whenever possible, the development of a personal relationship with local government and media authorities was attempted.
- Local radio station announcers read UN-produced news and informational reports in special UN segments broadcast on local stations, thereby easing regular listeners into a new programme format and style of information (non-partisan) with familiar voices.
- The commitment to the honesty and reliability of reports was the key component that made local acceptance possible. UNTAES media won over a distrustful and insecure population with consistent accurate, moderate and useful information.

Sudan presents a more difficult challenge to international media interventions. The Sudanese government frequently turns down requests by foreign journalists to travel in Darfur. It operates its own radio service, but few in the region regard the state broadcasts as a reliable source of information. Darfur Lifeline got permission from the government to broadcast on humanitarian grounds—its programmes are apolitical and produced in cooperation with BBC World Service Trust. Government permission was for a period revoked, but, after negotiations, Darfur Lifeline has resumed operations.

- Programmes are of a humanitarian nature. A team of local producers and researchers, all Sudanese, are officially humanitarian workers, not journalists.
- Close cooperation with NGOs, often suspicious of the media as a threat to their work, is vital to the success of the programme’s impact. Darfur Lifeline is widely accepted as strengthening and complementing NGOs work in the region.

The Media Management Training carried out by International Institute for Journalism (IIJ) concentrates on print media editors in Sudan.

- IIJ partnered has a local partner in a Sudanese newspaper, and has the strong support of its editor-in-chief.
- The participants are editors who reflect the regional diversity of Sudan. Although based in Khartoum, they represent print media distributed and published in both North and South Sudan.
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The United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) has a broad media strategy that includes a strong radio component that, despite an oppressive media environment and journalist arrest, harassment and intimidation, produces an educational programme and distributes it on state radio in Darfur. In South Sudan, UNMIS radio broadcasts 24/7 programming including information and news on an FM based network called Miraya FM.

- A local university and the local NGO network were solicited to establish parameters for assessing and identifying suitable human resources to start the project with.
- Partnership with an international NGO, Foundation Hirondelle, with a track record for peace and reconciliation radio in post conflict countries brought valuable expertise and resources (including external donor funding).
- There is an emphasis on radio as method of information delivery to the public. The high rate of illiteracy makes radio the most popular media communication in Sudan.
- A capacity building strategy has allowed a journalist training program to train, to date, a total of 120 journalists.
- A strong emphasis was placed on trying to create a participative approach to journalism.
- The initiative emphasized measurability. A December 2006 survey in the area of Miraya coverage showed that nearly 100% of people participating in vaccination campaigns learned about them from Miraya FM.
- UNMIS radio is adapting its strategy, now providing short wave broadcasts as well as FM to reach regions where broadcasting is difficult (North Sudan).

Covering about 50% of the country, UNOCI FM, part of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) is currently the fourth most listened to station in Abidjan and the first in areas without other radio access.

- UNOCI has strong international support. Although the UN has limited authority in Côte d’Ivoire, the fact that the incendiary nature of some Ivoirian media captured the attention of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and that the Security Council mandated the peacekeeping mission with monitoring the media and reporting regularly to its Sanctions Committee certainly strengthened the justification for media monitoring and for UN-produced programming.
- The public is kept informed of the peace process and encouraged to participate in it. ONUCI FM offers an alternative to propaganda and thus serves to build trust in the international presence and in the possibility for peace.
- UNOCI works with a local journalist association and a media watchdog group.
- UNOCI is involved with the government in the creation of a Media Road Map, delineating, among other things, a code of conduct and the building of institutional capacity.

The former UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia points to this country in perennial crisis and presents it as a real case to which the Toolbox applies. Several questions are posed about potential “tools” that may be considered to address the crisis in Somalia.

- How can the media contribute to the reducing of tensions and generate public support for peace?
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• How can a viable media be established in Somalia, where so little infrastructure exists and where the security situation intensifies the difficulties inherent in building institutions and developing human resource capacity?
• How can “peace reporting” be encouraged in Somalia, where pressures to report on violence and disaffection are strong?
• How can government opposition to international media intervention be circumvented?
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UNTAES Radio and TV, Eastern Slavonia, Croatia

1996-97
By Shira Loewenberg, Center for International Conflict Resolution, Columbia University

Root causes:
Break up of former Yugoslavia; reintegration of rebel Serb held region into Croatia.

Background:
UNTAES was set up on 15 January 1996 with Security Council resolution 1037(1996) granting authority to establish a transitional administration to govern the region during a transitional period of 12 months, and to authorize an international force to maintain peace and security during that period and to otherwise assist in the implementation of the Basic Agreement of 12 November 1995. The Agreement provided for the peaceful integration of the region into Croatia, with a military and civilian component to the UN mission.

Media landscape:
Well-developed with numerous FM radio stations and TV, including wide distribution of satellite TV. There were at least three local radio stations broadcasting in the Region, but radio and television stations from Croatia and from Serbia were accessible. Especially in the first phase of the mission, both private and state radio/TV broadcast incendiary content that was detrimental to reconciliation.

Media legislation:
Within the UNTAES region, either non-existent or not enforced as the Region was virtually lawless, apart from UN Transitional Administration

Project Aims:
The primary goal was to promote the peaceful reintegration of the territory into Croatia with a minimum of displacement and flight.

Immediate objectives:
To provide an alternative and moderate voice of news to residents of the Region, dispelling rumour and informing them accurately of UN actions and changes being implemented in the effort of peaceful reintegration.
To use local media facilities (and staff) to disseminate UNTAES message; this was especially important at the start of the UNTAES mission.

Strategy:
The Security Council resolution mandated the mission to maintain "an active public affairs element". In addition to providing the local population with information about the mandate, mission, and regional developments, UN information aimed at countering certain local media propaganda reports that fed insecurity and provided disinformation on the UN and the future of the region and its Serb residents.
It was seen likely that between 60,000-70,000 displaced persons, mostly Croats, would return to the Region, but it was also feared that a large number of Serb residents would flee and become refugees (mostly in Serbia). During this period, the process of ensuring the security of the local population, the organization of elections and the eventual transfer of authority required a constant flow of information to the populace to calm their fears and dispel rumour and propaganda.
An immediate challenge was to get on the air. UNTAES had to overcome local station resistance to cooperation on a technical and content level.
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Prior to obtaining its own radio transmitter in late 1996, UNTAES radio programs were broadcast solely by the local stations as special pre-taped programs and regular call-in interview programs. The same access issue was true for UNTAES television, which eventually broadcast on its own channel (granted by the Croatian authorities) in order to have unlimited control over its information capability in the region.

Partners:
Serbian Radio Vukovar; other local radio/TV stations including Croatian HRT in Osijek, Radio Borovo, and to a lesser degree, Radio Beli Monastir.
MTV provided content to UNTAES TV to fill blank time.

Outputs:
Daily programming of a humanitarian and informational nature.
News programs and interview programs weekdays and weekends;
election-specific information.
Cooperation of Serbian Radio Vukovar and key staff in production and broadcast of reliable and relevant information to Serb listenership.

Impact:
The region was successfully re-integrated into Croatia with a minimum of bloodshed (virtually none once UNTAES was in place) and a significant portion of the Serb population was not displaced once this process was completed. The dissemination of reliable and practical information by UNTAES Radio and Television certainly contributed to the success of the mission, though evidence is purely anecdotal.

Weaknesses:
Reconciliation between groups seemed hardly a priority for programming; it was more incidental. The primary goals were to inform the Region’s inhabitants of what the UN was doing, and of changes being implemented as re-integration into Croatia (with Croatian government authorities) was occurring. The “person-to-person” reconciliation was not a primary objective of media programming and production decisions. Main weakness was absence of any measure of formal evaluation. Some part of the mission’s success may likely be due to media and communication strategy, but this aspect is unmeasured.

Strengths:
Project worked in part due to robust leadership. It succeeded in convincing belligerents to become stakeholders. UNTAES radio and TV were, after initial scepticism, eventually accepted by the local population as reliable and accurate, and certainly helped local Serbs get practical information on procedures (weapons buy-back, car registration, obtaining documents, etc.) where local media could not be relied upon to give accurate information. UNTAES media helped local Serbs get used to the idea that reintegration was a reality, that they must give up hopes/delusions of separation, and that there were safeguards in the reintegration process to ensure their safety and minority interests.

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The Darfur Lifeline Project, BBC World Service Trust
Broadcast start date: January 2006 (ongoing). By Lisa Robinson, Projects Manager, Africa, BBC World Service Trust

Aims:
The project aims to provide the displaced populations of Darfur and their host communities with up to date, accurate and impartial information about the humanitarian situation which they can use to make informed decisions affecting their lives and livelihoods. It further aims to make humanitarian relief organisations on the ground more effective by boosting knowledge and take up of their services, enhancing inter-agency cooperation, and reinforcing key educational messages delivered by humanitarian service providers.

Immediate objectives:
To reduce the risk of common diseases and improve health by providing information and advice about water and sanitation, hygiene, vaccinations, and good health practices.
To increase food security by providing information that will support agricultural and livestock practices.
To increase protection by providing information on issues such as sexual violence and armed conflict, etc.
To improve shelter by discussing methods for building and maintaining structures in emergency situations.
To improve access to education for children by addressing barriers to schooling and discussing ways around those barriers.

Strategy:
A humanitarian needs assessment was conducted prior to implementation. It identified a need for additional information, which was apparent and acknowledged by all actors, including IDPs themselves.

Use of radio
Radio was identified as the most effective and efficient means to convey information to large numbers of people as radio can:
- Encompass needs from factual humanitarian information to discussion and debate
- Allow many voices to be heard and respond to IDPs’ stated wishes to hear each other
- Serve as a valuable tool in a low literacy society
- Weave educational messages into entertainment formats – vital in camp situations where boredom can loom large
- Challenge perceptions on sensitive issues
- Respond to a changing environment and reflect the shift from an emergency situation to a reconciliation and reconstruction phase

Use of outreach activities to stimulate dialogue
Radio clubs were organized in which audiences can gather to hear the programme and discuss topics raised. Community leaders were identified as ‘Radio Club Facilitators’ for groups with specific needs such as women, children, youth, etc. They received training on how to facilitate radio clubs and technical training on operating radios. NGOs and facilitators
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benefit from:
- Platforms to reinforce humanitarian work through entertaining and informative radio programmes
- Training provided on radio distribution and moderating group discussions

Local and international partners
- ICRC: For coverage of the family tracing programme
- Various INGOs: For implementation of listening groups and coverage of thematic topics
- Radio Nyalal: The Trust provided editorial and production training to the station.

Outputs of the project
- Lifeline Programming: Daily radio programmes, 30 minutes each
- Radio clubs
- Audience feedback stations
- Programme distribution (cassette, CD)
- Broadcast training and co-production for local stations
- Audience research

Impact:
The Darfur Lifeline programme is currently the only radio programme in Darfur for Darfuris. By providing a platform for voices from across the region, the programme and outreach activities work to breakdown existing prejudice and stereotypes.

Given the limited possibilities to mention the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in radio programming, the project sought creative approaches to broach the topic of peace that would effectively support discussion of the DPA as soon as the political and security situation allowed. In response, and with approval from the donor, the project implemented an alternative messaging strategy which addressed peace building issues based on the framework of the DPA itself. The strategy aims to break down resistance to talking about peace building and allowed for simple segues into discussion of the different elements of the DPA. The peace building items comprised testimonies, informative packages and interviews increasing readiness and discussion about the peace process, power sharing, wealth sharing, ceasefire and the DPA.

Weaknesses:
We haven’t found any clear weaknesses in our overall strategy, however, some issues have emerged which we might, in retrospect, have handled differently.

Although we are humanitarian broadcasters, most people confuse us with the BBC News operation which poses difficulties in our relationships with NGOs who don’t want to be involved in anything deemed ‘political.’ It also has created problems with the government which is angered by what they consider to be very one-sided coverage in the western media of the Darfur crisis. Despite verbal support from many authorities in the Sudanese government, there was strong scepticism about the relationship between BBC News and the BBC World Service Trust. Authorities believed that The Trust somehow contributes to news coverage of the Darfur situation, with which it disagrees strongly. Multiple meetings with authorities in Khartoum have since resolved this problem.
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In retrospect, we could have expanded our efforts to introduce and explain the role of the Trust and project aims to both INGOs and government officials. The original proposal intended to have INGOs collecting materials from the camps where they work to lower our profile in the region. This was unsuccessful however given the similar doubt INGOs held towards the Trust. Over the past year we have steadily built strong relationships with INGOs who now understand the value of the Darfur Lifeline project and the contribution it makes to their work.

We may have underestimated the degree of scepticism held by the authorities and therefore failed to identify external triggers that can impede our work. For example, we didn't anticipate that local authorities would perceive our trip to Kass as an attempt to gather information about a security incident that occurred weeks earlier. We also failed to consider that ICC hearings the same week could have made the government especially sensitive to media activities. As a result, the Trust staff visiting the area were arrested, transported back to Nyala along a very dangerous road, then released.

**Strengths:**
Adhering rigidly to humanitarian reporting has allowed the project to consistently operate without interference from authorities for over one year in Darfur. A deteriorating security situation, a clampdown on all media professionals in Darfur, and growing suspicion that the Trust contributes to BBC News led the government to order a temporary stop on making new Darfur Lifeline programmes. However, the reputation developed over the past year as reliable providers of life-saving information for IDPs and their host communities provided strong leverage for successfully negotiating a resumption of activities shortly after.

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Editorial and Newsroom Management Training for Sudan Print Media
2006. By Astrid Kohl, Head of International Institute for Journalism, InWent

Root causes:
Second Sudanese Civil War:
The Second Sudanese Civil War started in 1983, although it was largely a continuation of the First Sudanese Civil War of 1955 to 1972. It took place, for the most part, in southern Sudan, and is usually characterized as a fight between the southern, non-Arab populations against the northern, Arab-dominated government.
The conflicts probably were rooted in distribution of Sudan’s natural resources, particularly in the south, where there are significant oil fields. Oil revenues make up about 70% of Sudan’s export earnings. The south also has greater access to water, and is therefore much more fertile.
Darfur Conflict:
Just as the long north-south civil war was reaching a resolution, some tribal clashes occurred in the western region of Darfur in the early 1970s between the pastoralist tribes and the agricultural tribes, after Africa's greatest famine. The rebels accused the central government of neglecting the Darfur region economically; there is uncertainty regarding the objectives of the rebels and whether they merely seek an improved position for Darfur within Sudan or outright "secession."

Media landscape:
Because of a high rate of illiteracy in Sudan, radio and TV are more popular and have a greater audience compared to the print media. However, print media plays a much more important role in terms of opinion making.
According to local media experts this is due to:
1- Historical reasons – print media in Sudan is one hundred years old while TV & radio are new commerce.
2- The written word has its own magic and readers in Sudan tend to treat it with respect.
3- Decision makers normally treat print media as a yardstick to measure public opinion.

Print media is the most important channel for advocacy. Whereas the audience tends to turn to radio and TV for entertainment, they rely on print media for information. Southern Sudan is just emerging from decades of civil war with hardly any media infrastructure – no printing facilities, no powerful radio transmitters and poor communications. Southern Sudan print media is now produced in Khartoum and sent by air to the South. The UN has a short wave Radio Station in Juba in Southern Sudan, and some Southern broadcasts are transmitted from neighboring East African countries or from Northern Sudan. The Southern Sudan government has a few FM radio facilities. All Northern Sudan media are in Arabic while Southern Sudan media are in English.

Media legislation:
The year 2005 was noteworthy for an extremely rare event: the official lifting of censorship. However, Sudanese journalists are easy prey for a government which uses and abuses draconian legislation and nationalism tinged with religion and also exploits the region’s conflicts to justify repression. Journalists have been harassed, including through illegitimate arrests and the bringing of unmeritorious charges and
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law suits that have the effect of impeding them in their work. Two foreign reporters were arrested in 2006.

The news media were instructed not to comment on UN Security Council Resolution 1593. Several newspapers have been suspended temporarily or permanently after publishing articles considered critical of the authorities.

Under legislation enacted in 2004, the Press Council controls the profession and licences of all publications. It has suspended several publications over the last year. There is a strict control over the broadcast media. A military censor is still in place to ensure that state television reflects official views, and except for a few small local FM stations, there are no independent Sudanese broadcasters.

Aims:
IIJ offered a course on editorial and newsroom management to 15 print media editors serving North and South Sudan.

- To raise professional standards, skills and competencies through training and exposure to good management tools and practices.
- To increase the awareness of the media's contribution to the escalation of violence and, equally, to reconciliation and understanding.

Strategy:
For the IIJ it is of high relevance to cooperate with a local partner who seeks to work to the highest professional standards. The IIJ found such a partner in Mahgoub Salih, the editor-in-chief of the Al Ayam Daily. In terms of methodology, the emphasis of all courses is on practical work designed to improve journalistic know-how and competence.

Partners:

Impact:
The "Editorial and Newsroom Management" one week course included 15 participants, all working in Khartoum, but for print media distributed and published both in North and South Sudan;

Even though the seminar did not focus on conflict-sensitive reporting and the media's role in conflict transformation and peace building, according to the final evaluation, it had a slight impact in increasing the awareness of the media's contribution to the escalation of violence and to reconciliation and understanding. However, the project is ongoing and the middle or long term effects are as yet undetermined. A similar course is planned for 2007.

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Miraya FM Project, Sudan - UN
2006-7. By Leon Willems, Radio Director, UN

Root causes:
Sudan has been in conflict and in state of civil war since independence in 1956, with the exception of the period 1972-1984. The most important conflict is between the South, and the North of the country.

Root causes of the conflict are underdevelopment and scarce resources, cultural and political dominance of the North, lack of democracy, inclusion and accountability

Triggers:
Likely triggers for new conflict are:
- definition of boundaries between the North and South, especially the Abyei area
- control over oil revenues as the most likely money generator for development
- internal tribal conflict in the South (fuelled by Northern encouragement or not)

Media landscape:
Oppressive. Direct press censorship was curtailed after 9 July 2005, but in practice there are definite red lines that the press cannot cross. Journalists are prone to random arrests for "security" reasons, harassment and intimidation including beating and incarceration. Newspapers crossing the line are taken out of circulation. Internalised self-censorship is rampant. There are many restrictions in by-laws for journalists that further curtail press freedom. The press core is largely Northern and largely Islamic.

The electronic media in the North are completely monopolised by the National radio and television Corporation and dominated by the Arab and Islamic ideology. Commercial, non information basis radio is allowed as a business. The UN is allowed to broadcast a 30 minute educational programme on the Darfur Peace Agreement on the three State Radio Stations in Darfur once a week. Calls for changes in the press by laws, a revised charter or abolition of the press council and a more open media environment have been neglected.

The press situation in the South is somewhat better institutionally though not necessarily so in the reality on the ground. There are no press and information laws in effect. The print press in the South is, by and large, lacking in professionalism. Concerning the electronic media in the South, the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) has inherited three dysfunctional state radio stations and a shattered broadcasting infrastructure. Human resources in those facilities are under skilled and untrained.

Aims:
- capacity building
- building an environment of independent journalism
- providing timely and accurate information
- providing a space for inter and intra community debate so as to contribute to reconciliation and mutual understanding
- providing accurate and countering false information about the UN mission, larger UN family and the objectives of the international presence in Sudan.

Partners:
Miraya FM is a partnership between the UN Mission in Sudan and the Fondation Hirondelle. At the beginning of the project, partnerships were sought and found with...
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Khartoum University, the local NGO network and several UN advisors to establish parameters for assessing and identifying suitable human resources with whom to start the project. NGO Sudmedia was asked to train batches of journalists for the project. Since the start of the project a total of 120 journalists have been following these three months trainings. Roughly 50% is now recruited in Miraya FM.

Strengths:
In South Sudan, Miraya FM started broadcasting in Juba 24/7 from June 2006. News in three languages is coordinated from the Khartoum team, live talk shows and special projects are coordinated in the South. Miraya is now active in Juba, Malakal, Rumbek and Wau and will expand its FM coverage this year to 20-25 relay stations in the South, covering all the major population areas.

Although audience surveys are currently under way, it is fair to say that Miraya FM is a riot in South Sudan. A WHO survey in December 2006 in the area of coverage shows that near to 100% of people who turn up for vaccination campaigns hear about it on Miraya FM. Participation of local and Southern government officials in live talk shows to explain their policies and results (failures and successes) show that the mind set is beginning to change.

Strength of the project is the steep learning curve of the national staff. After initial disciplinary and professional problems, the service is running smoothly. Several uneducated learning journalists have taken on duty editor tasks.

In order to re-strategize for the North, Miraya started producing pre-recorded programming for State Radio broadcasters in March 2006. Those programmes are now broadcasted in Darfur and South Kordofan (Nuba Mountains) as well as the State Radio Stations in the South. Negotiations are underway with Khartoum State Radio to do a live show on their network, hosted by UN radio. Very soon, Miraya will start 3 hours a day Short Wave broadcasting targeting Sudan. And there is a website with streaming audio active since two weeks (www.mirayafm.org) which will cater to Sudan in general. Nevertheless, the audience for free radio in the North of Sudan will continue to suffer information drought. That can only be changed by deliberate, consistent and long time involvement and pressure to change by international actors.

Weaknesses:
The assessment to start negotiating for FM stations in the North was probably an illusion. It would have been time saving to strategize in a different way for the North. Though it is difficult to see how to achieve penetration of real democracy advancing media content is possible to put through to State controlled media environments. Sudan’s northern key politicians are not likely to give up the monopoly of information, which has been one of the key areas where the Islamist movements took over control in the early eighties.

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ONUCI FM Cote d’Ivoire
2004-7. By Susan Manuel, Chief of Peace and Security Section, UNDPI

Root causes:
For more than three decades after independence, Ivory Coast enjoyed religious and ethnic harmony and a well-developed economy. This ended when a coup toppling the government in 1999. The ousted president tried to ignite xenophobia against Muslim northerners over the issue which became known as “ivoirité.”

Triggers:
Alassane Quattara, a Muslim, was banned from running in the elections of 2000 because of his foreign (Burkina Faso) parentage. Violence broke out and scores of his supporters were killed after their leader called for new elections. In September 2002, a full-scale rebellion broke out, giving voice to the ongoing discontent of northern Muslims who felt they were being discriminated against in Ivorian politics. Thousands were killed in the conflict. The two sides hunkered down on each side of a “zone of confidence” patrolled by UN peacekeepers (ONUCI) and French forces (Licorne).

The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of January 2003 provided for the creation of a Government of National Reconciliation responsible for preparing a timetable for national elections in 2005, as well as for the restructuring of defense and security forces and the disarming of all armed groups. None of this began and in March 2007 leaders signed the Ouagadougou Agreement, which once again laid out steps to a long-term peace process.

Media landscape:
From the conflict in 2002-3, there were increased restrictions on the media with the government blaming media for inflaming tensions. In 2003-4 several journalists and media were attacked. On two occasions the government took over its own broadcaster (RTI) to replace the long-time director with a government hardliner. International observers raised spectres of Rwanda, fearing “hate media” would lead to a massive blood bath in Cote d’Ivoire. State broadcaster, RTI, is the only nation-wide (although limited) TV station. Nine of its 27 transmitters (in the north) were destroyed during the conflict. In the north, the Force Nouvelles started their own TV broadcaster. In 2005, RTI created a “programme d’urgence” for its reconstruction and was allotted some $10 million which seems to have disappeared.

In addition to the state radio, there were several private radio stations and some 110 “proximity” or community radio stations which tended to be controlled by various political interests. In Abidjan, some dozen newspapers are all identified with one party or another. Total readership is 100,000 at most (total pop. 6 million). This plus the tense security situation and fractured information infrastructure outside the capital have resulted in an information deficit, especially outside Abidjan and in the northern half of the country and parts of the west.

Progressive media laws have been drafted and the media climate has grown more calm, but not more diverse. Recently community radio Guiglo directed mob violence against civilians and humanitarian organizations. In the north, the public media frequency has been pirated by a propaganda radio and television and there is limited newspaper distribution. Gbagbo’s government considers the international press, and in particular RFI as an enemy voice and has suspended its FM broadcasts.

Media legislation:
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In 2004, Cote d’Ivoire adopted a set of progressive media legislation. However, these laws have not been promulgated. ONUCI and the previous Minister of Communication have also worked on a media Road Map.

Regulatory bodies have developed a voluntary media code for elections and will be developing a broadcast code to ensure fair access. These bodies will soon get new directors and directions, according to the Minister of Communications.

The Ivorian association of journalists, but particularly the OLPED, a self-regulatory media watchdog group, have played important roles and say they will also be involved in guiding media behavior during elections (which will probably be held in 2008).

**Aims of project:**
The overall aim of the peacekeeping mission was to help restore lasting peace in Cote d’Ivoire by supporting the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. As part of its public information outreach, the UN peacekeeping mission (ONUCI) created a radio station in 2004.

**Partners:**
The radio station is done by the UN alone although other UN and international bodies may use it. ONUCI also works with the Ivorian association of journalists and OLPED, a media watchdog group. ONUCI recently surveyed and is and feature programming to which various parts of the mission and UN system contribute.

**Immediate objectives:**
ONUCI FM was to counter hostile propaganda with its own neutrality, to call for peace and reconciliation and to enter dialogue with the population.

**Strategy:**
By providing a neutral voice via its ONUCI FM, the UN peacekeeping operation aimed at keeping the public informed of the peace process and encouraging them to engage in it. ONUCI FM also carries news of the UN, so that the public can better understand its mandate. The station began with broadcast in Abidjan: it now consists of 14 transmitters and has plans to expand to 18 in order to cover the main urbanized centers. Programming is also delivered to several of the 100+ community radio stations, which are assembled into a network, and offered training next month on election coverage, funded in part by Canada and IFIS. BBC Trust has also partnered on training, as had OCHA in 2003. Violence in 2004 spurred the UN to use its newly established radio station to broadcast information, after several days of playing music only. Previously, “hate media” produced by some Ivorian media had captured the attention of the international community, including Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The Security Council mandated the peacekeeping mission with monitoring the media and reporting regularly to its Sanctions Committee.

**Outputs:**
24/7 radio programming
Various training programmes
Community radio network
Media Road Map

**Impact:**
Opinion surveys have shown the radio is popular. ONUCI FM is currently the fourth most listened-to station in Abidjan and the first in areas with no other radio access. It covers about 50 percent of the country. Transmitters are in 13 sites outside Abidjan.

From November 2006, with the announcement of the “direct dialogue,” hostile and virulent media quieted down. This cannot be directly attributed to UN intervention, though, but to an order from the President. The threat of UN sanctions may also have been a contributing factor, as well as dialogue amongst media and with media organizations from the region.

**Weaknesses:**
Lack of exit strategy; broadcast over MW may not be clear; unclear buy-in from local media; lack of independence from state RTI; unusual exchange arrangement of equipment and technical help to state broadcaster; lack of range; divisions in international community; perception of weakness on the part of the UN in Cote d’Ivoire.

**Strengths:**
Many interlocutors on a recent visit attested to the value of a “neutral” source of information. New government (Prime Minister’s office) is eager to work with the UN on restoring diversity of voices and factual information to state media. ONUCI FM is currently the fourth most listened-to station in Abidjan and the first in areas with no other radio access. It covers about 50 percent of the country. Transmitters are in 13 sites outside Abidjan. It may be too early to tell if this latest round of the peace process will take hold, but journalists and media organizations are expressing optimism for now.
SOMALIA – a country in perennial crisis
2007 - By Erling Dessau, Special Advisor to the Humanitarian Futures Programme, Kings College, London and former UN Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia – and Afghanistan, and former UNDP Resident Representative in 7 countries, former advisor to UNESCO and to the University for Peace of the United Nations.

Root causes:
Somalia has been in a crisis since early 1991 if not since the late 1970’s. It is deemed to be a failed State. The population in Somalia is highly homogeneous, speaking the same language and almost all Muslims. But the population is divided into a highly complex system of Clans and sub Clans. For an outsider it is difficult to distinguish between the members of the various clans, but each Somalis knows precisely to which clan he belongs. This strong feeling of belonging has often led to fighting between the clans. The clan system originates from the traditional way of life with camels and cattle and grazing and water rights and ownership. It should also be mentioned that as part of the traditional way of life, “The Elders” have played a significant role in settling disputes.

Although Somalia formally is one Country, the country is in reality split in two or three separate “states”. Before independence in 1960 Somalia proper was an Italian Colony while the North-western part, Somaliland was a British Colony. At independence the two parts were merged into one country but with continuing tension between mainland Somalia and Somaliland leading to President Siad Barre bombing the capital Hargeisa in 1987 and at the same time destroying most of the infrastructure in Somaliland.

After the fall of Siad Barre in 1991, Somaliland declared its independence with Hargeisa its capital, and this has since been subject to much dispute. However, Somaliland has managed to keep relative stability and the economy is now also apparently flourishing. Although not recognized internationally, many countries have accepted the existence of Somaliland and maintain low-level diplomatic contacts. The North-Eastern corner has also declared some – albeit limited – independence with the name Puntland but so far with very modest success.

President Siad Barre was overthrown by opposing clans. The clans failed to agree on the future of the country and plunged the country rapidly into lawlessness and clan warfare. The population suffered immensely and after dramatic reporting world-wide, particularly on international television of the starving population and of the frequent looting of the United Nations – World Food Programme and NGO’s food convoys –and of intense fighting, the United States decided in late 1992 operation “Restore Hope” – likely a result of the so-called CNN effect!

Prior to the arrival of the US military, hundreds if not thousands of media people had arrived in Mogadishu. When the US marines arrived by landing crafts on the beaches, believing they were coming in stealth into totally unknown territory, they were to their great surprise received by an immense crowd of media.

The intervention by the United States was initially successful and the food distribution was resumed, but unfortunately – likely due to United States quite limited knowledge of the conditions in Somalia, its local political set-up and complexities, US was drawn
into Somalia internal politics. After the dramatic killings of 18 US marines in October 1993 also widely reported throughout the World and certainly in the US, the US Government decided to hand over responsibility for the Somalia Mission (UNOSOM) to the United Nations. Unfortunately the UN was also ill-prepared for this immense task, and made some serious errors including committing over 30,000 UN soldiers drawn from some 15 countries.

The US operation "Restore Hope" and the subsequent UN Mission were extensively covered by the media, because it was one of the first major UN peacekeeping missions after the end of the Cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Russia regime.

The media became an important factor by reporting about the successes and failures of the US and subsequent the UN Mission, but it became also an important factor in communication with the population in Somalia. In the absence of any newspapers or television, the radio was extensively utilized by US and UN in bringing messages to the people throughout the country. The daily press briefings by first the US commands and subsequently by the United Nations were always very well attended by the international media, but only by few local media.

UN also tried to broker some peace agreements between the warring factions, and sponsored several very expensive long drawn out negotiations between the warlords in Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Djibouti and Cairo and which sadly enough all failed. Now 16 years later and after at least 14 unsuccessful Peace negotiations, Somalia has again plunged into a total chaos.

**Triggers:**

The latest peace talks in Kenya had resulted in the formation of a National Government, the so called "Transitional Federal Government" (TFG). But its authority was challenged by several of the traditional warlords and more important by a newly formed group, the Islamic Courts.

In October 2006 Ethiopia launched an invasion of Somalia upon request from the Interim Federal Government, by then located in Baidoa, and which felt it was highly threatened by the Islamic Courts. The Ethiopian troops managed to overthrow the Islamic Courts regime and "liberate" Mogadiscio. But it appeared only to have been temporarily as the militia belonging to the Islamic Courts since has managed to fight back, supported by several warlords. Heavy fighting is now taking place in and around Mogadiscio with likely over 1000 civilians killed during the past few weeks.

It should be mentioned that several of the neighbouring countries have an interest in and tradition for interfering in the internal situation of Somalia. This is explained by the fact that there are considerable numbers of Somali people living in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. Unfortunately the US led "War against terror" has also resulted in an increased US interest in Somalia lately.

**Media landscape:**

The media in Somalia is underdeveloped, highly fragmented and partisan and barely financed. Broadcasters and journalists operate in an atmosphere which is hostile to free expression and the work is extremely dangerous.

In spite of this, diverse and to some extent professional media outlets have emerged particularly radio stations. There are around 20 local radio stations operating but no national broadcasters. It should be mentioned that BBC Somali service is likely the
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most accessible and most reliable media source in the country. Recently the Somali Diasporas in the West and in the Gulf States have also sponsored the development of Internet, but unfortunately domestic web access is severely hampered by practicalities such as lack of access to reliable mains electricity.

While the many fighting groups and the warlords have never looked kindly to the media, the most recent Islamic Courts have resulted in the media almost becoming a forbidden subject. Journalist and Media people are frequently harassed by the war lords and the militia and the Islamic courts and its supporters.

The current Government (TFG) has recently banned some media reports. Several radio networks were shut down in January 2007, and in February 2007 the TFG ordered three media groups not to report on any fighting, violence or the displacement of civilians. The country is now declared under "martial law" which apparently allows the present TFG to order the closure of several media actors. Also, in February 2007 a reporter was murdered in Baidoa.

**Media legislation:**
In a failed state like Somalia, there is no media legislation. The media operate under considerable risk and this applies to local as well as international media. The security situation is highly volatile.

**What to do:**
Since Somalia is perhaps one of the most glaring examples of a highly complex media situation in a failed state or in a country with a prevailing civil war, it may be of considerable interest to research the media situation in other countries in similar crisis in order to derive lessons that may be applied to the situation of Somalia.

- An important question is if and how the media may be able to contribute to the situation in a country like Somalia either by fuelling the crisis or by reducing tensions and possibly support the peace efforts. The local media in many ways can contribute to reshaping events in a peaceful direction. Similarly it is important that the international media try to understand the cultural set up and the background to the conflict.
- A second question could be how to establish a viable media service in a country with so little functioning infrastructure and a highly volatile security situation. UNESCO made an attempt to set up a "Somalia Peace Radio" but it was unfortunately not sufficiently well funded. A related issue is how to provide equipment, technology and training to journalists and broadcasters etc.
- A third question is how to ensure a balanced reporting from the local media in a country hit by civil war, like Somalia. The drama and emotions of violent news are often more attractive than peace reporting. It is also recognized that the mere reporting can contribute to or result in increased tensions. An effort must be made by the media to deal with the issues as a process and not only as the headlines of the day. Conflicts are made up of structure, culture and process. The media should therefore accept to have a "social obligation" to contribute to the peace processes.
Tool Box 3—Media interventions in prevention of imminent conflicts and in early recovery

Conflict prevention is a term used to describe two very different contexts; one describes the attempts to avoid a conflict in the period immediately before the outbreak of violence by dealing with the immediate and apparent triggers. Conflict prevention also describes the long term processes of addressing the root causes — either to prevent a first violent conflict or, in most cases, to prevent the recurrence of conflict. 50-60% of violent conflicts appear in areas which have experienced violent conflict in the last five years. Conflicts can often be seen as cycles. From a peaking violent conflict, de-escalation and stop of violence leads to a peace, which is often taken over by an escalation of tensions, triggering circumstances and a repeated peaking violence. If we can break this cycle by removing the root causes much has been achieved.

The case studies focus on the early recovery period, though some work with mid- and long-term perspectives. Post-conflict, they address the need for rapid humanitarian information, independent news sources, and the restoration communications infrastructure to provide the population much needed information for survival. There is also a need to build the capacity of local journalists to deal with the situation they report on professionally, serving to de-escalate rather than escalate the conflict. It is very important to link short-term activities with mid- and long-term strategies.

The Danish International Media Support (IMS) and the Canadian Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society (IMPACS) carried out the project Capacity building in Sri Lankan cease fire in 2002. The project was a two-day seminar and three half-day workshops to strengthen the capacity of the media to inform the public about the truce process through conflict-sensitive reporting.

• The local partner had the capacity to duplicate the workshops over the next year and a half based on a handbook published by IMPACS/IMS in the local language.
• The project developed the media’s capability to react quickly, and contributed to the strengthening of a strong local partner.

Also in Sri Lanka, FOJO carried out the project of the Sri Lanka Press Institute (SLPI), which combines institution-building and training, and illustrates the difficulty of working in an environment of recurring conflicts.

• Local ownership is key to the success of the Sri Lanka Press Institute, which is an initiative including journalists, editors and publishers wanting to pursue a constructive role for the Sri Lankan media in the prevention of conflicts and the strengthening of the democratic process.
• FOJO applied experiences from other parts of the world to help develop training methodologies, curricula, management, self-regulation systems and technical assistance to institution-building.
• Despite recurring conflict, the Sri Lanka Press Institute continues to work towards changing the media from within—a process that is succeeding in increments and will likely achieve a great deal during a longer period of peace.

In Timor Leste, Fondation Hirondelle took over the broadcasting system after UNTAET. Their project Timor-Leste, Support to the Public Broadcast Service sought to strengthen the governance and the production capacity of the broadcaster.
1. A careful strategy should be prepared when a UN mission leaves and a broadcaster is expected to become sustainable.
2. Clear agreements with government and broadcast management should be made before an international organization embarks on such a mission.
3. To develop a public service broadcaster in a country of conflict, it is crucial to work with all levels of organizations and society, including Board of Directors, management and staff as well as government and civil society organizations.
4. Good legislation is worthless unless it is properly implemented.

*International Media Support (IMS)* facilitated partnerships between a number of international media development and advocacy organizations with the project *Liberia, Partnership for Media and Conflict Prevention in West Africa.*

- Although too little funding has been made available, the approach has made it easier for new international actors to enter the country to assist the media.
- The project has included some degree of coordination amongst involved actors, thereby avoiding many potential project overlaps.
In June 2002 International Media Support and partners commissioned an initiative to quickly strengthen media capacity in reporting the fragile February 2002 cease-fire between long-time government and rebel adversaries Sri Lanka.

**Root causes:**
The conflict in Sri Lanka dates back more than 2000 years. Co-existence exchanged with wars between the Tamil Hindu minority (presently 20 percent) and the Sinhala Buddhist majority (74 percent). Both groups origin from India and have lived in Sri Lanka for a long time.

The British colonial rule from 1815 to 1948 placed the Tamils in senior positions of the civil service, and English was the official language. After independence, the Sinhala majority decided to make Sinhala the official language (1956) and introduced other legislation that favoured the majority. In 1972 Buddhism was written into the constitution as the main Sri Lankan religion, widening the gap between the two ethnic groups. In 1976 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed and in 1983 the LTTE launched the ‘First Eelam War’, which was the start of the war that is still fought.

There have been several attempts to negotiate a lasting peace in Sri Lanka, the latest being the Norwegian brokered ceasefire in February 2002. The ceasefire still exists on paper, but in reality both conflicting parties have resumed to war. Since 1983 more than 60 000 people have been killed in the armed conflict and at the moment more than 1 000 000 Sri Lankans are IDPs, due to the war and the 2005 Tsunami. The immediate trigger was a Feb. 2002 Norwegian-brokered truce with peace talks to begin in August 2002. Substantially deteriorated standards and practises of journalism by media in both ethnic groups seriously jeopardized public understanding and acceptance of the truce process and discouraged public consideration of reconciliation. Truce commissioners considered the indigenous media its greatest obstacle to success.

**Media landscape:**
By virtue of previous prosperity and high literacy, newspapers remained widely circulated and read; 1970s liberalization increased print, radio and television outlets. However, editorial independence in 2002 was minimal with most media reflecting Sinhala or Tamil political agendas, prevailing government party/army/rebel/funders’ preferences. Self-censorship, sensationalistic crime reporting and ethno-political bias were widespread. Most reporters were hired untrained. Except for private television, technology was generally very limited and substandard.

**Media Legislation:**
Government direct interference and censorship in editorial content was permitted under national emergency and security laws; media legislation remained incomplete and regulation was corrupt and partisan; Access to Information legislation was unavailable.

**Aims of the project:**
To strengthen the professional capacity of the media to provide well-informed public awareness of the truce process through conflict-sensitive reporting.
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**Immediate objectives:**
To reduce inaccuracy, misperception and sensational misportrayal of the truce process;
to introduce senior editors and journalists from print and electronic media to conflict-sensitive reporting techniques;
to sustain conflict-sensitivity reporting;
to foster public support for reconciliation.

**Strategy:**
Non-cooperation and language differences between Sinhala and Tamil-owned media outlets; threat of arbitrarily-imposed government censorship; absence of independence from media owners’ partisanship; inadequate media outreach by the truce supervision commission. However, there existed respect for professionalism, and popular support for conflict resolution.

**Partners:**
The respected independent local NGO Centre for Policy Alternatives, the Free Media Movement organization of independent journalists, and a new Centre for Counter-Conflict Journalism association of journalists. The Canadian NGO Institute for Media, Policy and Civil Society partnered with IMS.

**Outputs:**
a two-day seminar for middle-level editors and senior journalists, and three separate half-day workshops for print journalists speaking Tamil, Sighala and English; a newsroom workshop for state television; a train-the-trainers session. Longer-term development of training resources.

**Impacts:**
Almost 70 journalists from 30 media outlets were exposed to conflict-sensitive reporting techniques and skills, and brief familiarization with the truce process. The workshop content was reflected in immediate editorial comment in several media. The local partner CPA launched similar workshops over the next 18 months. IMS and IMPACS adapted the training content into a handbook published in 2003, translated and distributed in Sri Lanka in 2004. Truce commissioners informally reported a perceived brief improvement in coverage. However, the program produced no quantifiable confirmation of change in media reporting on the truce commission, the conflict and prospects for peace.

**Weaknesses:**
The program lacked specific immediate capacity for reinforcement of the skills development; invited senior-most editors did not participate; the program did not address undercutting issues of: minimal editors/reporters’ independence from partisan owners’ dictates that determine the tone of coverage and editorial freedom; government intimidation of free media; insufficient legal/legislative support for a free press; media self-censorship. The program lacked an outreach to media owners. The program did not address and devise a relationship or steps to improve the truce commission’s media outreach. (Not all of these issues were identifiable in advance.) The train-the-trainers initiative was too short and poorly-based. No evaluation of the program on media practices was conducted.

**Strengths:**
Immediate and rapid response by IMS to a media environment jeopardizing potential conflict resolution; a strong local partner with capacity to replicate and adapt the
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classification training; the creation of a training manual on conflict-sensitive journalism now available in a number of languages. The local partner and IMS partnered in further projects to strengthen journalism. The project provided also opportunity for an immediate consequent evaluation of all media capacities in Sri Lanka.

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Root causes:
The conflict in Sri Lanka dates back many centuries, and there are several causes to the war between the LTTE and the government that started in 1983. The main cause for the conflict is the tension between the Tamil Hindu minority (20 percent) and the Sinhala Buddhist majority (74 percent).

Both groups originate from India and have lived in Sri Lanka for a long time. There have been periods of tension and war between the two ethnic groups since the third century B.C, but also periods of co-existence.

The British colonised Sri Lanka from 1815, and left the country 1948. During the British rule the Tamils held senior positions in the civil service, and English was the official language. After independence, the Sinhala majority decided to make Sinhala the official language (1956) and introduced other legislation that favoured the majority. A sense of Sinhala nationalism defining Sri Lanka as the safeguard for true Buddhism was the powerbase for the ruling Sinhala politicians. Strong protests from Tamil politicians led to the first anti-Tamil riots in 1958, killing hundreds and displacing thousands of Tamils.

1972 Buddhism was written into the constitution as the main Sri Lankan religion, which widened the gap between the two ethnic groups. In 1976 the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) was formed and in 1983 the LTTE launched the ‘First Eelam War’, which was the start of the war that is still fought.

There have been several attempts to negotiate a lasting peace in Sri Lanka, the latest being the Norwegian brokered ceasefire in February 2002. The ceasefire still exists on paper, but in reality both conflicting parties have resumed to war.

Since 1983 more than 60 000 people have been killed in the armed conflict and at the moment more than 1 000 000 Sri Lankans are IDPs, due to the war and the Tsunami.

Triggers:
In 1983 13 government soldiers were killed in an LTTE ambush in Jaffna, which led to anti-Tamil riots in Colombo and elsewhere killing several hundred Tamils. The incident led to the ‘First Eelam War’.

Media landscape:
The Sri Lankan media landscape was, and is, extremely polarized and politicized. The Sinhala and Tamil media report the conflict based on ethnic lines, while the more balanced English media reaches a very limited audience. Therefore the Tamil and Sinhala audiences are confined to their own narratives, as the local language media fails to portray the other side in a nuanced way.

Sri Lankan media was, and is, vivid and highly competitive. New papers as well as TV and radio stations are launched almost every month, and there are many stakeholders interested in investing in media, for various reasons.

There is an over establishment on the media market, and few media companies make reasonable profits. This leads back to the politicized media, where media
owners are in business not only to make money, but also to use their media houses for political and other reasons.

The state owns and controls the biggest publishing house, as well as the largest TV and radio companies. There are several private media houses, both in print, TV and radio as well as in English, Sinhala and Tamil media.

The professional capacity of the Sri Lankan media is generally regarded as lower than in for example India, both in terms of journalistic professionalism and in media management.

The reason why the project started was that a group of Sri Lankan journalists, editors and publishers agreed that the polarized and politicized media landscape, and the low professional standards in the newsrooms was, and is, a problem for the media itself as well as for its expected role in the conflict and the democratic process in Sri Lanka.

**Media legislation?**
One point of departure for the launch of the SLPI was an agreement between the government and the media to abolish legislation that hindered press freedom. In general the legislation gave media a lot of freedom, although a Freedom of Information Act was lacking. The latest period of violence has given the government reason to impose a Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) that gives the authorities almost unlimited powers to crack down on media and journalists.

**Aims:**
To support the peace process and the democratic process by supporting a local initiative to professionalize media.

**Immediate objectives:**
To support a local initiative to systematically address the low level of professionalism in the media, by establishing a local journalism institute (SLPI) initiated and run by the media; doing training (Sri Lanka College of Journalism, SLCJ), advocacy (SLPI) and self-regulation (Press Complaints Commission of Sri Lanka, PCCSL).

**Strategy:**
The strategy was to support a local institute, initiated and run by the Sri Lankan media. The idea was, and is, to try to change media from within where the ownership and commitment of the industry is the key. Prior to the SLPI, media development in Sri Lanka was more or less ad-hoc and donor driven. Several shorter or longer training initiatives had been implemented, but there was no sustainability in the projects.

The method from Fojo’s side was, and is, to be an implementing partner sharing experiences from other parts of the world in order to develop capacity at the SLPI. Focus areas are training methodologies, curriculum development, management, self-regulation of the media, technical assistance in building TV and radio studios, financial systems, relating to donors and international networking.

**Partners:**
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The project is run by the Sri Lanka Press Institute, with Fojo as its international implementing partner. The project is funded by Sida, Norad and Danida. The SLPI is formed by a number of Sri Lankan media organizations such as the Editor’s Guild, the Free Media Movement and the Newspaper Society.

Apart from Fojo, the SLPI is working with several other international organisations such as SAFFMA, UNDP, BBC, ILO, and Internews.

**Outputs:**
After three years the SLPI is a strong and independent media institute, well established and respected locally as well as internationally. The main output of the project is that Sri Lanka has a media institute in place, systematically addressing the needs of the industry on a long-term basis. Another concrete output of the project is better journalism produced in the newsrooms.

**Impact:**
Very difficult to measure in the present political context. Unfortunately the space for good journalism is shrinking day by day in Sri Lanka. The latest period of violence has seriously deteriorated the situation for journalists. Reporters are killed, newspapers burnt and media houses threatened. According to Reporters Without Borders latest Worldwide Press Freedom Index (2006), Sri Lanka has fallen from the 51st rank in 2002, to the 141st in 2006.

After August 2006, the media landscape is again extremely polarized and politicised. The window of opportunity that opened in 2002 seems to be closed again. The government uses the media to win the war, and so does the LTTE. Those who wish to publish balanced, impartial and accurate news face grave constraints, and the editors/publishers/journalists who see their role as the role of ‘patriots’ have gained ground in the day-to-day running of the media.

After three years in existence the SLPI is a strong institute ready to deliver what was envisaged in 2003, when Sida and Norad decided to support the institute. The management professionally runs the institute, and implements the activities with more or less good quality. At the same time the ‘real’ output, i.e. more professional journalism in newspapers, TV and radio seems difficult to achieve on a large scale in the near future. Internal and external pressure on journalists, editors and media owners are strong, and the ‘media war’ is almost over where alternative voices are being silenced.

However the present situation makes the work of the SLPI extremely important. If the SLPI manages to continue the process to change media from within, there is a chance to see real results when the situation normalises. And the institute is playing an important role as a platform for a ‘track 2’ approach to the peace process.

**Weaknesses:**
One weakness is that the financial sustainability of the SLPI was not given enough consideration when the agreement between the donors and the SLPI was negotiated.

**Strengths:**
Mentioned above.
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Timor-Leste - Support to the Public Broadcast Service

Root causes
During the 24-year Indonesian occupation, human rights violations were widespread with some 200,000 people said to be killed. The crisis originates from a complex combination of factors: extreme poverty, institutional failures, political polarization, and demographic factors.

Triggers
In 1999, after the Timorese people overwhelmingly voted for independence, a rampage by pro-Jakarta militia backed by the Indonesian Military (TNI) turned about 70 percent of buildings in the capital Dili into rubble and left the people traumatized. The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste became independent and joined the United Nations in 2002. However, Timor-Leste’s development was severely hampered by a rapid deterioration in internal security in April-May 2006 which resulted in the displacement of around 150,000 people. Current government estimates indicate that 29,000 people are still living in camps in Dili and more than 70,000 are with host families in the districts.

Media Landscape
Timor-Leste’s political development has always been highly influenced by radio. Radio Dili, in operation during the Portuguese colonization, featured strongly controlled content & radio was equally important to the Indonesian authorities. The radio sector is the most important part of the media landscape in Timor-Leste due to a high rate of illiteracy and general lack of household discretionary income for newspapers or magazines. Early 2006, a USAID media assessment revealed that 18 community radio stations and a few quasi-commercial stations were operating, although professionalism was a problem. Access to TV is still limited to Dili and delayed transmission is available in Baucau. At present in Timor-Leste, particularly outside Dili, there is a widespread absence of reliable information and this vacuum fuels misinformation, sensationalism, disempowerment, and insecurity.

Media legislation
For both radio and TV, there is no true regulatory authority. The public service broadcaster, Radio Televisaun de Timor-Leste (RTTL), has been shifted to various government agencies over the past few years. The PBS Regulation, in general, is a very good law that creates the framework for an independent public broadcasting service. However, the overall legal framework remains quite weak.
Aims of the project
The project aimed at building a strong, independent, and accountable public broadcasting service during Timor-Leste’s first years of independence.

Immediate objectives
To strengthen RTTL on 4 pillars:
1. Governance
2. Management
3. Production and distribution
4. Content enrichment

Strategy:
When the project began, the harmful effects from the rapid handover from UNTAET were still felt among staff. The monitoring and support that the staff had received during UNTAET was no longer available, and their salaries were suddenly decreased. Consequently, there was a drastic drop in morale which continued to plague RTTL through the end of this project. Lack of supervision led to a decline in standards of work. The initial uncertainty regarding the survivability of RTTL, the government delay in appointing the Board of Directors, the continuous budget crisis, and the lack of administrative support resulted in apathy among many of the staff.

Outputs:
1. Managerial Capacity Building (technical, financial & overall administration)
   - Increased public participation and coverage of news
   - Increase in the diversity of news stories
   - Increased reliability of broadcasts, as well as increased studio reliability
   - Reduced operational costs
   - Increased production capacity
2. Production Capacity and Distribution Reliability
   - “60-Minutos” (weekly news & current affairs program)
   - “Lafaek” (children’s magazine produced and distributed by CARE)
3. Content Enrichment

Impact:
Evidently low. During the final year of the project, violence broke out in Dili & the RTTL offices were attacked, seemingly in response to anger at RTTL news programming. RTTL journalists were targets of attacks. In addition, some journalists have allegiance to political parties that prevent them from being critical of investigative in their coverage.

Weaknesses:
1. Lack of an initial clear picture/assessment, lack of a good cultural understanding
2. Underestimation of the nature of the existing radio (although UN, comparable to a government radio)
3. Proposed timing for deliverables too short
4. Lots of responsibilities with little power: lack of a clear MoU with PBS
5. FH too isolated: from political, civil society, media organizations and public
6. Lack of alternative strategy
7. Lack of implication in "legal environment” approach

Lessons (to be) learned:
• The Board of Directors matters
• Human Resources are key
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- Changing unprofessional work habits is difficult
- The pace of change is slow

**Strengths:**
1. Continuous training and mentoring resulted in significantly improved management capacities of senior managers and significantly improved capacities in administration and finance.
2. Comprehensive training in reporting and editing resulted in significantly improved radio and TV productions.
3. Coordination and completion of a national coverage study provides a plan for quickly reaching national coverage goals.
4. Coordination and completion of a comprehensive national audience survey provides important benchmark statistics concerning RTTL and media in general.
5. Improved RTTL office, studio, and field recording infrastructure enhances overall RTTL performance.
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Liberia, Partnership for Media and Conflict Prevention in West Africa

Root causes:
For close to two and a half decades Liberia was plagued by political autocracy, economic stagnation and civil unrest. In August 2003 a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Accra between the government and rebel groups, paving the way for peace and a power-sharing administration.

The sizeable regional and international presence in Liberia presented a significant opportunity to bring stability to the country in the short-term and establish the groundwork for addressing the country's problems and needs in the long-term. In this regard, the presidential and parliamentary elections in October 2005, which brought President Sirleaf to office, marked a significant step towards the creation of a stable democracy and ushered in a new phase in the post-conflict transition.

Media Landscape
The media environment in late 2003 was extremely poor. The civil conflict had left much of the media infrastructure destroyed or plundered by the combatant groups, with a severe human resource drain due to persons having fled the country. The media policy landscape and structures were also confused, inappropriate and in disuse, reflecting the previous autocratic system of governance.

Strategy:
As a response to the situation in Liberia in late 2003, IMS worked with a number of partner organisations to form the 'Partnership for Media and Conflict Prevention in West Africa' (the Partnership), with the objective of facilitating collaborative approaches for supporting local media to pre-empt and mitigate the effects of conflict in West Africa. The Partnership utilizes the diverse expertise and resources available amongst national, regional and international media development and freedom of speech actors, thereby offering a unique approach for the provision of assistance.

In this regard, holistic interventions relevant to local needs and reflecting the objectives of international actors can be designed and implemented covering the broad spectrum of media related concerns. This collaborative process serves to enhance the potential impact and creates stronger sustainability options for activities through ensuring long-term perspectives based upon strong local ownership and the division of tasks between long and short-term actors.

Objectives, Aims and Activities
Based on the findings of a mission to Liberia in 2003, member organisations initiated activities in Liberia during 2004 in key areas (please see table below).

For IMS, a key focus in Liberia since 2003 has been to facilitate the coordinated efforts of the Partnership, including most recently a joint mission to the country in June 2006. In this context, IMS has provided input with the Partnership, and specifically with UNESCO, to the Result Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF), the UN Common Country Assessment (CCA) and interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (iPRS), all of which are donor funding coordination mechanisms.

Within the Partnership structure, IMS has also focused on re-establishing the Liberia Media Centre (LMC), in cooperation with FreeVoice, International Alert, UNESCO,
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IREX, OSI and the Radio Netherlands Training Centres (RNTC). IMS has also cooperated with UNESCO and Article 19 on the media policy reform process initiated in 2004 at a national conference. This process has now produced draft legislations for an Act Establishing an Independent Broadcasting Regulator and a Freedom of Information Act. These two drafts, plus the Liberian Broadcasting System Act, are expected to go to the legislative in early 2007.

IMS has also facilitated the institutional development of the Liberia Publishers Association and Association of Liberian Community Radios, through cooperation by these institutions with WAN and AMARC respectively.

Most recently in early 2007 IMS worked on training for journalist reporting for the truth and reconciliation process as this process got underway demonstrating the importance for peace building that it be successful. This training was in cooperation with the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), PUL and LMC, and includes follow-up team reporting activities during 2007.

With the democratic elections in October 2005, the country has moved from an immediate post-conflict environment into a longer democratic transition. In this regard, the activities of the Partnership members have also increasingly begun to reflect the longer-term programme perspectives this requires.

**Partners:**
Regional and international organisations involved in the Partnership to date have included UNESCO, Panos Institute West Africa (PIWA), Media Rights Agenda (MRA), Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA), International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), International Freedom of Expression Exchange (IFEX), International Media Support (IMS), Article 19, World Association of Newspapers (WAN), Hirondelle Foundation, Open Society Institute – Media Network Program (OSI MNP), Open Society Institute West Africa (OSIWA), FreeVoice, IREX - Europe, International News Safety Institute (INSI), Ibis - West Africa, International Alert (IA), International Press Centre (IPC), Radio Netherlands Training Centre (RNTC), Journalists for Human Rights (JHR), UNDP - Monrovia Office and UNMIL Media Monitoring and Development Unit.

**Outputs and Impact**
Although each of the Partnership members have pursued their project activities in their own right, the collective projects undertaken by those organisations involved in the Partnership are listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Involved Organisations</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media policy and legislation reform</td>
<td>UNESCO, UNDP, Article 19, International Media Support, Ibis-West Africa, Open Society Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of and support for the Liberia Media Centre</td>
<td>FreeVoice, UNESCO, IREX, Open Society Institute, International Media Support, International Press Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia Media Project (incl. support to community radio)</td>
<td>International Alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support and exchange visit for the</td>
<td>World Association of Newspapers,</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Weaknesses:</th>
<th>Strengths:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The main weaknesses of the Partnership process have been twofold. Firstly, it has been difficult to sustain information sharing after the initial project establishment phases. In this regard, the reality has been that smaller groups have developed within the Partnership focusing on specific project activities or areas, such as the LMC or media policy reform. Secondly, due to the poor funding situation and the channelling of donor funds through the RFTF and other mechanisms, there has been little funding provided to media support activities, although considerable funds were earmarked in the relevant documents. In this manner, the participating organisations have had to seek funding through channels outside of the country, as well as their own core funding. Much of what has been done in Liberia has accordingly been undertaken on smaller budget lines.</td>
<td>The strengths of the approach have been that organisations which might not have otherwise become engaged in the country have done so, and it has been possible to ensure a relatively high degree of coordination and avoidance of overlap. Moreover, through pooling the resources available, the group has managed to undertake substantive projects activities in assistance of the local media community.</td>
</tr>
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| Contacts: | Jesper Højbjerg, director, International Media Support, jh@i-m-s.dk |
The impact of the media on conflict prevention and peacebuilding depends on many elements including the professionalism and capacity of local journalists, content choices and management. It also depends on a number of crucial factors like media legislation, regulation, the market, and, not least, the media’s ability to reflect the interests and needs of diverse population groups. With the goal of strengthening democracy and, thereby, preventing further conflicts from erupting, many questions must be considered. The following case studies address some of the priorities, and raise important questions in regard to information needs and media development in the context of crucial long-term impact and sustainability.

**Internews’ Building Independent Media in Afghanistan** implemented a comprehensive and holistic project involving assistance to media policy, new radio stations, training and the production of programmes in the private sector.
- The project has, besides seeking sustainability for 30 individual broadcasters, established a satellite network as a basis for distribution, exchange and production of programmes sold to international organisations and contributing to income generation for all broadcasters involved.
- The project advised the local radio stations on content as well as on technical, managerial and production issues. Strategy included long-term sustainability.
- Internews has a collaborative approach and works with a number of international partners.

**Press Now** aimed assist **Alternative Television (ATV)**, a private, commercial TV-station in Republic Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in becoming a commercially viable television broadcaster producing and airing credible daily news and current affairs programmes.
- As the only privately owned TV-station combining quality programming and commercial goals, the development and sustainability strategy had to deal with the balance between commercialization in the media market while maintaining a reputation of reliability, and unbiased quality reporting.
- While following this balanced route, ATV entered regional cooperation with broadcasters in formerly warring areas, and reported on politically sensitive issues. ATV seemingly contributed to a more balanced public opinion.

In a politically complicated landscape, **Deutsche Welle’s To a New PBS in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Management of Change** helped the three public broadcasters from, respectively, the Serb entity, the Bosnian-Croatian entity, and the all-State broadcaster to build a genuinely public, professional and politically independent public broadcasting sector for all citizens, well positioned to become self-sustaining.
- The project used executive coaching to ensure that local managers had ownership and the project was not perceived as an attempt to enforce particular Western models onto the recipients.
- To reflect the diversity of cultures on the beneficiary’s side, consultants involved with the consortium were deliberately chosen from a number of different countries.
- The transformation of the state broadcasters into public service organisations in accordance with international standards was supported by the European Union, setting it as a precondition for the signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union.
The Stanhope Centre for Communications Policy Research presents the case of the Ugandan government’s initiative in 1986 to establish a public service national newspaper – New Vision, following a 6 years civil war. The case is critical as it contrast the “top down” approach taken by international initiatives. New Vision is a completely local, self-sustaining initiative.

- It challenges conventional perceptions of the government media in developing countries and focuses on the role the state can have in promoting a more inclusive environment with a space for reconciliation and dialogue.
- It shows that in considering media intervention strategies, it may be better to ask what local solutions are possible or what the governments and people are able to do through their own initiative, as long-term media assistance is often controversial and difficult.
Building Independent Media in Afghanistan.

2002-2007
By Ivan Sigal, Vice President Asia, Internews

Root causes:
Failed state, civil war.

Triggers:
United States and allies invaded Afghanistan to eject the Taliban government.

Media landscape:
Barren. Under the Taliban, media production was state-run with harsh restrictions on freedom of speech and media, severely censored radio and newspapers, and bans on music and independently produced news. The capacity for media production was practically nonexistent.

Media legislation:
In late 2001, Afghanistan’s transitional government approved the publication of non-state newspapers, and in February 2002 the Ministry of Information and Culture removed regulations banning non-governmental broadcasting. However, erratic regulatory requirements that relied heavily on personal connections as well as concern about the political stability of the new government discouraged the development of radio broadcasters. Numerous laws in both the civil and criminal codes restricted freedom of expression and media.

Aims:
The program’s primary goal was to support the creation of independent, Afghan-controlled news and information media that would reach a substantial proportion of the population, be open and pluralistic, and provide numerous diverse platforms for information, discussion, and multiple voices and perspectives as an integral element of democratic discourse in Afghanistan. The program also aimed to build the capacity of Afghan journalists, editors and media managers to ensure the move towards self-sufficiency.

Immediate objectives:
- To develop a non-governmental broadcast sector, in particular radio, through provision of media policy and legislative support, radio spectrum advice, technical, managerial, journalism and production training for new media outlets as well as radio production.
- To provide ongoing support for an internationally comparable legal and regulatory environment through regular policy consultations on a range of issues from guidelines for broadcast license applications and cohesive rules governing allocation of radio frequency spectrum use, as well as local advocacy efforts.

Partners:
Internews collaborated with multiple international organizations involved in media development, including IMPACS, Afghans for Civil Society, Arman FM, IMS, Article XIX, UNDP, UNESCO, UN HABITAT, AINA, IWPR, Equal Access, Media Action International, the Baltic Media Centre, and IOM. Local partners and sub-awardees were Nai, Killid, Pajhwok News Agency, CIJ, Sayara, the Association of Independent Radio in Afghanistan, and numerous others.
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**Outputs:**

**Radio station Development:** In three years 31 radio stations across the country were built, staffed and trained, and many others received major technical and training support. By January 2006, nine stations were earning enough money locally to be entirely self-sufficient, and all of the stations earned enough revenue to support operations through the sale of air time on Internews’ Salaam Watandar network.

**Radio Program Production and Distribution:** Afghan-produced radio programming was enhanced through an in-house production studio and distribution network. Salaam Watandar (Hello Compatrion) was the first live satellite network in Afghanistan, and as of July 2006, 30 Internews-supported stations were broadcasting over four hours of Salaam Watandar programming daily. Advertisements and Public Service Announcements played on Salaam Watandar provide a steady flow of funds for operations for the station. At present, the network broadcasts over 10 hours/day, with 4-6 hours of original programming daily. Additionally distribution took place via shortwave, and each month some 120 hours of original programming from different NGOs was distributed on CD to 57 media outlets across the country each month.

**Training Resources and Center:** A local media training center, Nai, supported by Internews provided dozens of training courses in journalism and production skills, technical and IT skills, radio program design, issue-based journalism, business development, and station management. A technical support unit was established to advance the development and maintenance of radio stations.

**Media Policy, Advocacy Support:**
Among the outputs of the media policy/advocacy support were:
- a process for radio registration and licensing;
- advocacy to ensure freedom of expression was included in the Constitution;
- an ongoing freedom of media/expression monitor, resulting in the creation of Media Watch, which produces regular reports and a radio programming about the state of media freedoms and regulations;
- Afghan media advocacy groups were established, including the Afghan Independent Radio Association (AIRA), and a journalism association;
- media law working group, to support key media representatives working on a range of media law and advocacy issues, including codes of ethics, media law revisions, and education for journalists in media rights.

**Impact:**
The project has been focused on providing media spaces for information, discussion, and voice – all key aspects in providing paths for conflict prevention/resolution other than violence. A survey looking at the popularity, trust levels, and effects of increasing media outlets was produced by Altai Consulting, "Afghan Media - Three Years After: Nationwide Media Evaluation Project, United States Agency for International Development, September 2004/March 2005.

**Weaknesses:**
The biggest challenge has been that the goal of building and supporting so many stations in a short period of time has resulted in sometimes sporadic service and response in supporting stations’ continuing development. Appropriate human resources, both Afghan and international, have at times been difficult to find. Ideally, Internews would have chosen a slower development strategy, more paced to community development as a whole. However, multiple stresses, including the overall...
aid and development environment, and the relatively brief period of minimal security risks after the war, have pushed Internews to maintain a rapid development pace.

**Strengths:**
The key strength is probably the diversity of local ownership and engagement across the country, along with survey data that show that stations are generally perceived as locally owned and controlled – voices of the community, and thus a focus of positive development, information, and knowledge.

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Alternativna Televizija (ATV) in Republika Srpska, Bosnia-i-Herzegovina

1997-2007
By Wilco de Jonge, Executive Director, Press Now

Root causes:
Disintegration of Yugoslavia rooted in economic and social un-balances between the different republics of the federation. A long term economic crisis and decentralization of economic and political powers were among the root causes.

Triggers:
First multiparty elections led to nationalist leaders in 4 out of 5 republics 1 year before the conflicts started. Declared independence for respectively Slovenia, Croatia and later Bosnia caused armed resistance from the rest of Yugoslavia, led by Serbia. In Bosnia-i-Herzegovina the Serb minority started rioting and soon armed fighting in support for Serbia’s case in all-Yugoslavia.

Media landscape:
The Open Broadcast Network (OBN) was introduced in the summer of 1996 and started with four independent affiliated member stations, located within the Muslim-Croat Federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina. The internationally funded network had the objective to provide an independent, cross-entity television network aiming to increase media pluralism and thus assisting the development of democratization and stabilization of peace in Bosnia & Herzegovina. A small correspondent unit was set up in September 1996 in the Republic of Srpska. After only a few months of operation, the Banja Luka bureau was able to increase its young staffing and program output thanks to strong and direct relations with individual Donors to the project. It expanded into a fully-fledged independent local TV-station.

Media legislation:
When post-war reconstruction started, media legislation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was very unclear and remained so for a long time. The Central Regulatory Agency (CRA) was in charge of media regulation and was mainly dealing with the relation between public and private stations, regarding issues such as advertising minutes per hour.

Aims:
The project aims to help building ATV as a commercially viable television broadcaster producing and airing credible daily news and current affairs programmes.

Immediate objectives:
The immediate objectives were:
• To produce unbiased news with high quality and revolved around ordinary people’s everyday problems and concerns, focusing more on a social instead of a political perspective.
• To develop economic sustainability an editorial independence through commercial revenues.

Strategy:
In June 1997 Alternative Television (ATV) got its broadcast license and began producing news and current affairs specials from its improvised studio facilities. The first challenge was to build credibility within Republika Srpska, since ATV coming out of the OBN-network was seen as heavily biased in a Croatian-Muslim favor. In a highly
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In a highly politicized atmosphere, it was important from the start to produce news that focused on ordinary people’s everyday problems and concerns, focusing more on a social instead of a political perspective.

As the only privately owned TV-station combining quality programming and commercial goals, the strategy had to deal with maintaining a balance between commercializing in the media market and keeping its reputation of reliability and unbiased quality reporting to conquer a strong position in the competitive media market. ATV had to be the prime source of reliable information and thereby positively influence the public opinion to become more balanced. Finding a balanced route between these seemingly contrasting goals was the main challenge of this project.

**Partners:**
Next to Press Now, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Swedish Helsinki Committee (SHC), the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the Media Development Loan Fund (MDLF) have been involved in supporting ATV.

Locally, ATV participated in training courses given by the Media Center Sarajevo (MCS), another local partner of Press Now.

**Impact:**
Some concrete results of ATV are:

- ATV was the first to reveal the secret report of RS Government on events in Srebrenica, the outcome was public recognition and apology by RS President for the crimes committed.
- ATV was the first and only private TV station in RS that established regional cooperation with media from what were once war opponents (CCN, Zagreb; NTV Hayat, Sarajevo; B92, Belgrade, RTV Mostar, RTV Tuzla).
- ATV is the first and only TV station in RS that, during the Milošević regime, produced a documentary on Slavko Šuruvija, the Serbian journalist who was killed in Belgrade. The documentary has been awarded at several international festivals.
- ATV produces the successful series “Praonica” (laundry), a soap programme that touches upon sensitive political issues for a wider audience.

**Weaknesses:**
Besides the overall problems of operating on the undeveloped and too slowly progressing advertising market and economic stagnation in BiH, the biggest problem for ATV, particularly from the end of 2004, was that it faced spill over—undisturbed penetration of the broadcasters from the neighboring countries on BiH territory—which caused a stagnation of the advertising market, illegal work of cable operators broadcasting without copyrights for BiH. These spill-over channels are very popular and are tough competition for ATV.

**Strengths:**
The main strengths of the project are in the combination of quality reporting and commercial revenue production. Another strength has been the ATV director being the driving force behind ATV.

Some indicators of ATV’s strong points are that: ATV complies fully with the Editorial Charter of the International Federation of Journalists. They do not please the political elite by broadcasting unappealing press conferences and long political statements. ATV pays special attention to human rights issues, repatriation of refugees, freedom of movement, and economic development. ATV current affairs programs reflect the
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living conditions and experiences of ordinary people, thereby depoliticizing issues and
giving them social meaning.

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Wilco de Jonge, Executive Director, Press Now, deJonge@pressnow.nl
To a new PBS in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Management of Change
Year 2005-2006
By Thomas Kirschning, Head of Project Development, Deutsche Welle Akademie

Root causes:
Disintegration of Yugoslavia rooted in economic and social un-balances between the different republics of the Federation. A long term economic crisis and decentralization of economic and political powers were among the root causes.

Triggers:
First multiparty elections led to nationalist leaders in 4 out of 5 republics 1 year before the conflicts started. Declared independence for respectively Slovenia, Croatia and later Bosnia caused armed resistance from the rest of Yugoslavia, led by Serbia. In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) the Serb minority started rioting and soon armed fighting in support for Serbia’s case in all-Yugoslavia.

Media landscape:
The general media freedom situation in BiH nowadays is commendable. Overall, a high degree of media pluralism exists in the country. BiH has an elevated number of broadcasters estimated to be between 180 and 190, which by analysts still is considered excessive for a market of four million low-income consumers. The domestic press consists of six daily newspapers and 40 weeklies and monthlies.

A number of international governments have since 1995 invested significant sums of money to support the establishment of both private and public print and broadcast media, the legal and institutional framework over the past decade. They have also created the Communications Regulatory Agency (CRA), responsible for licensing and regulating broadcasting and telecommunications and the Press Council, a self regulatory body dealing with complaints about the print press.

The BiH media landscape is determined by the country’s complex constitutional structures, the still ongoing post-war reconciliation process, and the recovering economy. Ethnic divisions are reflected in the public broadcasting structure. Currently BiH has three public broadcasters - BHRT, RTFBIH, RTRS – and three main commercial broadcasters – OBN, TV Pink BiH, and Mreza Plus. After years of domination, the public broadcasters have begun to lose their leading positions in the market. The market share of the three public channels fell to 32 per cent in 2005 and has continued to decline since then.

Although BiH’s three major commercial networks are thriving, smaller commercial broadcasters face very difficult conditions without any apparent commercial viability or audience for their programming on the part of audiences. In addition there are several small size municipal radio and TV stations which are heterogeneous in size, programming, audience and financial back up. Governmental financial support for local media outlets throughout the country, especially at the cantonal and municipal levels in the Federation and Republic Srpska (RS) respectively, distorts both the market and potentially the editorial independence of these broadcast outlets.

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Currently, the Office of the High Representative focuses its media-related efforts on unification of the country’s dual entity public broadcasters with the state PBS. This will bring BiH in line with established European practice and is a precondition for the signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union.

Media legislation:
The legal framework for the protection of freedom of expression is largely in place. Since 2002 BiH has fully decriminalized libel and defamation. It has, however, yet to complete the reform and unification of its three public broadcasters. The creation of a single, state-wide public broadcasting system required BiH, among other tasks, to adopt four laws. It has managed to enact only three of them to date – namely the laws on respectively the structure for the PSB, the state-wide PSB (BHRT), and the entity PSB for Republika Srpska. Due to Croat resistance the law on the entity PSB for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RTFBIH) yet has to be approved.

Aims:
To support the key players in the Public Broadcasting of BiH to build a genuinely public, professional and politically independent public broadcasting sector for all citizens, which is well positioned to become self-sustaining.

Immediate objectives:
- Imparting advantages of a new self-conception for PBS staff
- Anchoring ethnic diversity as enrichment rather than threat
- Uncoupling particular interests of politicians and key players of the PBS
- Connecting common objectives of audiences with aims of program makers

Strategy:
We had to tie in with years of earlier foreign consultancies, and we had to face incomplete as well as delayed legal reforms defining the future structure of the PBS in Bosnia and Herzegovina – in terms of organization, financing, personnel and management structures. To avoid potential resistance against the ‘sapiencies of the next consultants from abroad’ we put the emphasis on executive coaching consultancy rather than providing another series of formal learning events.

Traumata of the Balkan wars are still manifest in the hearts and minds of the people. Serbian, Croatian and Muslim Bosnians for various reasons express fear to lose essential institutional parts of their particular cultural identities, should the three present public broadcasters become restructured under a common umbrella organization.

We decided to reflect the diversity of cultures on the beneficiary’s side also by the choice of consultants to be involved by the consortium. We had consultants from France, United Kingdom, Germany and a team leader from Macedonia.

Partners:
Deutsche Hörfunk Akademie, Adolf-Grimme-Institut and ProManagement GmbH

Outputs:
- 4 kick-off group sessions for key persons explaining intended objectives, processes and methodology
- 226 2-hours each face-to-face coaching sessions for General Directors and Directors
- 11 Formal learning events, facilitated workshops, seminars
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  o for Governing Bodies and Secretariat, *Role and Function of Public Broadcasting in Democratic Societies, Media Research and International Standards*
  o for Senior and Middle Managers, *General and Financial Management, Human Resources/Managing Teams, Project Management/Tools and Techniques, Human Resources/Conflict Management*
- One 4-day Business Game for 78 participants, including 25 top managers

**Impact:**
- Since the termination of the project only one significant case of discrimination amongst the three broadcasters has been reported, described as an "isolated incident"\(^2\), and evaluated "the Government had learned its lesson"\(^3\)
- Several former clogging top managers have been replaced
- Political/legal reforms have been accelerated
- EU has launched a new tender for a common newsroom, workflow standardization of production and archiving

**Weaknesses:**
- Not enough emphasis on intercultural learning/conflict solution (lack of time/money)
- Not enough scenario workshops (see above)

**Strengths:**
The results of the project have definitely benefited from our approach of coaching and sparring instead of teaching. This helped us overcome the cultural resistance against external consultants telling them how to do and presenting their own models for what to do.

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\(^2\) Ibid
\(^3\) Ibid
The role of the New Vision in shaping the media environment in Uganda after the civil war

In 1986 Uganda experienced the last political transition of its recent history. The National Resistance Movement (NRM) headed by Yoveri Museveni took power after years of guerrilla struggle in the bush and started a complex process of institution-building in the country. The media were one of the pillars of this transition, and, according to the movement's strategy, had to work to spread a new vision of the African future.

I suggest this case study for several reasons - it challenges conventional perceptions of the government media in developing countries; it focuses on the role the state can have in promoting a more inclusive environment, a space for reconciliation and dialogue; and because long-term media assistance is often controversial and difficult it is better to ask what local solutions are possible or what the governments and people are able to come up with.

Root causes:
Referred to as the Ugandan Bush War, the Ugandan Civil War or the Luwero War the conflict occurred between 1981 and 1986 and was the struggle by the National Resistance Army to overthrow the government of Obote and later Okello. The guerrilla struggle was launched from the southwest of the country and began following disputed elections in 1980 during which Museveni's UPM party was a part.

Media landscape:
Varied- at times there was very little opportunity for independent media outlets (during Idi Amin dictatorship between 1972 and 1979) but at other times there was some scope for opposition papers (such as the Weekly Topic or the Crusader) to emerge. In comparison with the current media landscape the media was very restricted.

Aims and Objectives:
The New Vision emerged out of a cabinet meeting in March 1986. It was part of the idea that the NRM felt as though they were bringing a fundamental change or a 'new vision' not only to Uganda, but also to the entire African continent. The editorial policy was established by a legal statute that specifically stated that the paper should be national and publish criticism of the government without being an institutional opponent of the government. It was intended to be more like the BBC- a public institution rather than a government mouthpiece. It was also a way of institutionalizing the processes of 'constructive criticism' that were practiced in the bush where soldiers were allowed to freely criticize officers if it was done openly and in good faith.
Outputs:
The New Vision is the most widely read newspaper in Uganda. It is one of the most profitable companies - 80% of the stocks are owned by the government and the remaining 20% by private individuals. The New Vision sees itself as a newspaper of records. Capital Radio is also part of the New Vision Company and the corporation has the strongest research department on media and information in Uganda.

Impact:
Journalists from other media outlets, in particular the Monitor, have cited the role of the New Vision in forcing professionalism– both journalistically and also in terms of running a newspaper as a business and not only as a tool for the representation of political voices. It brought different views to the centre, while some papers were more opposition they were forced to engage and debate with the arguments put forward by the New Vision.

The New Vision was also important in playing a role in building consensus– both on past, current and future issues. The importance of this should not be underestimated in countries emerging from major conflicts. Granted many people welcomed the NRM and were willing to give some leeway in the beginning, the New Vision promoted dialogue among different segments of the population. Twenty years ago Uganda was a very divided society. Now key facts can be accepted and there is some belief that newspapers such as the New Vision can provide factual reporting.

The New Vision has also been important in moving the agenda of the country forward- it regularly publishes reports of corruption and has been important in holding leaders to account.

Weaknesses:
It is still not completely independent. There have been worrying signs in the past couple of months that the paper will be increasingly under government control as William Pike, former CEO of the New Vision has been replaced with Robert Kabushenga formerly of the Uganda Media Centre. The New Vision has not been as open as some of its counterparts on reporting on the elections and the war with the Lords Resistance Army in the north.

Strengths:
When the New Vision started, it was from scratch. It was not a process of trying to reform or restructure, as the Uganda Broadcasting Cooperation that controls Radio Uganda and Uganda Television are still struggling to do, but as a self-accounting and profit oriented company there is strong incentive to increase revenue through reaching new readers or listeners. It is also a completely local, self-sustaining initiative.

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Tool Box 5—Programme genres, formats, Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and target groups to re-establish relations, reconciliation and common visions between adversaries

Organizations involved in programme development, production and support of media with the aim of establishing or re-establishing relationships between adversarial parties must consider the most effective ways of message delivery. The message must be delivered in a way that is both palatable to the often belligerent local authorities, and be of interest to the local populations who are the audience; the latter implies further consideration of the specific target audience in terms of such variables as education level and age. The case studies point to a variety of methods and formats utilized to impact reconciliation and the creation of a common vision among divergent groups. Formats include the more traditional information platforms of straight news and current affairs programmes, as well as entertainment programming and soap operas. Each case is content-tailored to the specific context and culture of the environment and to the profile of its target audience.

The Baltic Media Centre started Good Morning Afghanistan (GMA), now run independently by Awanama Productions and Consulting.
- The radio programme began broadcasting humanitarian information, and gradually developed into a more critical radio news programme.
- GMA uses the distribution system of the state broadcaster. It is a showcase for public service, broadcasting at the peak hours of the state broadcaster in an agreement accepted by the government.
- The programme broadcasts in two languages and has served as a common media platform across the population.
- The management and staff have succeeded in making the programme sustainable, at least in a mid-term perspective, through sales of consulting and programme production to international NGOs and donors.

Kids News Network in Afghanistan, started by Free Voice, has been very successful in providing popular programmes that empower Afghanistan’s children and provide a platform for peace dialogue.
- The TV news programme takes children’s right to information seriously and sees children and youth as playing an important role in peace building.
- The Kids News Network works entirely within the organisation of the state broadcaster, and has until now received solid political and editorial support.
- The programme has been met with great interest and viewing from the audience.
- Free Voice has developed a common format for Afghanistan, South Africa and Surinam.
- Free Voice works in partnership with other NGOs and international and local media consultants.
- Long-term financial sustainability remains a challenge.

Entertainment-Education is defined by Thomas Tufte, Nordic Research Centre on Communication, Development and Social Change as the use of entertainment as a means to strategically communicate about development issues with the purpose of influencing individual behaviours and/or articulating social change agendas.
- Storytelling can take on the role of making private concerns public and, thereby, a matter of political concern.
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- Storytelling can empower individuals and communities in the face of disempowering circumstances.
- The media cannot aspire to direct behaviour but only to articulate processes of dialogue, build empathy, recognize differences and stimulate participation.

*Search for Common Ground’s Radio Soap Opera in Nepal* aimed to increase the level of knowledge and understanding of conflict issues among the Nepali population, improve awareness and use of peacebuilding media, and increase youth engagement in peacebuilding activities at local and national levels.

1. By training local youth in the production of radio soap operas for conflict transformation, the project built local capacity and enable continuity.
2. The soap operas managed to change the attitudes of young people, engaged them in dialogue, and resulted in the new peacebuilding organizations and activities.
3. The project partnered with a local and an international organization (funder).

*Centre Lokole* is a *Search for Common Ground* initiative in the Democratic Republic of Congo that included four radio programmes for local and national broadcast.

- The soap opera programme was substantially the most popular and influential compared to the other radio programmes.
- The programme increased public demand for conflict resolution skills.
- Reconciliation and demand for conflict resolution turned out to be a stronger result than the objectives of creating a better understanding of the peace process and increasing contact across the country.
Good Morning Afghanistan – Feb. 2002 till now:
By Bent Nørby Bonde, fm. Director of Baltic Media Centre

**Root causes:**
Afghanistan has through history been a loose state, split into several ethnic groups, languages and provinces with strong social contrasts and little control from the capitol Kabul over the countryside. 23 years of civil war, the Taliban government controlling ¾ of the area, and a very loose state resulted in a backward looking, isolated, poor and religiously controlled country with strongly restricted human rights and no freedom of speech.

**Trigger:**
The September 11-attacks, carried out by members of the Al Qaeda Network who trained and planned the action in Afghanistan caused U.S.A.’s invasion as the Taliban government refused to hand over members of the Al Qaeda network.

**Media landscape:**
Only Taliban media existed, strictly controlled, mostly religious programmes, no music, no news about the outside world. One national radio broadcasting from Kabul and a few regional radios were broadcasting in the provinces. No press freedom at all. In the non-Taliban controlled part of the country, the media were less religious, but controlled by warlords. Professionalism was very weak.

**Media legislation:**
No formal legislation but the media was controlled by religious authorities.

**Project aims:**
The aims are to re-establish relationships between population groups across the country, support peace building and promotion of democracy.

**Immediate objectives:**
- To develop an independent public service programme – Good Morning Afghanistan (GMA) - providing humanitarian information and independent news,
- To provide a showcase for public service programmes and stimulate transformation of the state broadcaster.

**Strategy:**
The daily news programme should over time start soft with humanitarian information and gradually develop into professional and sometimes critical journalism, independent but adapted to the vulnerable situation. Strict principles about hearing both sides in every story should demonstrate to political leaders that independent public service was useful, but not very dangerous. Each programme was produced and broadcast in two languages – Dary and Pashtoo to bridge the two major population groups. The programme should be broadcast on Radio Afghanistan, under the authority of its Afghan Radio director, but protected by Baltic Media Centre (BMC) as overall responsible for the programme. The editor-in-chief of GMA and all staff was Afghan hired and paid by BMC. Radio Afghanistan should benefit from programmes attractive to the listeners and exchange of staff trained at GMA. Most of the time, a BMC-consultant supported the Afghan editor-in-chief in any political controversies. Exit strategy would be to let the programme become integrated back into RTA.

In a mid term perspective there is a need for programmes like GMA/GEA providing professional and independent news and serious features to all the population and
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thereby contributing to a common framework for national identity. If Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA) succeeds its reform into public service the function served by GMA/GEA might in a long term perspective be served by RTA.

Outputs:
- Good Morning Afghanistan was placed on Radio Afghanistan’s national programme with one hour’s daily morning news programme, having 5 minutes news resume broadcast in both Dary and Pashtoo, while rest of the reports would be different and produced roughly 50/50 between the two encouraging the audience to listen to different reports in each of the two languages.
- Good Evening Afghanistan was one hour’s daily afternoon news programmes, which also tended to have reports on cultural-, family-, social- and children’s issues.
- GMA had its own correspondents in the provinces strengthening the local coverage in the national radio.
- In 2007, five years after its start 62 % of the total population listens to the two programmes trailing BBC and Radio Liberty with 3%. GMA’s homepage has 7229 visits; 25663 pages reviewed: 123132 files opened; 247320 hits, and there are several feed backs from listeners.

Impact:
The programme has often had direct impact when it has been critical – whether it has resulted in dismissal of public officers or establishment of play grounds for children. There has been no genuine evaluation of impact on peace building.

Weaknesses:
The salaries might originally have been too high to allow for sufficient integration with Radio Afghanistan. It took almost a year before transmitters were brought in place to reach the entire country after the war. VOA established a transmitter for RTA on the condition that VOA in parallel could establish its own transmitter allowing terrestrial broadcasting of the competing VOA. Similar arrangements happened for BBC. The reform of Radio and TV Afghanistan went very slow due to lack of resources and international support in the initial phase, and because the politicians did not want to loose their control. On a purely commercial market basis without international donor organisations contributing to the financial basis such programmes will hardly be sustainable within the next decades.

Strengths:
The editorial independence was initially defended by a combination of an international NGO and as back up a larger donor – first EU, later USAID. The pressure on the day to day editorial decisions was the first 3 years not significantly bigger than in any Western country. The GMA-programme did not have an exit into RTA, but is now a public service programme broadcast via RTA’s transmitters but produced by an independent company, selling programmes, and consultancies mainly to donors with USAID being the biggest. In principle the major donor allows editorial independence but also brings up suggestions. The ability to reach an audience across different population and language groups is well done.

Partners:
Local partners: Radio/TV Afghanistan, local media-NGOs.
International partners: Baltic Media Centre (DK) was lead partner, but a lot of organisations – Denmark’s Radio, BBC, VOA, Internews, Equal Access, Danish
Institute for Human Rights, and others from different countries have offered training, equipment, and advice, or are having programmes produced.

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Afghanistan - Kids News Network
2003-2007 By Ole Chavannes, Free Voice’s program manager Kids News Network

Root causes:
An internationally funded full scale war in which regional warlords and terrorist religious organizations fought each other and international (Russian and American) forces to gain territory and political and economical power.

Trigger:
The trigger of the conflict might be considered the Soviet troops attacking in 1979 to prop up a pro-communist regime, which led to a major confrontation that drew in the US and Afghanistan's neighbours.

Media Landscape:
The media landscape was poor: only Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), the state broadcaster, was operational, producing some radio and television programs. Wide scale international financial and organizational support was needed to improve the quality and quantity of production. In 2003, when Free Voice began the project, the RTA infrastructure was being improved and plans to change the state broadcaster into a public service broadcaster were being launched.

Media legislation:
The new legislation was supposed to lead to a new media law whereby free and independent information gathering and broadcasting would be guaranteed. This new media law is still being processed; in June 2007 the Afghan parliament is supposed to decide on it.

Aims:
To give Afghan children a voice; to inform, emancipate and empower the new generation of Afghanistan and show the older generations practical examples of peace building initiatives (like schools being rebuilt) and peace dialogue (children giving their opinion on all kinds of developments).

Immediate objectives
To broadcast a weekly program in the languages Farshi and Pashtun informing a target group of children, 10 to 14 years old, with objective national and international news (from Deutsche Welle), educational entertainment, and a weather report (the first in Afghanistan).

Strategy:
To make news available for children in Afghanistan through financial, organizational and practical journalistic support we wanted to begin as soon as possible after the Taliban collapsed.

In cooperation with the Baltic Media Centre, a format was developed to start up a television program with news for children, called Ayenda Sazan (Future Makers). This project was part of a pilot from Free Voice, called the Kids News Network, already functioning in Surinam (Latin America) and South-Africa. Ayenda Sazan became part of Rosanna, RTA’s children’s department. The program seeks to explain the hard and confusing reality children see around them without making the children scared. Kids News portrays children as victors instead of victims. A young professional staff was offered intensive hands-on training by Dutch/Afghan experienced journalists, with
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methodological back up from experienced chief editors from the 20 year old Dutch NOS Jeugdjournaal.

The plan was that Free Voice would finance the project for the first 16 months, with the aim of having RTA continue to finance it after. The program is still not financially independent – a risk we considered well in advance. The continuous support from Free Voice up till now secures that most editorial staff earns just enough to stay in the competitive market with several new commercial stations.

**Partners:**
Consultants from the Baltic Media Centre and several freelance (Dutch/Afghan) journalist trainers. Ayenda Sazan became member of the international Kids News Network.

**Outputs:**
- The program has been broadcast steadily; now, twice a week. It is considered to be the most popular program at RTA.
- The number of kids and adults watching it is not known, but according to RTA, since 2003 2 million television sets had been imported. We assume that 25% of televisions are on when the program is aired, with at least 4 children watching per screen, so we estimate 2 million viewers. Because RTA also broadcasts via satellite in Central Asia (also in Europe and the US this summer), many refugee children watch the program as indicated by the many letters and emails from Afghan children in Pakistan, Iran, Dubai, etc.
- We are presently supporting the start up of a marketing department within Ayenda Sazan with the aim of getting local and international NGOs to sponsor the program, and guarantee an independent financial, sustainable future.
- The program has a female editor-in-chief and an enthusiastic staff of which half is female. The program has dealt with many taboos (i.e. a girl singing a song about a bird: the first cultural, non-religious act on TV after the Taliban). It has given children in remote areas a voice and influenced politicians to improve living conditions for children.

**Impact:**
There are hundreds of practical examples of news items aired in the last three years that have contributed to more understanding, dialogue and emancipation between children and between children and adults. A positive side effect of the Kids News program is that many adults are watching alongside their children, stimulating dialogue between different generations, and thus making small but concrete steps to conflict prevention.

**Weaknesses:**
The weakness of the project today is the financial sustainability of the program. Looking back, we should have focused more on training RTA in making a long-term business plan, as we do now. This business plan is driven by sponsorship by child NGOs, which sponsor the team’s production costs in return for a journalistic item that focuses on activities of the child NGO. An external threat to the program is the fragile political balance of power, with journalistic freedom under increasing threat.

**Strengths:**
Ayenda Sazan is a truly modernizing program, with critical but journalistic ethical and educational information for youngsters and great appreciation from its viewers. In May, the program will be aired three times a week and a website will be launched with
help from the Kids News Network. We believe the program will soon be financially independent and continue to make a difference in Afghanistan.

Contacts:
Contact for more information: www.freevoice.nl
Entertainment-Education: Exploring communication strategies against violence and conflict

By Dr. Thomas Tufte, Professor Roskilde University

My claim is that communication practices often end as disempowering rather than empowering processes in society.

Public and private non-commercial communication strategies can become an important societal force in establishing communications environments that can counter the aggression and desperation inherent in practices of violence and conflict. Communication for peace is about citizen-driven strategies to strengthen or rebuild the social fabric in society.

4. Storytelling can take on the role of making private concerns a public and thereby a matter of political concern.
5. Storytelling can be a vital human strategy for sustaining a sense of agency in the face of disempowering circumstances.

In many societies today, ordinary citizens are experiencing processes of rupture and transition. This is not least in situations of violence and conflict. In these situations, it is the social fabric upon which our society is built which is strained; roles are changing and in transition, and in the most violent cases, social fabric is being destructed.

Communication-wise, core strategic challenges are:

- How can we use communication strategically, as a tool in the process of repairing or weaving new social networks and thus a (re)newed societal foundation?
- How is or can media service their public, how can they serve genuine citizen concerns as outlined above, and how can they consequently, promote empowerment of the people, democracy and human rights?

Within the field of communication studies and communications practice today an approach gaining ground is that known as ‘communication for social change’. It is an approach which moves communication strategies in development work from being an addendum to help communicate and implement pre-established development goals and activities, to instead be at the heart of a development process.

This emerging communication paradigm is a move away from one well-known way to conceive communication strategically – the “epidemiology approach” – towards and a “social fabric approach” (Rodriguez 2004). The “epidemiology” approach conceives situations of social and political violence as a result of a “disease” that affects a specific community at a certain point in time. From this perspective, the goal of communication and media initiatives is to intervene in a conflict situation with pre-designed messages that address the negative factor and produce change in a specific direction – a direction pre-decided by the project “experts.” Communication and media are used to persuade individuals to adopt specific behaviours or attitudes, for example to dismantle negative ethnic stereotypes. Frequently, entertainment strategies are used to reach audiences in the hopes that – if entertained – audiences will receive, like, and internalise messages better.

The “social fabric” approach is very different. Here, social and political violence are understood as very complex phenomena that emerge at the intersection of many factors ranging from unequal distribution of resources, weak state presence, corrupt government officials, impunity, and strong presence of illegal economies (such as drug
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Trafficking. All these, working in conjunction, erode the social fabric and normalise a culture of strong individuality, disbelief on the rule of law, fear and isolation, exclusion of difference, and lack of solidarity among individuals. In these contexts, communication for peace initiatives emerge as attempts to “re-knit” the social fabric.

Though we do not exactly determine our lives and the situation we live in, storytelling can at least help us defining the meaning. When others provide us with powerful narratives, with normative and moral judgements it brings us at least to negotiate the meaning of our lives. Similarly, we can use storytelling to make our own life experiences visible.

Reception theory has long proved the point that no single meaning can be deduced from screening a fictional narrative or any specific media text. In other words we can not through fixed messages in fiction or other media genres make sure that the recipients accept and appropriate the same meanings. The interesting point is to analyse how and which meaning-making is produced among the audience. Fiction’s truth is almost by definition unpredictable.

Instead of fragmentation, lack of unity, sound bite-like and dispersed representation of lived life we should as citizens contribute to a proactive use of the media, where stories are being told that contribute to social integration, empowerment and participation of citizens. One of the key problems which lead to conflict and acts of violence today is the lack of recognizing ordinary peoples experience with violence and conflict and to deal with it in respectful manners.

Within the work of international agencies, in the UN, international NGOs and bilateral agencies, entertainment-education has gained significant prominence in recent years.

Entertainment-Education is the use of entertainment as a communicative practice crafted to strategically communicate about development issues in a manner and with a purpose that can range from the more narrowly defined social marketing of individual behaviours to the liberating and citizen-driven articulation of social change agendas.

While the first generation of EE dealt with the marketing of social behaviour like health related behaviour, more recent TV-fiction formats have been used as tools for the purpose of articulating social change. They have been integrated into multi-methodological strategies combining several media, linked through partnerships to civil society and grass root activities as well as to formal instruction.

From a previous focus on correct and possibly culture sensitive messages conveyed via the mass media, the focus is today more on problem identification, articulation of debate and advocating social change. There is a stronger recognition of the fact that lack of information is not at the core of the problem. The core is rather the ability to identify the problems and act upon them. The process of problem identification is itself empowering process.

It is an illusion that we can direct and control people’s behaviour and collective action, and the examples are growing of a communicational practice based on some different principles. To address violence, conflict, diseases, gender inequity, any social and development challenge in our risk society of today the communication principles to be used don’t aspire to direct and control behaviour but to articulate processes of
dialogue, building empathy, recognize difference and stimulate participation. Entertainment-education can serve that aim.
Search for Common Ground’s Radio Soap Opera in Nepal
By Francis Rolt, Consultant, Search for Common Ground

Root causes:
Poverty, exclusion, ideology, caste, ethnicity, environmental degradation etc.

Triggers:
Demands made by the Maoists on government, followed by announcement of the start of the peoples’ war. Failure of the government to take the Maoists seriously.

Media landscape:
A moribund state radio (Radio Nepal) which covered practically the whole country, and in 2005 about 50 community and commercial (‘private’) radio stations broadcasting across the country. Radio Nepal produced its own news and a few other programmes but most of its production was paid for and/or produced by a) commercial companies, b) Agencies (UNICEF etc.). Community stations varied enormously, from those broadcasting almost only music, to a few very engaged and involved in social change.

There were three major production houses with social change agendas producing high quality programming: Communications Corner which produced a syndicated news bulletin; Equal Access Nepal which produced a number of mostly youth oriented programmes; and Antenna Foundation Nepal which produced mostly magazine programmes and news as well as a highly successful TV drama series (focusing on caste issues).

The press (seven newspapers) was important in the cities, but not outside (rural Nepal has low literacy rates), including 2 state owned newspapers. Some private newspapers and weeklies are produced to very high journalistic and design standards. There were 4 TV stations (3 private) broadcasting to the Kathmandu and other large city-based populations. Finally, there were 2 news agencies, one state and one private.

Media legislation:
Press freedom suffered under the state of emergency invoked by King Gyanendra in 2005. Media watchdog Reporters Without Borders said Nepal accounted for half of the world’s censorship cases in that year. It said more than 400 journalists had been arrested, attacked or threatened. Private radio stations were ordered not to broadcast political news, apart from that produced by the state radio.
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Aims:
Overall project aims were to foster the participation of key sectors of the population in Nepal in addressing root causes of the conflict at national and local levels by reaching approximately 4 million Nepalese directly through a radio programme and complementary activities.

Immediate objectives:
Immediate objectives of the entire project (i.e. the soap opera + ancillary activities);
- Increased level of knowledge and understanding of conflict issues among the Nepali population
- Strengthened capacity of the population in conflict mitigation at local and national levels
- Improved media organisations' and professionals' awareness, knowledge and use of peace building media
- Strengthened civil society actors who are given a voice in reconciliation, conflict prevention and resolution, through the interactive use of media
- Increased youth engagement in peace building activities at local and national levels.

Specific target groups include youth aged 14-24 (4 million direct beneficiaries); youth leaders who will be trained in leadership development (300 direct beneficiaries); the Nepali media professionals who will participate in our activities (75 direct beneficiaries); and the civil society activists who will be involved in conflict resolution training (160 direct beneficiaries).

Strategy:
Radio is the most effective form of communication in the rural areas, which is where the conflict is played out. Soap opera can attract a mass audience, it can be used as a medium to discuss difficult issues in a ‘soft’ format, and to bring an audience along with you as the main characters alter their attitudes and behaviour.

The curriculum summit for the soap opera identified twenty attitudinal changes which the soap would seek to effect among the target audiences. Among these were; Youth believe that they have choices; Youth believe that they can have an impact on root causes by working together across dividing lines; Youth believe that they have a role in community building; Youth believe that cooperation with elders is effective and possible; Adults believe that cooperation with youth can help resolve societal/community problems; Youth believe that discussion, debate and understanding are better alternatives to solving conflict; Youth believe that they have a role as convenors/peacemakers in their communities.

SFCG has used soap opera in many other countries in conflict and knows that in association with community outreach this is an effective mechanism to begin the long process of recovery from conflict, and from all the hatreds and difficulties which a violent conflict produces. Strategically we focused on the Western and Central regions as these were the most affected by the violence, and are the poorest regions of Nepal. Methodologically speaking linking the soap to community outreach (radio listener groups, youth groups) is essential, in the sense that it gives listeners a framework within which they can begin the process of change in themselves and in their communities, as well as providing some psychological/intellectual support – recognition that they aren’t alone, that they’re part of a much wider process of change going on throughout Nepal.

Partners:
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Antenna Foundation Nepal, a Nepali NGO/production studio, and European Commission (funder)

**Outputs:**
- One baseline survey of youth’s role in peacebuilding
- One radio producer trained in soap opera for conflict transformation
- Five young writers trained in writing radio soap opera for conflict transformation
- Three 15 minute soap opera episodes broadcast every week for 18 months on selected FM radio stations and on the state radio
- Youth leadership development trainings (300 participants); working with youth leaders on conflict transformation, peacebuilding and leadership skills
- Conflict resolution training for 160 civil society activists

**Impact:**
The results of a cohort study completed in April 2007 xxx suggest ... (info. later)
Anecdotal evidence suggests strongly that

In December the CD reported: The youth leadership camp in Dang brought together youth leaders from 11 VDCs (village development committees) from the southern part of Dang District. The participants were from different ethnic/caste backgrounds and some diverging political backgrounds as well. Through the dialogue process they decided to form an umbrella and get working on peacebuilding activities of different sorts. Already, they have organized a feast against caste discrimination and a football tournament aimed at reintegrating children who have returned from the war. Meanwhile a youth group in Bardia that participated in the Leadership training has organized a series of football tournaments in February, including a tournament between Maoists and Police!

EqualAccess reported to me that they had had: ...good feedback from youth in the mid west on a field trip in Feb about SFCG’s drama (at about 50% of the youth sites they mentioned the program unprompted)

**Weaknesses:**
Underestimated the difficulties of training a group of inexperienced young people to be writers of a soap opera, which becomes a relentless roller-coaster, needing to be continually fired up and fed more and more and more scripts, with no let up for 18 months. On the other hand in this kind of conflict work it’s probably impossible to be fully prepared. Underestimated the length of time it would take to do an effective survey of attitudes among youth.

**Strengths:**
In a few months the soap (*Naya Bato Naya Paila – Treading a New Path*) became one of the most popular radio programmes with youth in Nepal (especially in Mid and Far West). It has got young people thinking and talking and learning about how to change themselves, their way of thinking and their environment. The way in which it is linked to the community outreach programme is extremely important, and gives great resilience to the project. Feedback mechanisms (for writers, for evaluation and for SFCG/Antenna) from ‘Community Focal Points’ based in villages/small towns are also a strength.

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Centre Lokole – Democratic Republic of Congo

2002-2007
By Ross Howard, Media & Democracy Group.

The project Centre Lokole in the Democratic Republic of Congo was launched in 2002 by the Brussels-based NGO Search for Common Ground to support conflict resolution by communications initiatives encouraging peaceful cohabitation among polarized groups. The multi-faceted program included four radio programs for local and national broadcast; support for indigenous NGOs, and conflict sensitive reporting training for local media. An October 2003 evaluation found substantial success in part of the radio initiative. The region is:

Eastern DR Congo, adjacent to Rwanda-Burundi and an area historically and recently inundated by Swahili-speaking Rwandan refugees and migrants interacting with indigenous Lingala-speaking Congolese.

Root conflict:
As a result of the institutionalized ethnic discrimination by Congolese authorities, and the extension of civil wars in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, tensions among the region’s ethnic groups resulted in widespread violent conflict, migration, instability, and alienation among the migrant and indigenous peoples.

Trigger:
Distrust, misperception and grievances between the two major groups were easily manipulated by Congolese governments, recurrent regional wars and rebel armies. Regional instability threatened to undermine the 2001 national peace process.

Media Landscape.
Media had been tightly controlled by government for most of the country’s post-colonial history. A small number of radio stations existed in the region in addition to the state broadcaster. A widely-dispersed predominantly rural population, geographical obstacles and extremely limited infrastructure plus illiteracy made radio the most effective communication technology for accessing significant populations. Broadcast skills were low, independent public-interest programming was extremely limited. Rather than seek a broadcast licence, SFCG became a producer of high-quality content made freely available to radio stations under agreements of use.

Aims
The project aims to support the peace process, promote unity for the Democratic Republic of Congo, and reinforce the capacity of local organizations to resolve local conflicts through the use of media, arts, dialogue, and training.

Immediate objectives:
1. To help citizens understand the peace process; explain the agreement’s relevancy to everyday life; support participation in the agreement-related public dialogue process.
2. To increase contact between east and west Congo; give opportunities to hear the voices/positions/languages of the west; make known positive changes within the country.
3. To get people to talk to each other; demonstrate examples of solidarity; strengthen capacity in peace journalism; strengthen capacity in conflict resolution.
Strategy:
Working in three languages; lack of a functioning non-partisan local partner and/or broadcast outlet; recruiting and training local talent; achieving cultural sensitivity in programming and participation by divergent ethnicities; achieving conflict sensitivity in programming, such as discussing ethnicity, political affiliation, addressing rape and hate speech; evaluating impacts on a dispersed and substantially illiterate audiences.

Partners:
The multi-year project was originated by SFCG and established as a stand-alone production studio and community service institution within the region. Funding was provided by international agencies and supporters of SFCG.

Outputs:
Four different-format radio programs were created and made available for weekly use by four local broadcasters including the state broadcaster: an entertaining soap opera (drama/comedy) dealing with very immediate, familiar local issues and their peaceful resolution, such as reconciling lives of young girls who had fled from the war with the ones who had stayed at home; a roundtable of political and civic leaders presented with popularly-expressed concerns; a current affairs program documenting incidents of coexistence achieved between conflicted individuals or communities; and a multi-ethnic panel discussion program. The latter three programs also included impartial news about the peace process and national dialogue. Separately, conflict-sensitive reporting training and conflict resolution training was offered to regional interests.

Impact:
A late 2003 evaluation concluded the soap opera program was substantially the most popular and influential, perhaps reflecting both its own production values and the public’s appetite for entertaining, easily-identified educational material with implicit messages about behaviour. The program was rated as highly trusted by listeners. Listeners identified strongly with specific characters and reported they altered their responses to potential conflict with other ethnic groups because of the program’s influence, as intended in Objective 3, to assist reconciliation among polarized peoples. The program increased public demand for conflict resolution skills. The evaluation team reported that “the degree of motivation that this medium instills in people has surprised…(us). The results from the soap opera go beyond the intended goals and objectives of Centre Lokole.” Objectives 1 and 2 had lesser success rates.

Weaknesses:
The soap opera was limited to the most limited broadcast-range station. The radio programs deserved more integration with grass-roots-based peacebuilding activities requiring additional capacity and support. Gender mainstreaming in scripts required more attention.

Strengths:
A well-funded NGO capable of extended engagement, flexibility to adapt programming, wide use of best communication media. Since 2004 the program has increased its production capacity, added new radio shows, added broadcast partners, adopted additional communication technologies such as community theatre.

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Conclusion:

The case studies alert us to the numerous challenges faced by media organizations active in conflict zones, and inspire us with the creative avenues that these organizations have taken to achieve their goals. The cases highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the various media initiatives, and thus provoke discussion on the best means and strategies for affecting the media landscape in the context of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. In deriving the Toolboxes for use in this capacity, the case studies provided valuable guidance and inspiration. It may be noted that future Toolboxes may be formulated for—among others—donors and technology experts and providers involved in media development, support and content production in conflict environments.

Energized by the enthusiasm and willingness of media policy-makers, strategists, practitioners, and academics to share and debate ideas and learn from one another, we hope that the Toolboxes will stimulate a fruitful dialogue and collaborative process that will ultimately improve the work in the field.
The Bonn Network: A Vision for the Future

Niels Jørgen Thøgersen, Media and Communication Consultant

The Cold War is over. We have all celebrated its disappearance for years. And we should continue to do so – and try to ensure that it does not come back in one form or another.

But the end of the world-wide Cold War did not mean that conflicts ended altogether. Unfortunately, they continued in large parts of the world, including in Europe in the Balkans. Not wars between nations, but inside nations. At all times – also today – we can easily count 40-50 serious conflicts around the world. The UN, the European Union, NATO, the African Union and others are active to try to stop them. In some cases with success, in others without.

It is evident that new and more efficient methods have to be launched to help to improve the situation, to help in peace building and also in preventing potential conflicts from breaking out.

We believe that all MEDIA – radio, the written press, the Internet, etc. — should play a much stronger role in this context than they do today.

Media are strong. Media exist everywhere. And media normally feel a strong sense of responsibility for positive development in societies where they operate. This is true for especially the so-called public service media, but also applies to most of the others.

Don’t media already play a role in peace keeping and conflict prevention? Yes, they do. Many projects around the world are good proof of that. Either the media initiate these efforts themselves, or they are part of projects supported by international organisations, governments, and others. So far so good.

But the real and serious problem is that the strategies for working with the media are hardly ever coordinated. On the ground there is often some collaboration between the implementers, but normally each donor starts its own projects and run them by itself without coordination and often in competition with others. This is, of course, very bad and very counter-productive.

The BONN NETWORK is an initiative to try to solve that problem. What do we want to do?

First of all, we want to ensure an ongoing informal coordination between all actors in this field. We want to build a simple and non-bureaucratic structure, which includes all potential stakeholders from intergovernmental organisations (UN, UNDP, UNESCO, the World Bank, OSCE, the Council of Europe, etc.) to the EU institutions, the media (incl. the EBU and IFJ), the many NGOs operating in the field, and the research institutes dealing with these questions. By bringing them together in the Network, we have a great chance to ensure that they are all well-informed in a timely manner on what is going on and can benefit from each other’s experience.

Secondly, we want the BONN NETWORK to be pro-active with the donors in the sense that we try to identify potential conflict areas well in advance, prepare a project to try to address these problems in time, and arrange that those NGOs and media which
have the necessary expertise and capacity to run such projects will finalise the proposal and run it, if the funding is forthcoming. It goes without saying that each project will have different participants.

Thirdly, we want the BONN NETWORK to organise itself in such a way that it is able to act with great speed and efficiency when there is a need. Success in conflict prevention is very often a question of time — to be able to act very, very quickly. The NETWORK will create a database with the names and contact points of as many experts as possible. The database will also contain an operational overview of the media landscapes in countries and areas where conflicts might arise. It will also in its database have an up-to-date overview of possible funding possibilities for different types of needs. It will build a very efficient and fast communication network between its members. And it will try to have framework agreements with important donors like the EU’s Stability Instrument and its mechanism for rapid reaction, giving it the possibility to act and react with immediate effect — and without having to wait for procedures, which can take too long to complete. These procedures must, if possible, be finalised before the needs arise. It is evident that donors like the EU and others are very interested in working with large networks like the BONN NETWORK instead of having to deal with individual partners in each case.

And, as a fourth point, the BONN NETWORK will on a permanent basis work closely with universities and other research institutions to learn from their research in previous experience in the field. Why not learn from experience in the past? This will bring us all forward. Several universities, including European and American universities, have shown a very active interest in working with the NETWORK about these matters.

These are the main reasons why we took the initiative to create the BONN NETWORK. It is an informal network, where all participants remain independent and responsible for their own activities, but where closer coordination and cooperation will bring everybody, not least the solutions to serious conflicts around the world, decisively forward.

We strongly believe that this is a WIN-WIN situation for EVERYBODY. For solving the conflicts. For the donors. For the media. For the NGOs.

The conference in Bonn at the end of April was a very good start for the discussion on cooperation. More and more partners are joining the Network, and the first coordinated projects are already coming into place in several parts of the world.

Let’s all continue very actively along this road.
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Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum
By Paul A. Linnarz, CEO DW – MEDIA SERVICES GmbH

During the conference in April 2007 in Bonn, more than 100 high-ranking representatives of inter-governmental and media organisations, researchers, NGOs and donor institutions were invited to outline rapid action tools and coordinated strategies in peace building and conflict prevention.

The two-day meeting generated some impressive results. Participants from more than 70 different institutions and 20 countries engaged in discussion, highlighting the international and interdisciplinary approach of the working groups.

It was clear from the beginning that the exchange of ideas and experiences is not a one-time event, as new strategies and better coordination between the various players need time to develop. The conference was meant to be a starting point or, as Deutsche Welle Director-General Erik Bettermann put it in his welcome address, “the beginning of a sustainable process”.

Therefore, the participants are invited to join the Bonn Network, which aims to provide a continuous virtual platform for dialogue. In addition, “Media in Peace Building and Conflict Prevention” will be the focus of the first “Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum” in 2008.

Starting next year (June 2 - 4), the Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum (www.dw-world.de/globalmediaforum) will take place annually in Bonn. The main agenda items will change but the event will always address ways to cope with global challenges and developments that are largely influenced by the media.

The target group is both international and interdisciplinary. Media representatives from around the world, high-profile experts from inter-governmental and non-governmental organisations, politicians, entrepreneurs and scientists will sit around the same table at the conference. A simple philosophy drives the initiative: Those working on the future have to think in networks – and in global dimensions.

Although next year’s conference on media in peace building and conflict prevention takes on a global and not just a European perspective, Deutsche Welle considers it to be an important contribution to the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue.

Germany’s international broadcaster has dedicated itself to intercultural dialogue for decades. Deutsche Welle values credibility. It stands for independent, thorough, pluralistic reporting. Journalists from more than 60 countries work together every day to produce content in 30 languages for DW-TV, DW-RADIO and DW-WORLD.DE. At the DW-AKADEMIE, Deutsche Welle passes on its know-how to partners from all continents, while the participants share their expertise with German colleagues.

Bonn is a centre of international dialogue – and not just because Deutsche Welle is there. More than a dozen United Nations agencies are based in the city on the Rhine River. About 100 international institutions and non-governmental organisations work there as well. The city hosts several “global players” of German business and some 50 high-profile, globally networking science facilities operate in Bonn and its immediate neighbourhood. Important agencies and some ministries of the German government are also located in the former German capital.
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The World Conference Center Bonn (www.worldccbonn.com), located just a few steps from Deutsche Welle’s headquarters, serves as the backdrop for the conference. Germany’s former Plenary Chamber on the Rhine River offers numerous conference rooms, a spacious foyer for presentations and catering, and a 400-seat restaurant.

Around 800 guests are expected to attend the first Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum. The three-day conference offers podium discussions and workshops, interactive presentations and exhibits, meeting points and an attractive supporting programme planned with the help of renowned partners. Participants from around the world will find an ideal environment to discuss media in peace building and conflict prevention, international support to media in post-conflict states, and the role of the media in preventing imminent conflicts and strengthening democracy.

The event offers interested partners and sponsors the opportunity to actively participate by making financial, strategic or content-related contributions. You are invited to have a hand in making the Deutsche Welle Global Media Forum a huge success.
The German Policy on Media in Conflict Prevention
By Ambassador Friedrich Däuble, the Federal Foreign Office

The German government adopted in 2004 an "Action Plan on Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution and Post-Conflict Peace-Building". The plan was drafted by a team of academia, journalists and civil servants and of course deals among other areas with media as a strategic leverage point for crisis prevention. It is worthwhile quoting in full the concise paragraph on media in this document, which is of fundamental importance:

"Professional and independent media are an important building block of effective crisis prevention. Many crises have shown that media can be instruments for inciting terror and violence as well as instruments for crisis prevention. The challenge is to prevent existing media from being instrumentalized by parties to a conflict and to create general conditions conducive to journalistic reporting that is objective and conflict-sensitive and thus peace-oriented. Precisely those journalists who report from and on crisis regions must be aware of the critical nature of their role and exercise their profession in a particularly responsible manner, especially with regard to the separation of news from commentary and above all with regard to the scrutiny of statements by parties to a conflict. In order for the media to play a full and active role in crisis prevention, it is essential to not only ensure freedom of the press but also further the development of a journalistic ethic. In Germany, too, the media are called upon to heighten awareness of conflicts and their resolution. Fewer than half of the world's people have access to television or the Internet. Especially in many countries in Africa, South America and the Middle East, the number of internet users is still minuscule in comparison to Europe and North America. For this reason, traditional radio and newspapers will continue to play an important role. A conflict-sensitive and peace-conducive approach is likewise desirable in the digital media. There are limits to freedom of speech, however, notably in the case of "hate-speeches". International media, by virtue of their greater distance from the fray, can often have a moderating and conciliatory influence on the parties to a conflict. Cultural sensitivity and impartiality are particularly important in this context.

The Federal Government promotes media policies that aim to break down negative stereotypes and further intercultural dialogue and peaceful conflict resolution. Political foundations help local media to play their educative role as information providers in the democratic development process. The Federal Government supports independent media and dialogue programmes for media in various regions through the Institute for Foreign Relations (ifa). At the request of the Federal Government, InWEnt (Capacity Building International, Germany) is increasingly focusing on crisis prevention awareness training for foreign journalists. Since January 2004 the DW Academy, which evolved out of the Deutsche Welle (DW) Training Centres, has been providing upgrading training on behalf of the Federal Government for foreign professionals and managers from the field of radio and television broadcasting. Within the framework of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, the participants are also working to further the drafting of media legislation that
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meets European standards. International NGOs receive funding to realize film and radio programmes for crisis regions that are specifically designed to have a conciliatory impact and help build peace capacities.

Especially in countries with limited range of domestic sources of information, the resources of international and German media can be drawn upon. Deutsche Welle is responsible for presenting a well-rounded picture of life in Germany and communicating the opinions of the German public on important issues. Topics related to crisis prevention and its actors and methods are incorporated into these programmes.

Existing programmes to support the work of journalists and the media in partner countries could be more strongly geared to crisis prevention in order to meet the goal of a more prominent role of the media in this area. It is countries with high conflict potential in particular that are often lacking both a journalistic ethic and the necessary political conditions.

Development of the information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure can make a key contribution to the emergence of rule-of-law structures. Information monopolies can be broken up, dissenting voices can make themselves heard, and political opinion formation processes can be encouraged. Information and communication technologies can thus improve the general conditions for civilian crisis prevention.

Concrete initiatives
- Through special media programmes, local and regional media representatives are being made aware of the impact of their reporting on crises themselves and on the aim of crisis prevention.
- The Federal Government is expanding training programmes for journalists from crisis regions as a focus of its endeavours.
- The Federal Government is supporting the creation of independent bodies for the exercise of journalistic self-regulation along the lines of the German Press Council and the broadcasting councils.
- The Federal Government is providing targeted support to further the development of and facilitate access to information and communication technologies in partner countries, also through assistance in the enactment of corresponding media legislation and provision of advisory services for its implementation.

The German government remains committed to the Action Plan and spares no effort to put it fully into practice. In Afghanistan we are confronted with all questions related to rebuilding from scratch radio, TV and print media. These questions are: Should we support national institutions by just giving them some money or equipment? Or should we try to work directly on the ground? Should we direct our aid to official institutions only or should we try to develop a private sector? What is the best way to develop a stable democratic society with an acceptable level of well being? We have learned in Afghanistan that we need a better strategy - that we have to build on lessons learned, that we have to form and extend networks of all kinds in the media.

The conference on Media in Peace building and Conflict Prevention contributed to making progress on crisis prevention. Therefore I have been extremely grateful to Deutsche Welle for organizing this event. I am happy that the Foreign Ministry was
able to help and support DW in setting it up. These efforts have to go on, and Germany will continue to be helpful.
The Value of Media in Conflict Prevention Outbalances the Risks

By Christian Berger, Head of Unit, Crisis Management and Conflict Prevention, EC DG RELEX

EU is going to face a number of challenges over the next 10, 20, 30, 40 years. One is conflicts – could be regional conflicts, could be international conflicts, could be internal conflicts but could also be trans-border issues like international terrorism or organized crime. Another challenge is the unbalanced distribution of wealth around the world. Another one is environmental challenges, the degradation of our environment. The fourth one – perhaps linked to the environmental one – is demographic challenges we are facing in Europe and around the world.

Now the Union is trying to respond to all these challenges and I think it is very clear that the European population has a very high expectation of the Union to respond to those challenges. Not only the European population but also the international community at large has a high expectation of us that we contribute to the meeting of those challenges. We hear a lot from our colleagues that what they like best of what we are doing is the soft power approach to conflicts. Now the instruments that we have developed have been mentioned as conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

To understand how these fit in conflicts, one has to be aware of the cycle of conflict. A conflict normally has four cycles. One is the pre-conflict stage when everything is going nominally right, where the international community at large is providing all sorts of assistance to a country for democratization and institution building and so on. Things can go wrong and you enter into a hot phase of a conflict. Again the international community often comes to the rescue with humanitarian support and protection support and things like that. Then after the conflict hot period is over it is again the international community trying to help a country find a stable solution for its situation. Finally, we enter the post-conflict period, which is as important as the pre-conflict period. You may know the World Bank statistic that 50% of all countries coming out of a conflict fall back into a conflict within five years.

The challenges I mentioned earlier are some of the main things people talk about when they mention root causes for conflicts but of course there is also overtones which are ethnic, which are religious. I think this is where the media comes into play and has to play a very strong role and this has been fully recognized by the EU and by the Commission in particular. Here we have the problem of what media is actually doing. Is the media helpful or is the media actually hindering the finding of a solution to a conflict or dealing with a crisis situation.
I think we are fully aware of the risks of using the media and I would like to mention a few of them. One is that one conflict – like the conflict in the Middle East – often is occupying space when other conflicts where more people are dying are perhaps not that present in the media. The opposite is fatigue. If too much about the same conflict is in the media people get tired. Again the Middle East is a good example. Media can also be biased; spread prejudices or favor one participant in a conflict over another.

We also see that often the media is criticized for trying to be objective. That means that if you report something objectively like a suicide bombing in the Middle East or an Israeli retaliation to a suicide bombing. This can often be portrayed by the other side as an inflammatory action.

Now at the same time we value the impact the media can have on conflicts and on crisis situations. So this is the mirror image to the risks. One is the diversity of the media – that you get a lot of different information of a conflict. Second is the impartiality of the media. Thirdly is the peace building effect that the media can have and that is particularly at the community level.

What can the media do in order to address issues of conflict and crisis situations? It can help change the attitudes about the others other vis-à-vis the other party to the conflict. It can create awareness about a conflict in the international arena but also it can create awareness about the preoccupations and other things on the other side of the fence. Tell the other party of the conflict what they are preoccupied with. And it can help us in the international community and the EU to develop a communication strategy when it comes to addressing conflicts and crisis situations.

Let me now be a little more concrete on what the EU and the Commission is doing in this field. There are a number of issues and a varying degree of involvement. With our political contacts with our partner states we are always raising the issue of media and freedom of the press. We are raising human rights issues. We are raising democratization issues. We make this a very important component of our bilateral agreements with third countries. One important area here is Euro-Mediterranean partnership with our North African and Middle Eastern countries with the issue of democratization and human rights, including freedom of press. These are essential elements of our relationships. But we go one step further. We also try to get those countries to help achieve those goals by providing technical assistance, by providing funding to projects. One thing we do not want to do, we do not want to use the Commission for passing “Spin Doctor” messages to the outside world. This is a very delicate issue for institutions like the Commission in its relationship with the media.

We have a lot of instruments at our disposal. One is research, and there is a lot of research being done in terms of conflict and crisis management and the role of the media. Besides research there are different funding instruments, one of which is very new; it is the instrument of stability.
The stability instrument came into being only at the beginning of this year and has a short and long term component. The long-term component is addressing the issues of radicalization, issues of “Islamaphobia”, is addressing general issues of that kind. The short-term component can be tied very specifically to a crisis situation. To give you an example, during the Lebanon War when radio stations were bombed in Beirut, we could have stepped in to help build the radio transmitters because as you recall the wrong radio station was bombed, not the Hezbollah one but the moderate one.

Secondly we have the human rights instrument that addresses the issues of democratization and freedom of press.

On top of this we have geographic instruments that are addressing very specific issues and situation in countries. Again let me mention the Middle East, you have the European Partnership for Peace Program which allows us to fund peace-related media activities. We have funded a peace radio station in Ramallah, which is broadcasting in Arabic, Hebrew and English. Another is an Internet project called “Bitter Lemons”, which allows Arabs and Israelis to voice their thoughts on the Middle East Peace Process. A third one you may know is done by Search for Common Ground. We have been funding the Sesame Street activities and we have funded five video clips that are trying to explain to the other side what people think about the core issues of the Middle East Peace Process, borders, Jerusalem, refugees and the like.

Now, what we are going to do next is to be more operational in our work with the media and there could be on the one hand helping to build up capacity in third countries when it comes to the media. Look at the media structures with which the media is working and provide technical assistance to media organizations. That is on the operational side.

One thing, which I am very grateful to this conference, is building up networks. I think that we here have a number of organizations that we need to bring together. These are professional organizations representing journalists, monitoring what the media is doing, or helping develop the media, and there are also foundations like Deutsche Welle or BBC Foundation which have an educational aspect and approach to things.

We are looking forward to continuing the work in this forum in the conference next year in order to get ideas from all the organizations represented here and also to see as we, the Commission and EU, can help these organizations to do their work out in the field.

**Early Warning, Media and Prevention of Conflicts**

**Dr. Monica Wohlfeld**, Deputy Director Centre for Conflict Prevention, OSCE
The OSCE has a long-standing and distinguished history of activities in the field of conflict prevention and peace-building. The OSCE’s conflict prevention tools include regular political dialogue and exchange of views among OSCE participating States in the Permanent Council, the network of OSCE Field Operations, and permanent Institutions like the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights/ODIHR, Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. These tools are complemented by various ad hoc mechanisms applied whenever needed: Personal representatives of the Chairman-in-Office, fact-finding missions, Task Forces and steering groups, etc. Within the OSCE Secretariat, the Conflict Prevention Centre is responsible for implementing OSCE tasks in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.

In the early 1990s, and especially in view of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, it became clear that the apparatus at the disposal of the OSCE for preventing and resolving conflicts was in need of adaptation and enhancement. The Budapest Summit in 1994 cast the OSCE as “a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management” with a “flexible and dynamic” approach. New mechanisms, procedures and political instruments were established to facilitate this role. The emphasis shifted from mechanisms of prevention of inter-state conflict, mainly based on politico-military instruments, to an increasing attention to the factors that generate conflicts within and between States. To this end “second generation” instruments, such as permanent Institutions and Missions of long duration were created. The Field Operations are new forms of international involvement into potential conflict situations.

There are three independent Institutions, which serve primarily to support participating States in the implementation of OSCE commitments. In doing so, they work very closely with the OSCE Field Operations, which are present on the ground and have established relationships with local governments, NGOs and representatives of civil society. One of the three independent Institutions is the OSCE Representative for the Freedom of the Media.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media

The Representative and his office are an OSCE institution dedicated to dealing with the media, reflecting the importance that the 56 OSCE participating States places on respect for media freedom. The Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media is based in Vienna and has a team of 9 officers.

The mandate of the Representative is clear: helping journalists who find themselves in a difficult situation, helping States improve their media structures, and helping Governments and institutions improve the education of their journalists.

OSCE commitments related to freedom of the media are enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, where the East and West committed themselves to freedom of expression and, equally, to the principles of tolerance and mutual respect between people holding differing opinion and beliefs. At the Budapest Summit in 1994, world leaders once again took the opportunity to strongly reaffirm their commitment to freedom of expression as a fundamental human right, and to independent and pluralistic media as vital to free and open societies.
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Today, in case of non-compliance with the OSCE commitments the Representative seeks “direct contact, in an appropriate manner, with the participating State”. In this way, he takes an active role in preventing the escalation of issues that concern the media.

The Role of OSCE Field Operations as instrument of early warning, mediation and peace-building

OSCE Missions and field activities – there are some 19 of them now in operation, in South-Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia – ensure that the OSCE community is kept informed of developments in its various areas and facilitate political processes designed to prevent or settle conflicts. They also assist the host countries with longer term post-conflict rehabilitation tasks. The mandates, composition and operation of Missions are increasingly varied, underlining the flexibility of this instrument. To give some examples, Field Operations are involved in:

- Assisting in the organization and monitoring of elections;
- Providing support for building or strengthening democratic institutions and for the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
- Promoting the respect of human rights and the protection of the rights of national minorities;
- Helping to facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Monitoring, verifying and assisting in fulfilling agreements on the peaceful settlement of conflicts;
- Supporting the collection of weapons and arms, and their destruction;
- Promoting economic development;
- Providing support in the rehabilitation and reconstruction of various aspects of society, for example reforming the police sector and developing a viable civil society;
- Supporting the development or strengthening of free and fair media.

This last point is of course of relevance to our discussions here today. Let me give you some examples of media-related activities that OSCE Field missions carry out in view of conflict prevention or post-conflict rehabilitation.

In South-Eastern Europe, OSCE Missions put much effort in strengthening the capacities of government institutions and of local journalists to deal with the legacy of war crimes and to foster public discussion on the recent past. For example, the Mission to Serbia has organized in 2005 and 2006 visits of journalists to Bosnia and Herzegovina and to Croatia to enable them to see with their own eyes how war crimes were being researched, investigated and tried in their neighbouring countries. Discussions were also organized on the media’s crucial role in reporting war crime-related issues.

Special attention has also been devoted in this region to the younger generations. In the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, the OSCE supports courses to train the next generation of journalists. The former OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Mr. Helmut Duve, initiated the so-called “mobile culture container” which travelled for three years in the conflict-ridden countries of the Balkans, offering a flexible venue for meeting, musical, dance and theatre performances, classes and workshops, radio stations and photo laboratories for young people between the ages of 15 and 21. Through this initiative, a network of 11 school newspapers and seven
Much attention is given to enhancing media legislation in the countries where the OSCE operates. In Armenia, the OSCE Office chairs the “Media Legislation Working Group” which serves as an open forum for exchanging information and discussing problems. In Georgia, the Mission is active in monitoring the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act in the regions as well as in the capital. In Moldova, the Mission has supported efforts for fundamental reform of Moldova’s broadcasting legislation. Promoting media freedom on both sides of the Dniestr/Nistru River remains a key activity of the Mission, which also closely monitors the national public broadcaster Teleradio Moldova.

In Central Asia, the focus is on training journalists on journalistic skills and information technology. The OSCE has created “Media Resource Centres” in Tajikistan, and in Kyrgyzstan. The OSCE also closely monitors the media in the run-up to elections.

Finally, the media is recognized to be an important means to reach out to minorities and help them preserve their identities. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the OSCE Mission helps a local newspaper produce a 4-page supplement in Romani language as a way to reach out the Roma community, and to preserve their language and their people. In Kosovo, the Mission also provides support for a series of Roma language radio programmes to address issues relevant to this community.

Kosovo is an interesting case study. Following news reports which detailed the account of the drowning of three Kosovar Albanian children, up to 60,000 people took to the streets in violent protests on 17 March 2004. Following these events, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media produced a detailed report on the “Role of the Media in the March 2004 Events in Kosovo”. The Mission in Kosovo – which is our largest field mission with over 2000 staff members – also drew lessons from these events and strengthened its media programme as a consequence. Three years down the road, the Mission’s efforts in this field resulted in significant improvements in institutional and legislative frameworks governing media operations. The Mission facilitated the establishment of the Kosovo Press Council, a self-regulatory body for the print media. The Kosovo Media Institute, a mid-career training facility for media professionals, opened its doors in January 2006. The Mission also assisted the Kosovo PISG in the drafting of defamation legislation.

From the perspective of Headquarters, the media reports which we get are very important for early warning purposes. Within the Conflict Prevention Centre, the Situation and Communication Room monitors open sources of media 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. The alerts which we receive from these media sources allow us to analyse developments at an early stage and take appropriate action.
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Environments, Development Communications Division, the World Bank:

Media plays an important role in governance and in development. Media disseminates information to markets and customers; it can influence investment behavior nationally and internationally; it can give a voice to the poor and others who are normally not heard. And media provides a platform for public discussion of matters of concern to society.

Media can play an important watchdog function exposing corrupt politicians and unethical behavior. Very often it is the international media that draws public attention to massive human rights abuses and political crises that are developing somewhere around the world. So I certainly believe - and so does my organization - that media has an important role to play in society. Without wanting to downplay this importance, we do believe, though, that the international focus on media development is too exclusive and too narrow and that we need a more systemic approach to communication, particularly in fragile states but it also applies beyond that to any governance situation.

Post-conflict situations provide great challenges. And yet, it also provides the great opportunity to get it right; to "build better" and to create a society that can withstand tension and manages conflict constructively. Conflict is an inherent part of any society and needs to be managed carefully and constructively to prevent it from taking on violent expressions. Research has shown that over 50% of countries coming out of conflict will slip back into violence within a few years; this statistic shows that we only have a narrow window to intervene and to create a system that will manage societal tension.

In talking about communication, I like very much (Jürgen) Habermas and his notion of the public sphere where state and society interface and build understanding through communicative action. Habermas' work provides a helpful conceptual framework that can be built upon for practical use. In post-conflict societies one major challenge is to reconstruct a thus functioning public sphere. I do believe that media is a highly relevant actor in this context, but I also believe that there are other actors that play a role and need to be taken into consideration when working in these environments. The state, for one, plays an important role.

When we look at the current post-conflict policy debate we see that it has moved from the notion of post-conflict peace building to state building - sometimes also referred to as "nation building." This now widely used reference to state building reflects the recognition of the relevance of the state for the survival of a society. Looking at the public sphere we also have Civil Society and Media playing an important watchdog and advocacy role; and we have the "enabling environment," meaning the legal and the regulatory framework and the market conditions under which these actors exist.

A comprehensive analysis requires looking not only at the single actors but also at the interaction between them: How do they relate to each other? How does the system work? Recognizing the importance of a professionally working media one should ask if journalists are allowed to do their job, if they have the space as well as the skills and the technical equipment to perform? Assessing the enabling environment requires to look at legislation and at licensing rights. Taxation is another issue that deserves attention: in certain countries media outlets have absurd taxes to pay and can simply not exist or prosper under these conditions.
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It is equally important to look at civil society: What role do they play? What are the issues important to them? How are they being heard? How do they receive information? Can they access information? Can they disseminate information? How do they relate to media? Is there some sort of partnership? Are they being taken seriously by the media? Are they being considered of public interest or are they being pushed aside?

From the World Bank perspective we are looking at the State. The State does have a central role to play and one should look at the communication capacity of the State like we assess any other sector to identify support possibilities and improve services in this field. Does the state have the capacity to provide the information? Does it have the capacity to collect it internally? It begins with very basics in a post-conflict society; is there an archive and a filing system? Is there an internal system that different government institutions use to share information? How is information shared between the center and the periphery - how does information get to the regions and to the rural areas? This becomes particularly relevant when you look at decentralization policies that are being implemented and quite often pushed. Decentralization of authority and implementation has to be developed hand-in-hand with a communication policy that ensures that information gets out to the rural areas and also flows back to the capital. Mechanisms of information sharing and of dialogue are of key concern when you try to rebuild a state.

The Bank has helped reform Ministries of Public Information to ensure that the state has a “champion of communication” who can convince others of the importance of this issue. Freedom of information acts have been helpful in creating transparency, but need to be matched by public capacity. Although it is the right of the citizen to access public information, state institutions and civil servants have to be actually aware of relevant information, know that there is a right on the side of the citizen to access it, and finally, be able to provide the requested information. One has to look at it systematically; it is impossible to implement a freedom of information act without also building state capacity to deliver on that. If not, it will create an imbalance.

I find it very important to look at language policy: What languages does the state use to communicate with its citizens? This is a very touchy and political sensitive issue particularly in a multi-ethnic/multi-lingual environment. Is public information being made available in languages that service the different ethnic or language groups? This is a crucial issue to take consideration when developing an inclusive societal dialogue.

It is important to develop media, but you also have to develop a state able to engage constructively with media. An understanding of the role of media and the capacity to engage with, and respond to it has to be developed on different levels. Entry points need to be created in different state institutions - be it in the prime minister’s or President’s office, the ministry of information, the police, the parliament and other public institutions - the training of media advisors, public information officers, media analysts and spokespersons is of importance in this regard.

State-society relations will only be functional if there is a structure that systematizes and guarantees a constructive engagement with media and with civil society - it is essential for a functioning societal dialogue.

In the World Bank we have taken a comprehensive perspective on communication, particularly in post-conflict environments. We do believe that if communication is not being taken seriously as a sector, as is health, infrastructure or any other field, it will
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not get the attention it deserves.

To summarize; communication and dialogue are central for good governance in general but play a particularly important role in post-conflict recovery. The issue has to be approached in a systemic way and addressed as a sectoral issue to get the policy attention, financial attention, the coordination it requires.

The Challenge of International Cooperation in Media Legislation
- Dr. Ivan Nikoltchev, Media and Information Society Division, Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs, Council of Europe

This brief essay builds on my personal experience with media development in the framework of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe as well as with the Council of Europe’s work in the field of freedom of expression and information in times of crisis. While I shall often refer to the Council of Europe, the views presented here are my personal ones.

The Council of Europe is a unique organization and the oldest political one on the continent. Its main objectives are to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In pursuing them, it follows certain logic. Normally, the first step would be to set standards for its member states on which they can base their policy and regulation work. These standards can be legally binding - like the well-known European Convention on Human Rights. Its Article 10 guarantees the right to freedom of expression and information. They can also be non-binding instruments such as recommendations.

Once the standards are developed and adopted, the organization makes them widely known and expects its member states to apply them in practice. Finally, the organization monitors how the member states implement these standards.

This brief introduction brings me to the first case study – the media assistance work done by the Council of Europe’s Media Division in the framework of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe. Between 2000 and 2006, the Stability Pact was extremely active in the field of media – a field which was one of its core priorities. This was a time of wars, of pre-conflict and post-conflict situations so that gave us a lot of food for thought. It demonstrated in a number of cases how things should not be done but also showed a lot of right approaches to follow.

The most important part of the Council of Europe work was to help set in place a proper media regulatory framework and to implement it in line with the organization’s standards. It was not an easy task. Unlike other big projects, it does not require enormous amounts of money. It does, however, consume a lot of effort, a lot of political capital and it is often not smooth.

Let me take, in a very simplified form, one example - Kosovo. Kosovo was at the point where it needed very much adequate media legislation. The first major law waiting to be passed was the law on broadcasting. Unfortunately, it was stalled for a couple of years. The main reason was lack of agreement on a number of issues between international players. One of the sticking points was the differing philosophies of the
European and of the American side on the role and place of public-service broadcasting.

This issue, some sub-issues following from it and different political interests held the process for a rather long time. Then came the point when the main actors realized that there was more at stake. They finally reached an agreement on the basis of the Council of Europe standards. This brought in the process the provisional institutions of self-government in Kosovo and very quickly a very good law was passed. Soon thereafter quite a progressive defamation law was drafted which decriminalized defamation.

In short, cooperation and understanding were among the keys to this success. There is no universal recipe how to achieve this. Sometimes it takes time, sometimes it never happens. In my experience, the cooperation worked not so much as a result of high-level agreements between the actors but mainly due to the successful interaction between dedicated individuals at the operational level, i.e., thanks to peer level contacts.

This, of course, is a tricky approach because it boils down to whether you happen to encounter the right personalities. One cannot offer an algorithm that guarantees success. Still, I believe that we should always do our best to identify and involve the people who can communicate, who can build bridges, and who can cooperate.

In addition to the above-mentioned disagreements among international actors, there could be potential or existing conflicts between the internationals on the one hand and the local players (e.g., governments) on the other hand. The next challenge comes from various conflicts, including political infighting, between local players. These conflicts are often very difficult to resolve. The one thing that can and should be done, however, is to aim for realistic cooperation and possibly consensus between the international actors. This greatly helps to reduce potential conflicts between the international organizations and the local institutions.

If international actors do not agree, we often encounter a phenomenon which we call "forum shopping" for lack of a better term. By this we mean the attempts of local actors to solve their problems by "shopping" for the institution which offers the best terms for them on various individual issues. That should better be avoided.

The Council of Europe can be of great help here. It has developed a wealth of standards and ideas for protecting freedom of expression. These standards, though formally valid only for Europe, have a rather universal value and international players can use them as a source of consensus. Minor differences should be set aside at the point when conflict looms. The Council of Europe standards can serve as an excellent basis for drafting the blueprints for action in preventing or resolving conflicts. This drafting should ideally be done before such action becomes urgently needed.

My second example of excellent cooperation comes from our work aimed at protecting freedom of expression and information in times of crisis. By "crisis" we mean situations such as wars, terrorist attacks, natural disasters, man-made disasters, i.e., situations that threaten freedom of expression.

The objective of this work is to protect and promote freedom of expression and information, not to limit it. Especially after the September 11th attacks, we are witnessing creeping limitations by governments of this freedom. One needs to look no
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further than at the direct censorship during the Iraq war or more recent pressures on journalists to reveal their sources of information, to hand over to authorities their photographs or video records from demonstrations, etc.

Our group of specialists on freedom of expression in times of crisis has been working on these issues since 2005. Among its many tasks is to develop concrete ideas for setting up a network on the rights and responsibilities of media professionals in times of crisis. The network will aim to contribute to the protection of media professionals, to help them to work efficiently, independently and safely in times of crisis. The network will be web-based but would also include direct contacts between people. It will be complemented by a network meant to promote the contribution of media to tolerance, dialogue and understanding. That would ideally contribute to the prevention of conflicts.

In this work, we successfully cooperate with the European Broadcasting Union, the OSCE, the International News Safety Institute, the European Commission, the European Newspaper Publishers Association, Article 19 and other organizations and individuals. This helps a lot because we build the consensual items already into our blueprint and we don't have to argue later when we are on the ground, in the field or we have to take action.

I would like to invite all organizations to cooperate in this work done by the Council of Europe. They can contribute by offering their very precious expert input, their expertise now when preparing the standards. The cooperative product will then be even more useful later in the field when conflict and post-conflict situations arise.

From Hate-Media to Media Against the War
- Jean Reveillon, Secretary General, the European Broadcasting Union

The Public Service Broadcasting feels that each war and each conflict is proof of its failure. If God should issue The Ten Commandments of Public Service Broadcasting, the following seven commandments would certainly be included:
1. Don't forget you represent a community,
2. You need to strengthen this community and help it grow peacefully,
3. You have to give minorities a voice and help the integration of all citizens within your community,
4. Your mission is to develop social awareness and a sense of citizenship,
5. You're there to promote universal values among all your viewers and listeners: peace, tolerance, democracy and the respect of the others above all,
6. You shall serve the public and ensure that no political leaders hamper its interest to live in peace,
7. You've to provide the tools for your citizens to understand, engage and live in peace with their neighbours within the larger communities, in Europe and in the World.

If a violent conflict starts, it is a sign that something in the social contract between the public service broadcaster and its community has gone wrong and that, very likely, the radio and television of that country have not fulfilled their core mission. We, at EBU, are passionately against war, not only because war indicates that public
service broadcasting has failed to fulfil its mission, but also because war and conflict tend to transform media (as well as human beings) into tools of hate.

This is why we are so concerned when a conflict develops. We consider it our mission to help the broadcaster in that country to re-start on a new basis, helping to rebuild the community that the conflict has broken or split, trying to fix and repair the break of trust between the Public Service media and its community..

EBU in the last ten-fifteen years, unfortunately, has been asked to intervene in all big conflicts that took place in Europe. We've been in Bosnia for nearly five years. We've been in Kosovo since 1999 and we're still there. We've been in Palestine and in Lebanon...

But if we consider that the members of EBU are all European, Middle East and Northern Africa broadcasters (with names such as BBC, Deutsche Welle, France Télévision/CFI, RAI, RTVE, Netherland Radio and NOS, RTBF, RTBF, etc., a total of 75 broadcasters in three continents), it is not a surprise that EBU and its members have been asked to help in practically all conflicts happening around the globe.

The Radio and TV Afghanistan has been helped, thanks to DW, RF, BBC, NHK, DR and other members; Iraqi TV journalists and technicians have been trained at RAI, and Télé-liban has been enabled to rebroadcast all over the country thanks to the support of a group of 6 European broadcasters; Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation has been rebuilt 4 times by TF, BBC, NHK and others; many radio stations in Africa have been initiated thanks to the support of RTBF; Deutsche Welle is each year involved in dozens of different countries; and the first radio transmission after the tsunami in Banda Aceh was made possible through the support of Radio Netherland International.

The list could go on forever... because we (the Union as well as its Members) are asked every day to intervene by our national governments, by the European Union, by UNESCO, by UNDPI, by the OSCE, by Stability Pact in the Balkans, and by all kinds of donors and NGOs that are active in the field of media and violent conflicts.

All along these 10-12 years of experience in helping media to avoid escalating violent conflicts, EBU and its members have learned one very important and crucial thing: whatever we do or are ready to do, war and conflicts are so complex that the success of our actions very much depends on what other intervening bodies and partners do in the same area.

Let me explain the concept through some concrete examples. The most recent is the story of the antenna to Télé-liban. The conflict between Hezbollah in Lebanon and Israel led to several Israeli bombings destroying transmission facilities of not only radical voices, but also of the most balanced broadcaster, the PSB Télé-Liban. Members of EBU offered to replace the destroyed antenna, but for practical and financial reasons, it took 9-10 months to do so, while the biased media, some of which are by many defined as "hate media", never stopped their transmissions and recovered very rapidly from damages, thanks to their alternative and very efficient support networks.

Another case was the request for assistance to the Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation before the Lebanon war. Only incidentally, the members of EBU discovered during a meeting that the PBC had sent the same requests for assistance...
to a dozen members of EBU, and that several of them had expressed their willingness to deliver many of the same things, without any coordination or continuity in the action.

Today, there is a general consensus that media can play a significant role in conflict situations by promoting conflict resolution, peace building and reconciliation. I also think that public service broadcasting plays a vital role in promoting reconciliation, peace, law and order and the establishment of a democratic civil society.

After the war in Kosovo in 1999, WBU was mandated by the United Nations mission in Kosovo and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to help in the setting up of Radio Television Kosovo, RTK, as a public service broadcaster. As in other conflict situations, we gave RTK free access to our Eurovision News Exchange, which carries more than 30,000 news items between the European public service broadcasters.

As a final result, the EBU brought to Kosovo the means to broadcast unbiased information by training local media and educating professionals, decision-makers and citizens of the importance of public service values. Today - on the edge of the "mise en place" of the Ahtisaari plan- the results of that work risk being hampered by the fact that local government is trying to put pressure on RTK and more directly control the local public service, profiting from a new audiovisual law. This is for EBU another example of how one can never consider results as permanent and definitively achieved. One’s work in the specific field of assistance to media can be biased or even destroyed by other related fields (legislations, economic conditions, decisions by intergovernmental bodies, etc.) that one is not able to control or to follow properly.

Another example in previous years was the help to build up a Bosnian public service system from the ashes of a local station of the former JRT (Jugoslavian Radio TV). Some of the most talented managers of public service broadcasting (from BBC, SRG-SSR, etc.) have for years helped to start from scratch what today is called RTRBiH on the basis of a mandate coming mainly from European institutions acting in the region as donors. But for the first 3 years, this station had to dispute with donors and compete with OBN, another national broadcasting service transmitted by satellite and financed directly by the US government, following the Dayton agreements. For three years, these two services competed with each other in a market with scarce or non-existing resources, competing for the most talented people and trying to influence new legislation in favour of, respectively, public service broadcasting and a free market approach. OBN later simply disappeared, because the business plan conceived by the Americans never managed to reach the balance of income and expenditures within the set two years in a country that was just coming out of a long and costly war.

I could continue with dozens of cases like these in which even the best intentioned broadcaster has had to prepare itself some time before starting to help, or other cases in which enormous efforts made by one partner have been left unattended without follow-up for months and months. In other cases, results from years of hard work and solidarity have been wiped out in no time by newcomers with huge funds, or projects have stopped simply because international funding has ceased far too early.

But this kind of intervention (on reconstruction of community media) is not the only one broadcasters are committed to in conflict zones. There is another one that for us is equally if not more important, and it is the need of the whole world community to
be informed on the conflicts arising around the world. We are committed to democracy and to bringing independent and unbiased information out of conflict zones anytime and anywhere.

As much as the EBU is committed to addressing freedom of expression, it is also very much concerned about journalist safety. The protection of journalists in conflict zones is crucial to addressing freedom of expression and opinion. Media can give a voice and visibility to people suffering in conflict zones, but by no means must journalists become the victims of their own profession. On many occasions, public service broadcasters have pledged to uphold their responsibility to create conditions in which journalists can do their job safely and to bring to justice those who commit crimes against them.

An increasing number of journalists and media staff risk their lives and are killed in pursuit of their profession every year. According to a report published by the International News Safety Institute in March, over the past ten years, a thousand news media personnel around the world have been killed trying to report the news. That amounts to two deaths a week. Recently we came together with the World Broadcasters Union (WBU) to push for the release of Alan Johnston, the BBC journalist in Gaza who for many weeks was kept as a hostage.

On a political level we campaign with the WBU, the International News Safety Institute and the International Federation of Journalists for a UN Security Council resolution on journalist safety, which was finally adopted on December 24, 2006, after two years of campaigning. This resolution urges states to do their utmost to prevent crimes against journalists and to investigate all crimes committed against media professionals. Not only do we need the support of governments, but we also need the support of international agencies and non-governmental bodies to recognize the importance of media in conflict resolution and to evaluate what we can do together to counter the growing danger faced by journalists and co-workers in conflict situations.

In addition, we are providing safety courses to journalists in order to prepare them to face potential dangers when reporting in unsafe and unpredictable situations, but there is obviously much more to be done by all parties.

The journalists and media people are (among the civilians involved in war or conflicts) the second category at risk, far above the doctors or the NGO representatives.

From the point of view of the Public Service Broadcasting and European Broadcasting Union particularly, we need to ask God to include at least the following amendments, should he formulate Ten Commandments for assistance to media in conflict zones:

1. Don’t forget that a lot can be made before a conflict starts. The role of media and particularly of electronic media could be really crucial in accelerating the de-escalation of a conflict situation.
2. It is better to prevent that to rebuild, and small and focused actions can produce enormous results at much lower costs than is the case after a war.
3. If a conflict starts despite the previous mentioned efforts, there is a need first to find ways of protecting the local journalists and the media which are not “hate-media”;
4. It is equally important to protect the journalists sent to cover the conflict, as they are acting on behalf of the international public, serving the most important value of
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all: the truth.

5. When the violence stops, it is crucial to build or re-build media, as soon as possible, which can help re-establish relationships and reconciliation across conflict borders and help develop national unity and a political leadership accountable to the public. Editorially independent and professional media are crucial for the provision of humanitarian information and the de-escalation of tensions.

6. To have success, highly efficient coordination is necessary between peacekeeping organisations, local embryonic authorities, donors, media and NGOs in the phase immediately following a conflict in order to identify and agree on priorities, assess the level of needed resources, and delegate or share responsibilities for individual tasks in strong local and international partnerships.

These are the reasons why we're so strongly in favour of the creation of a coordinating body among all entities that are keen and ready to intervene in conflict zones (before, during and after). Only a transparent and efficient coordination can maximize the effective results and reduce overlapping and the waste of resources.

Let's hope and work together for the best possible amendments.

Have International Broadcasters a Mission in Conflicts

Christian Gramsch, Programme Director DW-Radio/DW-World:

Our reporting from crisis regions is an important part of Deutsche Welle’s mission. In my opinion, it makes sense to distinguish between different areas of instability. On the one hand, we talk about areas that have been hit by unforeseen events, particularly from natural disasters, happening without any prior warning and requiring fast reaction. One example is the Southeast Asian tsunami in December 2004. On the other hand, we have war and civil war in regions where the provision of information is crucial. We have been experiencing this for some time now in Somalia. Thirdly, there is another category of countries that are more or less unstable with a latent conflict brewing under the surface, waiting to break out. Afghanistan is a good example but also Iraq, with its difficult and unstable situation on the brink of a civil war.

The first point that I would like to talk about is the constructive division of roles between international broadcasters like BBC, Radio France and of course Deutsche Welle on one hand, and with the local media, on the other hand, in areas of instability.

The fundamental and obvious is that every player should perform specific tasks that are his core business. International organizations should not become providers of journalistic information. Broadcasters, on the other hand, should only in an emergency provide direct assistance. Exception to the rule is to help partner stations and to set up radios. Here again, the rules should be that international broadcasters are not logistical companies. The logistics and distribution of equipment has to be undertaken by partners. We, as an international broadcaster, can react by expanding journalistic programs and providing more information for the affected region.

If you look at the aftermath of the tsunami in Southeast Asia as an example, most local broadcasters also re-broadcasted Deutsche Welle and aired all programs when their frequencies were completely destroyed. People had no access to information. They had no information as to when assistance was expected or whom they should approach. We reacted in different ways. On the one hand, we expanded the
broadcasts - especially in the Indonesian office. But we also assisted our co-
broadcasters and with our expertise helped to rebuild several local broadcasting
stations. In addition, we made short-wave receivers available and distributed them
locally. The German Armed Forces and other partners then took charge of the logistics
on the ground. That is a sensible course of cooperation.

In times of crisis and catastrophes, it is helpful at times if local broadcasters that are
still functioning can give us a piggyback. This way, we can be sure the programs can
be made available to the people who probably will become better informed about
developments in the region than from what a local broadcaster can do on its own. We
are always ready and willing to offer this sort of assistance. In war or civil war
situations, it is even more difficult. International broadcaster should expand their
broadcasting in these circumstances and inform the people in the affected regions
independently.

At the end of 2006, for example, we expanded our service for Somalia and Ethiopia.
This program was also made available to local partner radio stations. In an acute
emergency, it ought to be feasible that international broadcasters cooperate in order to
guarantee a regular flow of news coverage throughout the day. Either you broadcast
one after another or offer content while maintaining separate frequencies, but this is
not that easy. Expanding that service costs money that is usually not budgeted for by
the broadcaster. Supplementary financing is necessary. This is where international
organizations enter the scene. The UN could provide a special fund for these
processes, which could be provided fast and without red tape or bureaucracy. A long
application process is an obstacle to block resources of the broadcasting companies.

In political unstable countries and regions, it is more about building up and preserving
democracy and freedom of expression. Deutsche Welle has on several occasions
expanded its Dari and Pashto radio programs for Afghanistan since 2001. In the area
of Kabul, we have FM stations that run in cooperation with the state-run Afghan radio.
In fact, the cooperation has been very close for a considerable length of time. The
television department of Deutsche Welle has set up a program window in 2002 in Dari
and Pashto that was broadcast by RTA. Parallel to this, we trained people to be
responsible for producing the programming as well as technicians. So the team has
been able to produce its own international news since the end of 2006. We did not
just do this in Kabul, but also in Herat, Kunduz, Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif. These
measures were sponsored by the German Foreign Ministry.

Particularly in Afghanistan, practically every large international broadcasting company
is at present offering programs in the country’s languages. The competition is very
tough. Everyone wants their own programs on as many and as good frequencies as
possible. This lack of cooperation cannot be blamed on the broadcasters themselves.
It is more of a political issue, and a political task to achieve as much cooperation as
possible. But as there is not even a common European foreign and security policy, you
are not going to achieve a joint program for European and international broadcasting
companies. Each has to explain their county’s perspective on the issues that are
making it transparent.

Also, the different approaches become obvious. Deutsche Welle operates separately
from the state and is independent in creating programs. But Voice of America is a
different story, not to speak of the psychological units of the US military, which for
propaganda purposes broadcast their programs under the label of journalism.
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If we look at partnerships with local stations our partnerships in areas of instability usually function very well. For example, Deutsche Welle Radio has since September 2005 cooperated with Radio Dijla, one of the first private radio stations to operate in Iraq. We produce a weekly call-in program named “Iraq Today” especially for people aged 15 and 35. The program is aired by radio frequencies owned by Radio Dijla around Baghdad. The program is produced in Bonn and the Iraqis can call a number that is charged as a local call, which is then transferred to Germany and paid for by Deutsche Welle. People can freely express their own opinions from the price of accommodation to their fear of violence and questions about starting a family in the current situation.

The program is a very successful one. It creates a forum with its reports and, at the same time, gives an impression of western points of views and positions. The program is financed by funds from the German Foreign Ministry as well. Again, we have the same rule that the normal budget cannot be extended to allow these programs to be financed by Deutsche Welle. One thing that also functions excellently at Deutsche Welle is partnerships in the field of training. We train journalists at seminars and workshops in Bonn and through internships. These highly qualified people help their country’s broadcasting when they return and they take with them expertise which they pass on to others. The partnerships with local broadcasters can also go as far as the broadcasting stations taking international coverage from our programs. This normally does not function at times of crisis, but functions in the prevention of conflict and in the building of post-conflict stability.

The second question that I would like to deal with very briefly is the cooperation between the international broadcasters, the local media and international organizations. What can I imagine and what would I like to see happening?

Training of journalists is an area where the financial support of international organizations would be very, very useful. International broadcasters could also cooperate in training in regard to issues like democracy or the role of international organizations. In an acute crisis, it is extremely important that the players actually know each other. In this way, strategies can be developed; for example, in reconstruction or for informing people. This discussion at the conference in Bonn was a step in the right direction.

There has to be a clearly assigned contact partner in every institution that is involved. We need a list of telephone number of people we can call in times of crisis to make decisions. There should be financial resources made available for crisis situations. Because only then can enough money be accesses to enable making the first measures. Furthermore, we should agree on the criteria with which we want to proceed. Which demands should a program fulfill in times of crisis? What journalistic expertise is needed on the ground? Who makes sure after a catastrophe or war that there is the necessary technical equipment for running studios and transmissions? Who does the logistics to transport to the region? Who trains people for the tasks needed and who will finance these tasks? All this needs to be decided beforehand.

For example, all technical equipment can be purchased beforehand. Basic studio and transmission equipment can be set aside for deployment during a crisis, and training concepts can be kept on file. That would be an important beginning.

The Benefit from Coordination – also with Donors
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**Mark Whitehouse**, Director of Media Development, IREX

When looking at coordination from a US perspective, I shall stress that I am not representing the US Government, but IREX, which is an independent NGO. My remarks reflect my own views and not necessarily those of IREX. In my work with IREX and work with US government funding I have seen the good and the bad of how the United States coordinates media work. This includes both coordination within the US government - between the many different parts of the US government - as well as US Coordination with US implementers and with other donors and international implementers.

There are four levels of key actors involved in media development – policymakers, donors, implementers, and the local media community. Coordination must involve all levels.

Starting with those who make policy at the governmental level, they are the ones who determine the overarching framework within which media development takes place. These policymakers, at least in the US perspective, are often very separate from the donors, those who are doing the actual assistance work. They therefore create the policy framework, but pass on implementation responsibility to others. So it is very important that they have to be involved in coordination efforts.

Second, it is important to note that the donors in the US include various elements of the State Department and USAID as the largest donor for media development. They are the ones who receive the funding from the US Congress, the ones who develop the programs, and the ones who determine how programs are implemented. Obviously, they are a key player. USAID alone spends tens of millions of dollars a year in media development (as do parts of the State Department). Yet in USAID, there are only one and a half "senior media advisors." Other USAID staff is more broadly democracy and governance specialists – specialists in civil society, elections, etc. For the US, which spends roughly 40 to 50 million dollars a year on media development in dozens of countries, it illustrates the lack of experts involved at the staff level there and, more broadly, that media development is not a fully accepted field within the development community as it frequently is lumped together with civil society and democracy programs writ large.

Thirdly, if you want the programs to be successful, you need experts such as international media NGO’s, international media unions and associations, such as IFJ, as well as independent international experts. These experts need to be engaged in the process.

Finally, the local media community has to be involved in partnerships with the donors and implementers – partnerships at the planning and implementation stages. This level of participation is vital to success. We as outsiders do not fully understand the situation and the context. But also key – we need to ensure our programs are credible and that the local community is buying into what we end up doing.

So, again, those are the four key players: policy makers, donors, experts and local media community. The next question is when should coordination take place? I believe it should be an ongoing issue and should really start at the stage when the foreign policy framework from the US government is being developed – when the US is deciding its approach to dealing with a specific conflict or a specific crisis.
What is the goal of the foreign policy going to be? Is it going to be to support democratization? Or might it support stabilization, which often is at the expense of democratization? Perhaps it will support a particular regime as part of broader foreign policy goals. And in many cases, US foreign policy will be non-intervention in a specific conflict or crisis.

Obviously, developing and implementing policy is ultimately the province of governments. However, NGOs are playing an increasing role in policy advocacy and development. They possess vast expertise and experience that can benefit policymakers. I think that one of the weaknesses in media development has been that the media development community has not played as strong a role in advocating at the policy level in the United States, whereas others who are involved in governance, democracy, or human rights are much more active in advocating at the policy level.

Following on to policy there is the issue of strategy. Once you have determined the policy goal, what is the strategy for getting there? Often, as we know, media is not even part of the strategy. But when it is, it is often seen as an instrument to achieve specific goals rather than an institution or a system in itself that should be strengthened. So I would argue that at this level we need to involve media experts and NGOs and the local community to ensure media is approached in the most effective manner.

Finally, coordination is often most successful at the project level where money is flowing and the strategy has already been determined. At this level, it should really involve those implementing the projects and the local media community. Also, it should still involve, to some extent, policy makers so they understand how a project is moving in support of a larger policy. Also, at the project level policymakers are trying to intervene, unfortunately often compromising the independence of the implementer or of the local media community. So it is important that there be communication to try to avoid that.

Some examples serve to illustrate these issues of coordination. During the period of the Kosovo crisis, strategic coordination focusing on Serbia worked well. In the US, the State Department involved experts from the NGO community - implementers such as IREX, and they involved the local media community. They had regular meetings at the State Department where they actually invited in people outside the State Department to work with them on developing how to support the media during the crisis.

While this may have been somewhat of a rare occurrence in the United States it offers lessons. One reason it worked is that there was coordination within the US government; there was someone effectively in charge of assistance strategies. Some argue that maybe that worked because at that time the US embassy had been evacuated so you got rid of one player, the United States embassy, and the State Department in Washington took things over. But it also gets back to the fact that we should not underestimate the importance of the quality and nature of people involved. The people involved at State wanted to make coordination work.

Importantly there was also good coordination at the project level. It was not perfect or without problems, but people implementing projects for the US and for other donors were communicating fairly well and regularly. There wasn't a lot of duplication, there was pooling of money where needed for emergency support including for things like newsprint, for transmitters, for stations that had their equipment seized or...
vandalized. Information was shared and work plans developed with input from other donors. In sum, the community at the project level was working very well together.

After the overthrow of Milosevic, the coordination continued at the project level. However, at the strategic level it broke down. US policy changed after a friendly government came to power. Implementers and the local media community believed that there was less concern about independent media and more concern about supporting media that were not too critical of the new government. At that point, the role that experts, NGOs and others had in working with the policy and strategic framework started to come to an end – there was disagreement over what policy and strategy should be in the post-Milosevic era.

But in sum, cooperation and coordination was a success. Money was saved because there wasn’t duplication, experts were involved and the local media community was involved. Local media were asked what their opinions were, what they needed, what they wanted - and the US government listened to them and took them at their word.

In some sense, I struggle a little bit with what to use as a bad example. Not necessarily because there are so many examples, but there are a few. I decided to take one that may seem easy - Iraq. It is not an issue of whether or not the US should have invaded Iraq or not, that happened and is the subject of other disagreements. But rather, why didn’t media assistance work out effectively, particularly at the initial stages.

Media professionals and media experts were involved in discussions with the US policy community about post-war Iraq – that wasn’t necessarily the problem. Very often however, they weren’t listened to and their advice was not heard. A lot of things that happened were predicted by those who were trying to have their voices heard. There wasn’t that sense of wanting to listen to media experts’ opinions and to lessons learned from previous conflicts. At the strategic level, again, there was little involvement or little substantive involvement. It was driven largely by the Department of Defense and key players were left out of the process, like USAID and elements of the State Department.

The Department of Defense, which was assuming a larger policy and strategy role in development issues, seemed to proceed with its own views of media development. They really weren’t involving experts and they weren’t involving local media community in discussions. Oftentimes, they weren’t even involving other parts of the US government in discussions. Since that time, things have loosened up as mistakes were made and lessons learned. There have been efforts to try and involve experts more, and the State Department and USAID have taken back control of most elements of democracy and governance strategies.

Interestingly, what this has led to is the US Congress actually getting involved. When they asked for a US Democracy strategy, one was not forthcoming from the administration. They asked which experts and NGOs had been involved and consulted. As such, the most recent supplemental funding bill for Iraq required delivery of a democracy strategy to Congress.

Besides the larger issues in Iraq, the lack of involvement of experts on many levels has led to many mistakes. Over one hundred and fifty million dollars was spent on the Iraqi Media Network (IMN – the state broadcaster) by the US. I am not sure what exactly that has gotten us. While the government put extensive amounts of money
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into IMN, it did not even start any substantive, comprehensive media program for over two years after the invasion of Iraq. In part, mistakes were made because these other elements of the government weren’t consulting experts and learning from previous lessons in Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan where media assistance was an important element from the beginning.

An additional issue in Iraq is that some elements of the US government are pursuing psychological operations, Psy-Ops, as they are called. While Psy-Ops are a frequent and necessary part of warfare, some seem to have been sold as media development rather than as adjuncts to military operations. The issue of planting stories in the Iraqi press has been presented by some as media development.

Obviously, Iraq wouldn’t be a solved situation if they had involved us media professionals or the local media – media is but a small part of the problem – and, I hope, the solution. But I do think a lot less money would have been wasted and a lot more progress would have been made early on, before the security situation deteriorated, if there was a more strategic and informed approach to media development. Now that the US government is doing this, it is against an environment where the security situation is deteriorating and making work difficult.

There are more details and more lessons to be drawn from experiences in Iraq, Serbia, and other post-conflict or conflict environments. But I do want to emphasize that to work with media efficiently and successfully in conflicts and crisis situations, it is necessary to have coordination and cooperation at all levels, from the policy to strategy level, down to the project level, and finally to the local media communities.

Broadcasting again with a Tool Box
Bryan Coombes, Broadcast Director, VT Communications

As a technical company, we are slightly further down the food chain and our role is to make sure that the content that people are producing can reach the audiences effectively and as efficiently as possible. We bridge that gap between the audience and the broadcaster. I think it is really about getting the content to the right place, to the right people at the right time.

In a post-conflict situation, there are a variety of different challenges in terms of local infrastructure, what roads, buildings and communications structure are left and how that are left and how can you harness those and use that. Obviously, the political regime that exists frequently determines issues around the regulatory license issues, which in terms of actually communicating, but also importing equipment, can be difficult.

It is also an important challenge to make sure that there are people available with the necessary skill sets from a technology point of view for deployment in a longer-term scenario within a country.

The key for us in that situation is the state of available power supplies. The first thing to do is to take stock of where we are now with regard to the already mentioned challenges. Part of any needs assessment should be to look at what actually is physically available. I think that also some of the effort in planning is to be very clear in the short term about the objectives; what is the target audience, what are the
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messages certainly, but what are the target audiences and where are they and what is the best way of reaching them?

The early phase would tend to typically be, I guess, shortwave, which is easily deployable very quickly, there are no license implications and you get a big geographical coverage. It can be done fairly quickly and there are an awful lot of shortwave radios out there. There is also a variety of means one should look at to find out what can be done. One has to look at what is available, for sat-phones, and is there any available mobile phone infrastructure, rapid deployment vehicles, and how quickly can they be helicoptered or driven in physically?

If a network is set up of international actors working with media in conflicts and crises, the whole idea of containerization - potentially the radio in a box with a fairly straight-forward laptop and a mixer with a 30 watt FM transmitter - can actually be deployed fairly quickly. The thing that people also need to take stock of is how this content reaches the audience, so people need to think about receivers. I have seen over the years the gradual change in terms of distributing a series of solar powered, single frequency receivers so that people could find out what is the situation, what is happening next, and where is the aid coming from. Again, people are familiar with the idea of being able to ship wind-up radios to be used if there is no power or no battery supplies. Some of the infrastructure is about getting to the audience, some of the infrastructure is also about helping people communicate and plan the assistance.

There is also a need to think about the longer term infrastructure roll-out plans in more stabilized environments following the initial crisis phase. What actually is the exit strategy and is there a plan for people? People need to be aware of what is in the best interest of that country in terms of its longer-term infrastructure. Some of that may be harnessing the old technology and some of that may be looking to harness the newer technology.

To ensure the best use of resources, it is important to think about where the rapid response equipment, the “radio in a box” or the “studio in a box” be redeployed in another part of the world. In summary, I believe that, complementary to other toolboxes, there is a need for a technology tool box that allows bridging that gap quickly, efficiently and effectively in terms of getting those messages and that content to the right audience.

Security, Rapid Impact and Popular Involvement
- Christina Dahlman, Programme Specialist, UNESCO:

The need for visions and better cooperation is something that has been voiced on a number of occasions. Already in 2003, Swedish Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) invited UNESCO to co-organize a small seminar, which was held in Vaxholm, outside Stockholm, to discuss various challenges facing media assistance in tension areas of violent conflict.

The reason for such meetings is that it is an unfortunate fact that media assistance in conflict and transition situations very often become ad-hoc and also highly competitive, thus undermining the very basis for coordination which is planning and information sharing. But we should also recognize that working in an area of conflict and transition poses very specific challenges, as well as extreme working conditions, which also undermine the sought-after cooperation and coordination.
International bodies such as UNESCO and its sister agencies are mandated to act as intermediaries between different civil society partners and the member states to promote successful cooperation and use of international resources. This is also why UNESCO, as the specialized agency mandated to promote freedom of expression and equal access to information, continues to examine how to best serve the link between normative and very difficult practical media assistance in the field.

So building on the recommendations of the meeting in Vaxholm, World Press Freedom Day in 2004, which was celebrated in Belgrade, outlined both policy and structural procedures regarding the protection of freedom of expression and independent media during times of conflict. The Belgrade Declaration, which was the result of the discussions held during the conference on World Press Freedom Day was later endorsed by UNESCO’s 33rd General Conference. This means that the member states of UNESCO reconfirmed their commitment to support media and peace building as well as extend their support for better-coordinated strategies.

Throughout the discussions over the past years, it has been pointed out several times that constructive media assistance aims at enabling popular participation in decision-making and peace building, and requires a blend of approaches that tie together the quick impact of interventions with more long-term capacity-building strategies. However, there seems to be incoherence or at least a gap between the quick-impact imperative to save lives and the way the international community responds to reconstruction and development. And it is clear that if the challenges of transition with countries that undergo these very difficult times are to be met effectively, it is very necessary to build a bridge between the immediate objectives of rapid-response assistance with the longer-term goals of maintaining freedom of expression and developing independent and pluralistic media.

To achieve the outlined goals to fulfill promises of rapid response as well as continuity and long-term commitment, we are best served if we listen to each other and work together, something that the conference in Bonn also was striving to see how we best can do. I would, however, like to stress that the calls for better coordination, which have been called on for many years, to better the linkages between the rapid interventions and the long-term commitments, have not been completely ignored. There is willingness to do better and there are also a number of initiatives in this area that offer platforms and beginnings and even concrete ways to better contribute to these efforts.

In an effort to link peace building, human rights and poverty reduction, the United Nations has developed in-country mechanisms such as the Common Country Assessments and the United Development Assistance Frameworks. These instruments are set up to provide platforms for better coordination and ways to ensure national ownership of the reconstruction and development processes. Under peacekeeping missions, we also have a unified UN team under the coordination of the Special Representative of the Secretary General. And within this UN country team framework, there are concrete examples of where UNDP, UNESCO and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as well as the Department of Public Information have come together in joint projects in order to try to better serve the platform for interaction, but also for civil society partners and NGOs to actually implement concrete activities on the ground.

These planning mechanisms, even though we are talking about intern-governmental bodies, of course, also include strategies on civil society development. I believe it is
very important that the NGOs and civil society partners and international professional organizations should more routinely be invited to actively participate in the planning mechanisms set up in order to ensure that the lessons learned and the experience and knowledge that is out there gets included from the outset of any kind of broad-based or holistic approach to peace building.

We also have to remember that there are still, even though we have these mechanisms on the ground, some very real and specific challenges that need to be addressed if we are to do better in the field of media assistance.

First of all, we should not underestimate the impact of security risks. Iraq is a grim example of a situation when all the planning and coordination in the world cannot change the fact that we (the international community) are not able to be present on the ground in Iraq to the extent needed to ensure real and coordinated efforts together with local partners. It is a very difficult situation, also for the safety of the local partners. Iraq remains the worst killing field in the world when it comes to journalists.

Also, other conflict zones present grave threats, especially to the local media and partners, but also to the international assisting partners. We should also remember that the very nature of post-conflict assistance is often characterized by very tight deadlines and sometimes impossible implementing timeframes. It is not unusual that funding arrives at the outset of actual implementation, leaving almost no space for planning and coordination with either the international partners or, more importantly, the national counterparts.

Another aspect to take into consideration is the shortage of resources and lack of timely funding which also contributes to a faster, more competitive climate among NGOs and also among UN agencies and donors. This, in turn, very often leads to projects and programs reinventing the wheel rather than learning from previous experience and building on achievements that have been made. In worst-case scenarios, old mistakes are also repeated.

So what can be done and what are the possible ways to try to come to terms with these challenges? Well, one example is the response to the recommendations from the UNESCO/Sida meeting in 2003 in Vaxholm that I mentioned previously—a partnership addressing media needs in West Africa. The Partnership for Media and Conflict Prevention in West Africa consists of UN agencies, international professional organizations and regional and local NGOs coming together to try and maximize on the experiences that do exist, and also to try to share information in order to pave the way for more coordination efforts.

A pilot case was then developed in December 2003 when this partnership undertook a joint media-needs assessment in Liberia. The team, which consisted of UNDP, UNESCO, OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs), International Media Support, IFJ (International Federation of Journalists), and several others worked closely with local partners such as the Press Union of Liberia to actually feed into the United Nations assessment a complete picture of the needs on the ground in terms of media in Liberia and what was needed to actually reconstruct it.

Although the funding never really materialized to actually put into place all the issues that were outlined in the needs assessment, one positive aspect that did come out of it was that it did lay the foundation for information sharing among the partners who
participated in the original needs assessment. And it also led to an active pooling of resources. Because of the lack of the major funding, all of the organizations came together with whatever resources they had and actually were able to start implementing different activities. They also had the time and possibility to work closely with local partners, which is essential to work in these areas.

The lessons learned from this initial pilot have also paved the way for other initiatives. Partnerships and consortiums of NGOs have been initiated in Sudan and Nepal and expertise pooled both in terms of better coordinated assistance, and also to count on the strength of numbers when it comes to joint advocacy missions to push for press freedom and freedom of expression principles.

It should not be underestimated that there is a lot of work in keeping this and maintaining these types of partnerships and consortiums. And they do demand a lead organization that is capable, willing and committed to taking on the added workload of actually keeping the information flow going, making sure that everyone is on board and making sure that everybody is heard. I would like to compliment the International Media Support, who throughout the work in Liberia, Sudan and Nepal has actually carried a lot of the workload in keeping the information going and trying to keep the concept of the partnership alive.

Finally, I would also like to stress that UNESCO is, of course, willing to pull its weight in this process and try to better its capacity and ways to further coordination. It is also willing to take on coordinating responsibility as well as join in to support partnerships in new areas to further consolidate the collective knowledge and experience we have in order to move forward.
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CONFERENCE REPORT
CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS

AS ADDENDUMS

1 When we use the term “conflict”, we refer to violent conflict
4 Lund, M. 1996, Preventing Violent Conflicts, Washington DC, United States Institute of Peace
9 RODRIGUEZ, C., 2005. Communication for Peace: Contrasting approaches. Wccd1, Dgroups, world Bank (Personal Communication)
10 Lederach, John Paul, 1997 Building Peace – Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, United States Institute of Peace Press